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ABSTRACT  
 
 This dissertation examines the different but interconnected ways Soviet leaders and 
citizen-soldiers interpreted the Soviet war effort as a masculine endeavor.  At the front, the entry 
of women into the ranks of combatants challenged not only men’s preeminence, but also official 
and popular narratives of a masculine ethic of national defense that stretched back to the Russian 
Revolution.  The chapters of this dissertation explore the ways in which masculine values and 
priorities from the 1930s persisted in the Red Army despite the distinguished service of female 
combatants and divisions among male soldiers, commanders, and propagandists.  Motives and 
actions such as hating and killing, comradeship and revenge, or serving Stalin and using skill, 
appeared as exclusively masculine in frontline culture, in contrast to depictions of vulnerable 
women as non-combatants and passive victims in the civilian realm.  Analyzing Russian archival 
materials, military newspapers, and soldiers’ letters and memoirs, this study investigates the 
interaction and evolution of official and popular notions of soldiers and heroes as masculine 
subjects.  This dissertation argues that divergent official and soldierly masculinities retained a 
common set of values that emphasized women’s non-military nature and non-combatant roles as 
a way to preserve the gendered motivations established at the outset of the war.  In order to 
challenge scholarship that presents catch-all sets of motives that operated throughout the war, 
this study focuses on civilian men’s creative synthesis of influences from front life, soldier-
specific propaganda, and small group combat dynamics into a soldierly identity.  Made up of 
battle-tested fighters, the combat collective emerged as source of masculine affiliation separate 
from the national collective or soldiers’ families.  An examination of rank-and-file narratives, not 
just propaganda, reveals how ordinary soldiers participated in the creation of Red Army practices 
and values in wartime. 
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INTRODUCTION: FIGHTING MEN, SOVIET CULTURE, AND TOTAL WAR 
 
 On the eve of the Second World War, Red Army leaders feared that young men in the 
ranks were insufficiently masculine.  In the middle of the war, they struggled with how 
successfully women combatants fought alongside Red Army men.  In the war’s final months, 
those same leaders worried that their men were too masculine as they rampaged through 
Germany.  Gender shaped the not only the Soviet government’s approaches to mobilization, 
motivation, and morale, but also Red Army soldiers’ subjectivities and sense of duty to 
comrades, family, and country.  This dissertation argues that official and soldierly masculinities 
evolved in relation to one another while retaining a core exclusivity that denied equal status to 
women combatants.  Propaganda directed specifically as soldiers consistently revised narratives 
of masculine heroism that ignored the existence of civilian men altogether.  Fighting men 
expressed masculine subjectivities centered on the elite nature of their combat performance as an 
expression of exceptional skill, dedication, and toughness.  While official and soldiers’ sets of 
values rarely shared a common notion of sacrifice, duty, or even heroism, their mutual emphasis 
on the masculine nature of frontline service persisted as a commonality throughout the war.  
Frontline propaganda appeared responsive to the changing strategic situation, but never managed 
to anticipate major shifts in soldiers’ motives for fighting.  Instead, Red Army fighters, usually 
through indiscipline, contributed to shifts in policy and propaganda during the early, middle, and 
late stages of the war.  A sense of masculine duty to family or bonds with comrades also 
contributed to why Red Army men fought.  However, such loyalties to a local, rather than 
national, collective, also fueled discharge petitions and insubordinate acts.  To support these 
claims, I analyze troops’ letters, petitions, recollections, memoirs, and diaries, as well as official 
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rhetoric and policy that targeted soldiers in newspapers, leaders’ speeches, propaganda 
directives, and military orders. 
The Red Army and total war 
 This study begins in July of 1938, rather than at the start of the German invasion in June 
of 1941.  Examining the Red Army and related civilian training efforts during peacetime and 
small scale conflicts provides an essential frame of reference for understanding wartime changes. 
This border war period provides evidence of not only Soviet expectations and preparations for 
war, but actual reactions and reforms in response to fighting in different borderlands and on 
widely varying scales.  Hundreds of thousands of Red Army troops saw battle in these conflicts, 
and Soviet political and military leaders faced real enemies and real problems that demanded 
difficult decisions in order to deal with a mixed operational record.  Their choices, and soldiers’ 
and young people’s responses to limited war and mobilization, provide critical insights into the 
transition to war in Stalinist society and culture.   
 July of 1938 marks the outbreak of a month of fighting between the Red Army and 
Japanese forces in the Soviet Far East.  Several military-organizational milestones also took 
place in 1938.  The Red Army abolished national units and drafted its first fully multi-ethnic 
conscript cohort.  Officer schools doubled in size and course duration was cut to prepare for 
army expansion.  The remnants of the military purge or Ezhovshchina ended, and Lev Mekhlis, 
Stalin’s hand-picked candidate, took charge of the political administration of the Red Army, or 
PUR.
1
  Taken together, the events of 1938 provide a key starting point for studying the Soviet 
                                                 
1
 On ethnic units, see Susan L. Curran and Dmitry Ponomareff, “Managing the Ethnic Factor in the Russian and 
Soviet Armed Forces: A Historical Overview,” in Ethnic Minorities in the Red Army: Asset or Liability? ed. 
Alexander R. Alexiev et al. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988).  On officer training school numbers and course 
duration and quality, see Roger Reese, The Soviet Military Experience, (New York: Routledge, 2000), 91. For an 
explanation of how military purges shifted from the Red Army leadership to middle-ranking officers and then ended 
entirely, see Roger Reese, Red Commanders (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 121-131. On the 
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Union’s final pre-invasion preparations. The bulk of the dissertation deals with the war years, 
1941 to 1945, and concludes with the final year of fighting that culminated in the conquest of 
Berlin.  
 The Red Army that began to fight border wars in 1938 had been founded in 1918, but 
drew upon a considerable base of Tsarist practices, traditions, and personnel. Small groups of 
mostly urban volunteers and radicalized soldiers formed the nucleus of the new force, which first 
sought to defend the revolution from German aggression, before turning to face White forces in 
the Russian Civil War.  Peasants comprised the vast majority of Red Army soldiers and even 
officers, and former Tsarist non-commissioned officers with acceptable social backgrounds rose 
to command positions.  Communist Party members vigorously debated the nature and even 
existence of an army that could operate in accordance with revolutionary principles.  Issues 
ranging from the legitimacy of rank structure and military discipline to the conscription of youth 
and role of female citizens divided Bolsheviks between those who favored military effectiveness 
and those who valued revolutionary principles.  The primary military reason for the Red Army’s 
victory in the Civil War lay with the superior mobilization and retention of peasant manpower.
2
 
 The post-Civil War Red Army underwent considerable restructuring, and developed out 
of a compromise between a conventional standing army and revolutionary citizens’ militia at the 
Tenth Party Congress in 1921.
3
  Soldiers’ and officers training suffered because military 
effectiveness always coexisted with political objectives, in particular the recruitment of peasant 
cadres who would operate on behalf of the Communist Party after their service terms ended and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Politburo’s appointment of Mekhlis to PUR chief after he served as editor of Pravda for seven years, see Iurii 
Rubitsov, Mekhlis. Ten’ Vozhdia  [Mekhlis. Shadow Leader] (Moscow: Iauza, 2007), 149. 
2
 Red Army success stemmed from a combination of organizational skill, geographic centrality, and a political 
agenda that appeared as the lesser of evils to many peasants. Orlando Figes, “The Red Army and Mass Mobilization 
during the Russian Civil War 1918-1920,” Past and Present, No. 129 (Nov 1990). 
3
 Roger Reese, Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 9. 
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they returned to the countryside.
4
  Red Army leaders collaborated with their German 
counterparts in the 1920s, but proved the more innovative strategic thinkers, with a group 
surrounding Marshall Mikhail Tukhachevskii conceiving of “deep operations” as a means of 
applying new military technology to achieve decisive victory.  The Red Army eventually began 
to mechanize, especially in response to the Manchurian crisis in 1931, and retained priority status 
in industrial planning after the Nazi takeover in Germany in 1933.
5
  Training and staffing 
problems persisted among non-commissioned officers and lieutenants, and morale and discipline 
remained low among mostly peasant conscripts.  Compounding these issues, the Red Army 
suffered a serious blow to its strategic leadership during the purges of 1937-1938.  On the eve of 
new conflicts, the Red Army remained split between pursuing political and security objectives, 
which new reforms addressed tangentially at best.  
 The German invasion of June 1941 began with great initial success, crossing the Dniepr 
River and capturing Minsk, Riga, and Smolensk in less than a month. However, Soviet defenders 
made up for leadership and organizational failures with tenacious resistance, which slowed the 
German advance, achieving particular defensive success on the southwestern front.  German 
forces failed to seize Moscow and Leningrad in 1941, despite capturing a vast expanse of Soviet 
territory, which marked the failure of the German invasion plan, called Operation Barbarossa.  
The Soviet Union began to prepare for total war, having evacuated as much of its industry and 
population as possible, and mobilized vast numbers of new soldiers, including tens of thousands 
of women.   
 The year 1942 began with Soviet offensives to drive the Germans back from Moscow and 
establish strong bridgeheads over the Donets river.  Soviet spring offensives aimed at liberating 
                                                 
4
 Mark von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
5
 David R. Stone, Hammer and Rifle (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000). 
  
5 
 
 
Khar’kov and eastern Ukraine failed completely, and the Germans quickly capitalized by 
launching a large scale offensive in the south at the end of June. After a month of steady German 
advance, Joseph Stalin issued an order, number 227 for the year, to deal with perceived problems 
of morale, division-level leadership, and discipline.  Citing effective German measures of a 
similar kind from the winter campaign, Stalin instituted blocking units and penalty battalions to 
discourage and punish further retreat.  Blocking units consisted of specially selected soldiers, 
often with secret police backgrounds, ordered to detain or kill troops retreating without orders, 
while penalty battalions collected servicemen found guilty of unauthorized retreat or other acts 
of indiscipline.  Penalty battalions often undertook dangerous and even suicidal missions as a 
means of forced combat redemption, but offered a slim chance of return to the regular ranks for 
those who survived.  The phrase ‘not a step back’, which Stalin emphasized as the order’s 
primary message, would epitomize the Soviet Union’s desperate defensive determination. 
 While holding the line on the central and northern sectors, the Germans advanced 
southeast throughout the summer and reached Stalingrad on the Volga river.  After months of 
street fighting, German forces failed to capture the city, and a Red Army counter-offensive 
encircled the attackers and recaptured large swathes of territory by year’s end.   The New Year 
saw Soviet offensives after the capture of Stalingrad fail on all three fronts, but these efforts 
exhausted German forces in the process.  After successfully defending their positions around 
Rzhev, for example, German forces undertook a staged withdrawal to consolidate their defenses 
further west.  Fighting around Kursk brought the first defeat of a German offensive in summer 
campaigning weather, leading to the liberation of much of central Russia and eastern Ukraine 
that fall, culminating in the liberation of Kiev in November.  
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 The mid-point of the war saw women’s and non-Slavic soldiers’ combat roles surge, 
before the liberation of occupied territories provided new reserves of manpower and the 
incorporation of partisan units into the regular forces.  Winter and spring offensives liberated the 
Crimea, southwest Ukraine, and broke the German lines south of Leningrad, driving to 
Novgorod and territory beyond.  Greater supplies of heavy weapons helped balance declining 
Soviet manpower reserves, and more mechanized but undersized Red Army units began to cross 
into foreign territory for the first time in the spring of 1944.  The Red Army marked the third 
anniversary of the German invasion with a massive offensive to liberate Belarus, followed by a 
drive through the western Balkans and north into Hungary.  After a protracted siege of Budapest 
and drive through the Baltic States, the year ended with Soviet territory totally liberated and the 
Germans in full retreat. The winter of 1945 brought final offensives into Germany, Austria, and 
the Czech lands, which culminated in the fall of Berlin, and total victory, in May.  
Claims 
 In a recent article, historian Catherine Merridale poses the question “Did gender matter in 
the Soviet army?” in her title.  This dissertation unequivocally argues that it mattered more than 
the categories of generation, culture, or rank that Merridale posits as having been crucial. 
Appeals to masculine duty had a unifying potential across those categories while marginalizing 
men of any type who failed to perform as combatants.  At the front, official rhetoric and the 
rank-and-file’s expression of soldierly subjectivities employed masculine values and language to 
discuss competing notions of heroism, skill, sacrifice, revenge, and unit cohesion.  Soldiers’ 
responses to military service and soldier specific propaganda were far more complex and 
personal than the categories of support or opposition to Stalinism that historians often use to 
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interpret them.
6
  Instead, this dissertation argues that the relationship between the masculine 
subjectivities of combatants and the heroic ideals and behavioral scripts that appeared in soldier-
specific propaganda was dynamic and interactive.  Each set of gender ideas adapted to the other 
and to changing wartime circumstances, which verifies historian Anna Krylova’s findings that 
Stalinism provided individuals with incomplete model selves to aim to inhabit.
7
  In order to 
challenge scholarship that presents catch-all sets of motives that operated throughout the war, 
this study focuses on civilian men’s creative synthesis of influences from front life, soldier-
specific propaganda, and small group combat dynamics into a soldierly identity.
 8
   
 I argue that soldiers’ ambivalent response to official rhetoric at the front in favor of 
developing relationships with their fellow combatants reveals clear limits to Soviet citizens’ 
drive to affiliate themselves exclusively with the national collective that historian Jochen 
Hellbeck has described among civilians in the 1930s.
9
  Moreover, solders did not await 
propaganda cues, access the integral brutality instilled in them by all aspects of Soviet life, or 
follow the slow, methodical drive of a traditional Russian way of war.
 10 
 The grassroots 
                                                 
6
 Mark von Hagen, “Soviet Soldiers and Officers on the Eve of the German Invasion: Toward a Description of 
Social Psychology and Political Attitudes,” in The People’s War: Responses to World War II in the Soviet Union, 
ed. Robert W. Thurston et al. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000); Robert W Thurston, “Cauldrons of 
Loyalty and Betrayal: Soviet Soldiers’ Behavior, 1941 and 1945,” in The People’s War; Catherine Merridale, 
“Culture, Ideology and Combat in the Red Army, 1939-1945,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 41 no. 2 
(2006). 
7
 Anna Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat: A History of Violence on the Eastern Front (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 24-27. 
8
 Suzanne Ament, “Reflecting Individual and Collective Identities - Songs of World War II,” in Gender and 
National Identity in Twentieth-Century Russian Culture, ed. Helena Goscilo et al. (DeKalb: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 2006); Catherine Merridale, Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945 (New York: 
Picador, 2006), 124-127; Roger Reese, “Motivations to Serve: The Soviet Soldier in the Second World War,” The 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20 no. 2 (2007). 
9
 Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary Under Stalin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2006). 
10
 On the role of propaganda,  Antony Beevor, Stalingrad (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 166-186; on the 
unleashing of the Soviet system’s integral brutality, built up over a quarter century, see Amir Weiner, “Something to 
Die For, a Lot to Kill for,” in The Barbarization of Warfare, ed. George Kassimeris (New York: NYU University 
Press, 2006); on the Russian way of war, Richard Overy, Russia’s war (London: Penguin Books, 1997),  213-216, 
and Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1997), 113-115. 
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development of combat collectives within combat units shaped Red Army frontline culture and 
soldiers’ approaches to violence.  Soldierly subjectivities developed alongside loyalties to these 
groups of combatants who shared frontline hardship and danger.  The values and practices of 
those who survived early engagements shaped the norms of recruits and replacements that joined 
them later.  Survival and success in combat bred a certain level of elitism into combat 
collectives, which manifested itself in exclusion and disdain for non-combatants, risk-averse 
officers, and most women at the front.  Combatant solidarities created loyalties outside the chain 
of command, which were manifest in efforts to cover-up insubordinate or illegal acts ranging 
from petty theft and disobeying orders to rape in the war’s final months.  
 Wartime propaganda and culture are perhaps the most studied non-operational aspect of 
the war, but such studies consistently neglect soldier-specific content.  I challenge the prevailing 
scholarly consensus about the significance of Soviet victory at Stalingrad as a turning point in 
wartime culture.
11
  Rather than dividing the war into a period of “breathing space” followed by 
the return of 1930s “normalcy,” I argue propaganda remained purposeful before Stalingrad and 
flexible afterward.
12
  A close reading of the Red Army newspaper Krasnaia Zvezda [Red Star] 
reveals that official rhetoric aimed a very different message to frontline soldiers than to civilians 
on the home front, and sought to constantly adapt to perceived changes to the military situation 
and soldiers’ apparent morale shifts.  Soldier specific propaganda employed soldier heroes and 
their exploits, whether real or embellished, to provide fighters and political workers with 
                                                 
11
 John Barber, “The Image of Stalin in Soviet Propaganda and Public Opinion during World War 2,” in World War 
2 and the Soviet People, in ed. John Garrard et al. (London: St. Marten’s Press, 1993); Jeffrey Brooks, “Pravda Goes 
to War,” in Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia, ed. Richard Stites (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1995); Krylova, chapter 6; Richard Stites, “Introduction,” in Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia. 
For an early effort to challenge this periodization, see Lisa Kirschenbaum, “Our City, Our Homes, Our Families: 
Local Loyalties and Private Life in Soviet World War II Propaganda,” Slavic Review 59 no. 4 (2000). 
12
 Victoria Bonnell, Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and Stalin (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997), 220-224; Stephen M. Norris, War of Images: Russian Popular Prints, Wartime Culture, and 
National Identity, 1812-1945 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006), 179-185. 
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examples of motives, goals, and expectations that featured masculine qualities and duties.  
Historians Karel Berkhoff and Catherine Merridale have argued that such efforts were part of 
Soviet wartime propaganda’s success in creating a unifying and inspirational narrative.13  I use 
soldiers’ wartime responses to demonstrate how propaganda actually constituted only a partial 
source for soldiers’ understanding of wartime changes, and often provided an unintended basis 
for soldiers to make claims on the state.  
 Overall, soldier-specific propaganda and combat collective-generated frontline culture 
influenced each other.  Their shared masculine perspective provided the greatest source of 
commonality, and both accepted a version of the idea of a masculine ethic of defense with 
origins in the Russian Civil War.
14
  I argue that this mutual influence and common masculinity is 
most apparent in the depiction and treatment of women in the Red Army.  On this point, I 
disagree with Krylova’s otherwise compelling study, which argues that a non-oppositional 
construction of frontline gender identities took place during the war and informed the sense of 
duty Soviet women combatants possessed as a “front generation.”15  I instead seek to 
demonstrate the persistence of old gender ideas surrounding military service in soldier-specific 
propaganda and among male troops, neither of which ever accepted the entry of women into the 
fighting ranks on a large scale.  
 Official and soldierly perspectives interacted as a masculine bloc, modulating and 
responding to developments while preserving combatant status as an elite masculine role.  The 
masculinity of fighting men appeared in contrast to women by omitting any coverage of two 
                                                 
13
 Karel Berkhoff, Motherland in Danger (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 65, 277; Merridale, 
Ivan’s War, 63-65, 229-230. 
14
 On the masculine values of the Russian Civil War see Joshua Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation (DeKalb: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 2002).  For the postwar characterization of that conflict as a masculine endeavor 
in Soviet culture during the 1920s, see Eliot Borenstein, Men without Women (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2001). 
15
 Krylova, 3-4. 
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wartime roles: men outside the military and women combatants who killed the enemy and were 
accepted members of their combat units.  Troops’ combat collectives developed in opposition to 
the women they left at home and engaged through letters, and then greeted women at the front 
with sexual harassment, scorn, or at best pity.  With only nurses, supportive relatives, and 
victims of enemy violence appearing in soldier-specific propaganda, male combatants had few 
reasons to expect or accept that women came to the front with the same motives and capabilities 
as them.  I argue that the masculine bloc preserved an exclusive and hierarchical frontline culture 
across the boundary of official and popular values and norms. 
Theory 
 Much scholarship has examined the role of revolutionary ideology in everyday practice, 
and how Soviet citizens utilized it for self-identification and self-presentation.
16
  Soviet ideology 
could hold genuine appeal for citizens and inspire identity-formation in pursuit of a collectively 
harmonized life.
17
  While the state structured citizens’ interactions with official ideology, 
individuals embraced these definitions of social identity at different times and for various 
reasons.  In analyzing how individuals’ writings interacted with ideology, I also draw from Eric 
Naiman’s approach to “how the ideological text is read and absorbed by its consumers,” in which 
he asserts that such texts “provide a glimpse at the process by which individual subjects were 
shaped and by which official discourse  transformed and was transformed by individual bodies 
and minds.”18   
                                                 
16
 Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); 
Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind. 
17
 Kotkin and Hellbeck diverge on these points, with Hellbeck focusing on how individuals tried to adapt themselves 
to the collective. 
18
 Eric Naiman, “Discourse Made Flesh: Healing and Terror in the Construction of Soviet Subjectivities,” in 
Language and Revolution: Making Modern Political Identities, ed. Igal Halfin (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 
2002), 219. 
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 Historians have given limited attention to the roles gender and extreme wartime 
experiences could play in shaping Soviet subjectivities.  Anna Krylova’s work provides the 
pioneering exception, in which she argues that young women soldiers “actively engaged in the 
construction of their identities and exhibited similarities in their thinking through Stalinist 
[gender] ambiguities.”19  However, it is not only women’s writing that explores the relationships 
between men and women, battle front and home front, and the individual and the state in 
wartime.  To examine the masculine subjectivities of Red Army men based on Krylova’s 
premise, I adapt the approaches employed by historians of British troops’ experiences of total 
war, which is arguably the most developed body of English-language scholarship on soldiers’ 
writings.  I concur with gender historian Michael Roper that soldiers’ writings, not just their 
actions at the front, constitute a site of gender performance, in which the precariousness of 
masculinity at the level of lived experience is apparent.
20
 In particular, Roper demonstrates the 
importance of relationships with comrades and correspondence with family in shaping soldiers’ 
subjectivities.  
  I also engage Roper’s assertion that the incorporation of subjectivity into the study of 
gender restores the importance of personal relationships and emotions, especially in as intense an 
experience as war.
21
  My approach to sources builds on British historian Jessica Meyer’s 
insistence that any analysis of the cultural scripts and lived experiences “which men drew on to 
define their individual identities as soldiers and as men” must rest upon a close reading of a 
                                                 
19
 Krylova, 26. 
20
 Roper draws his understanding of performativity from Judith Butler’s work.  Michael Roper, “Maternal Relations: 
moral manliness and emotional survival in letters home during the First World War,” in Masculinities in Politics 
and War ed. Stefan Dudnik, et al. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 301-302. 
21
 Michael Roper, “Slipping out of View: Subjectivity and Emotion in Gender History,” History Workshop Journal 
59 (Spring 2005): 59-61. 
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variety of types of personal narratives.
22
  Following Meyer and Roper, I focus on the writings of 
Red Army men at the front as a matter of active negotiation between the competing influences of 
official ideology, personal relationships, prewar expectations, and frontline experiences.  The 
outbreak of war and its turbulent strategic developments challenged both official scripts and 
personal views of how men and women fit into distant families, military hierarchies, primary 
groups, and civilian communities. 
 My study draws from several scholars, theories, and histories of masculinity and the 
construction of categories of gender difference. I consider gender identity as a dynamic process, 
performed over time in relation to cultural ideas about “male” and “female” identities.23 Gender 
historian Joan Scott emphasizes the importance of studying how hierarchies of gender are 
constructed or legitimized.
24
  Michael Kimmel’s work highlights how men could make up more 
than ninety percent of the Red Army, and yet they have scarcely been considered as men.
25
 
George Mosse identifies masculinity as central to modern political and national ideologies 
because it represented an ideal of both body and soul.
26
  I also incorporate Kathleen Canning’s 
assertion that studying gender demands the “positing of a reciprocal relationship between 
ideologies and experience of gender that were lived and assigned meaning differently by male 
and female actors.”27  I adapt elements of all these approaches to examine masculinity and 
gender hierarchy within the Red Army’s frontline culture.   
 The sociological masculinities theory of R.W. Connell informs my study of the 
interaction of frontline propaganda and Red Army soldiers’ subjectivities. I combine Connell’s 
                                                 
22
 She treats soldiers’ letters home, diaries, condolence letters, pension petitions, and memoirs as separate narrative 
forms. Jessica Meyer, Men of war: Masculinity and the First World War in Britain (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), 10-13. 
23
 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1999), xv. 
24
 Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 4. 
25
 Michael S. Kimmel, The History of Men (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 5. 
26
 George Mosse, The Image of Man (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 1-5. 
27
 Kathleen Canning, Gender History in Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 62. 
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framework with combat effectiveness theories from military history to understand both the 
connection between different notions of men’s ideal roles in wartime and the relationship 
between men’s and women’s gender roles.  This approach to gender is particularly useful for 
engaging soldiers’ subjectivities amidst the informal hierarchies and inconsistent female 
presence that characterized the Red Army at war.  I seek to engage the role of “social practice” in 
relationships between individuals in forming subjectivities to consider the ways in which 
gendered subjectivities deviated from official norms and models.
28
  Adapting these approaches to 
a wartime context, I examine how individual combatants responded to gendered military-
patriotic official discourse in the reconstruction of their own identities.  Connell’s revised 
formulation of the hierarchical relationship of genders distinguishes between “internal” and 
“external” masculine hegemony: the internal domination over subordinate masculinities that do 
not contribute to the maintenance of patriarchy, which reinforces external domination over the 
“emphasized femininity” defined in contradistinction.29   
 Gender theorist Demetrakis Demetriou, in a revision of Connell’s work, explains that 
such a reformulation of hegemonic masculinity is best understood as the reordering of different 
elements of a “masculine bloc,” rather than a single masculinity constructed in relation to 
femininity alone.
30
  The masculine bloc describes a process of constant hybridization and 
incorporation of “diverse elements from various masculinities that makes the hegemonic bloc 
capable of reconfiguring itself and adapting to the specificities of new historical conjunctures.”31 
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This distinction is particularly useful for understanding Soviet wartime gender dynamics, in 
which official and popular masculinities diverged, interacted, and borrowed from each other, but 
never differed in their assertion of an alternately passive, subordinate, or victimized feminine 
opposite and subordinate to the soldier-hero ideal. 
 By employing a theory of dynamic gender norms and subjectivities, I argue that gender 
ideals and gendered subjectivities changed multiple times during the war.  I identify these 
changes to soldierly masculinity based on relationships with family, other men, other women, 
state officials, military command, as well as soldiers’ sense of duty or reason for living in war. 
This approach differs from scholarship that identifies a single positive soldierly masculinity or 
fixed set of masculinities that operate for the duration of the conflict.
32
 Focusing on gender 
change allows for a thorough examination of the instability that not only war but women’s entry 
into the fighting ranks brought to Soviet gender constructions, as well as the adaptation and 
persistence of masculine values and subjectivities.  
 Identifying such consistent gender change matters because it played a central role in the 
interaction between individuals’ masculine subjectivities and the ideals official rhetoric 
promoted through its soldier heroes.  I consider gender change as part of the process of (re-) 
forming subjectivities at the front and self-shaping in response to experiences of war.  Likewise, 
official ideals and objectives appeared as moving targets throughout the war, which contributed 
to the divergence between official and soldierly masculinities.  Even for the military sub-group 
of the Soviet population, the pace of change in masculine ideals meant that there were multiple 
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scripts for individuals to adopt in any given year of the war, in addition to the competing 
influence of comrades, family, and wartime experiences. 
 A binary gender configuration persisted in frontline culture after women joined the ranks 
of combatants in significant numbers in 1942.  Wartime binaries operated between front and rear, 
soldier and civilian, combatant and auxiliary, and primary group and replacement soldiers, to 
name the most relevant to the Red Army. Several factors help explain this, including how 
women joined the Red Army and how gender binaries operated in Soviet culture outside the 
military. Soviet women first entered the Red Army in 1941 in small numbers as non-combatants, 
such as nurses, medics, doctors, signalers, and in auxiliary services such as cooking and laundry.  
Women first entered ground combat as individual volunteers, usually scattered alone among 
different units on different fronts.  Throughout the war, women concentrated in a few branches 
of arms, especially the infantry specializations of sniper and machine gunner and the celebrated 
military aviation roles of fighter and bomber crews.  As a result, fighting men, especially tankers 
and artillerists, had limited firsthand experience with women combatants.  Rumors and 
stereotypes usually prejudiced the few encounters that took place, leading them to treat women 
as unworthy comrades-in-arms. 
 The larger structure of Soviet men’s reactions can be understood as analogous to the 
dynamics of women’s entry into skilled industrial jobs a decade earlier.  As historian Wendy 
Goldman explains: “Male peasant migrants brought patriarchal and conservative views of 
women into the workplace. They were not alone in their hostility: men at every level of industry 
reacted strongly to the regendering policy. And Soviet women fought back.”33  In the Red Army 
of the early 1940s, patriarchal values were long-established.  Likewise, young women usually 
had higher expectations and better training before pursuing military careers than did those 
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women attempting to secure factory jobs.  In the crisis of the Winter War, women’s first efforts 
to volunteer resulted in token positions, which ran parallel to their sisters’ and mothers’ struggles 
in the workforce: 
Women, however, were rarely admitted into the apprenticeships that opened up 
access to more skilled positions. They worked in “support” or janitorial services – 
cleaning, mopping, loading, and hauling – rather than in production. … Soviet 
labor analysts in the 1920s and 1930s explained women’s concentration at the 
bottom of the industrial hierarchy as a consequence of their family 
responsibilities, poor education, and physical weakness.
34
  
 
Local military committee members’ responses to volunteers, as well as official rhetoric, used 
similar reasoning to justify women’s limited options.  During the Great Patriotic war, after 
women reached the front in numbers, the attitude of men in the ranks and command positions 
played the critical role in preserving a gender binary.   
 Soldiers expressed their view of women’s legitimacy and status relative to men the same 
way Soviet workers had, whereby  
Men in many jobs had difficulty conceiving of women as workmates rather than 
sexual partners, and the atmosphere at work was often tense.  Men frequently 
regarded women’s presence not only as an infringement of their privileges as 
male workers but also as a sexual transgression, and their resentment in turn took 
on a sexualized form. They subjected women to sexual advances and obscenities 
expressly intended to force them off the job.
35
  
 
Fighting men’s prejudices about women soldiers needed no basis in fact or observation to drive 
their behavior, and received minimal challenge or criticism from frontline propaganda.  Male 
troops consistently found some grounds to disqualify women as equal combatants, usually 
sexual, with little concern for double standards or women’s actual capabilities.  Women’s 
expressions of a feminine soldierly subjectivity, or justified pride in their military 
accomplishments could not overcome the prejudice of many of their fellow fighters.  Women’s 
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participation did not preclude a gender binary from operating in the Red Army because too many 
fighting men understood their military service in precisely that way.  Moreover, soldiers and 
frontline propaganda articulated the masculine nature of military duty more thoroughly and 
frequently because of women’s arrival at the front.  Women’s presence also encouraged them to 
adapt in order to preserve their elite status in the hierarchy of contributions to the war effort.   
Methodology and Sources 
 To study Red Army troops’ views and their interaction with official rhetoric, I examine a 
variety of wartime and retrospective soldiers’ writings.  Contemporary sources consist primarily 
of letters, which include a variety of subcategories.  Memoirs and interview recollections 
comprise the retrospective sources.  I use both types in order to maximize the amount of material 
analyzed, and to balance the character of response to front experiences.  Wartime writings 
provide an immediate reaction to developments at the front, and reflect the emotions, sensory 
experiences, and details surrounding events that were only hours or days old.  Postwar 
recollections offer combatants’ perspectives with the benefit of time to make their own 
interpretations, knowledge of the larger sequence of events involved, and a developed sense of 
their own and their comrades’ spectrum of experiences and behavior in wartime.  These different 
attributes allow me to consider a greater number of questions and engage them in greater depth 
than would be possible with either type alone.   
  Letters from the front provide access to the greatest number of soldiers writing to the 
greatest variety of audiences and for the greatest number of reasons.  That is not to say that 
letters constitute an unproblematic source.  Aside from a small number that appear in published 
document collections, letters confiscated by NKVD censors remain classified and absent from 
Russian archives, so the available pool necessarily excludes personal letters with content deemed 
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defeatist or anti-Soviet.  I attempt to deal with this in two ways:  showing the diversity and 
deviations that persist in uncensored letters, and including soldiers’ letters to government 
officials or institutions, which were not archived separately by soldier as was done with personal 
correspondence.
36
   
 Self-censorship represents a further problem with soldiers’ letters.  I attempt to address 
self-censorship by tracking how the same troops broached a new subject after months or years of 
silence to gain a sense of which experiences or reactions were likely relevant earlier but absent 
due to self-censorship, and which were limited to certain phases or fronts of the war.  With such 
shifts or reversals in mind, I consider how soldiers’ refusal to discuss certain topics at certain 
times constitutes part of their expression of masculinity, rather than treat it as a total barrier to 
understanding.
37
  I also reviewed letters for themes in common with my reading of postwar 
memoirs and interviews, in which veterans who opted to share their stories were more likely to 
be forthright about subjects that they seldom addressed in correspondence at the front.  These 
approaches only alleviate the problem of self-censorship, leaving certain opinions permanently 
private.  
 I scrutinized a sample consisting of approximately six thousand soldiers’ letters stored in 
Russian archives.  The number of letters a single soldier produced ranged from 1 to over 900, but 
the average was around five and often a single letter or petition.  The organization of Russian 
archives prohibited the creation of a representative sample of soldiers based on different 
categories because such information was rarely available and the level of detail inconsistent.  
Outright errors in categorization further complicate any effort at organizing a sample letter 
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authors.  As a result, I focused on maximizing the breadth of soldier-letter authors studied.  I 
sought breadth in prewar social categories of education, political affiliation, profession, social 
origin, ethnicity, marital status, and age, as well as military categories including rank, prewar 
training, voluntary or conscripted service, branch of arms (mortars, artillery, armored forces, 
snipers, etc.), fronts, and start date of combat service.  
 Building on this breadth of soldier types and experiences, I adapt Sarah Davies’ approach 
to analyzing Soviet public opinion in Communist Party and secret policy reports or svodki.  
Davies’ method of analyzing popular views in the Stalinist 1930s proceeds from the premise that 
“the obstacles to reaching any reliable quantitative conclusions," make a focus on "typical and 
recurring themes,” as well as the contingency of different views, the most fruitful approach.38  
Accordingly, I opt for a broad focus on the subordinate groups of the military in general, rather 
than one particular rank level or a few social categories because the opinions soldiers expressed 
were not specific to those categories.  I analyze letters for common language and concerns across 
groups while remaining attentive to specific group interests when they appear.  In addition to 
what soldiers write about, I pay particular attention to when they write about them, especially in 
relation to when similar ideas figured prominently in propaganda.   
 This study focuses on soldiers’ views as a particularly valuable element of the Soviet 
population’s responses to the war effort.  Red Army men were at once subject to propaganda and 
surveillance but arguably less susceptible to coercion (since German bullets were just as deadly 
as those of the NKVD and blocking units).  Troops faced the greatest exposure to danger and 
expectations from the state of the unoccupied Soviet population, making their opinions and 
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motivations worthy of examination separately from those of their civilian counterparts.
39
  High 
losses and battlefield promotions based on combat merit brought many men of limited education 
and literacy into the ranks of sergeants and lieutenants, thereby blurring the social distinctions 
between leaders and led in companies and even battalions.  Frontline realities further diminished 
these barriers, since officers of all ranks were expected to act as a personal example for soldiers 
to follow, in battle and non-combat behavior, and shared most of the danger and hardship that 
their men faced. 
 In order to minimize the impact of a particular genre of writing, type of recipient, level of 
state surveillance, or reason for archival preservation on my interpretations, I analyze different 
types of documents, usually archived separately.  These consist of soldiers’ letters and diaries, 
submitted by families and surviving veterans, junior officers’ diaries, submitted at the conclusion 
of their service, petitions to various state and military agencies and leaders, retained by those 
agencies or offices, and letters intended for families and comrades but sent to the state radio 
committee for broadcast, which the committee preserved, whether or not such programs gave 
them voice on-air.
 40
  This approach enables an identification of trends across types of letters so 
that their content cannot be attributed to genre, self-censorship, instrumentalized rhetorical 
appeals, or other such structural factors alone.  
 My approach to memoirs and interview recollections likewise focuses on maximizing the 
breadth of types of veterans considered, based on factors such as prewar social group, communist 
party status, and branch of arms.  I treat memoirs and interviews as rhetorically constructed texts 
and examine them for veterans’ choices in self-representation.  Although postwar texts focus 
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more on military events than those written in wartime, both types involve clear efforts to affiliate 
themselves with some groups and contrast themselves with others, whether fellow soldiers or 
non-combatants, families or officers, men or women.  Postwar sources also tend to focus more 
on combat details and women at the front, likely because the former proved problematic with 
censorship, while the latter would have raised uncomfortable questions from the largely female 
recipients of letters. I engage only post-Soviet material not only to avoid the censorship of 
sensitive topics such as rape or order 227, but also because those Soviet-era memoirs tend to 
provide highly impersonal operational narratives.  Quantitatively, I examined over a hundred and 
twenty soldiers’ memoirs and interviews, which is a much smaller number than the number of 
letters engaged, but postwar sources are consistently much longer than individual wartime texts. 
The memoirs and interviews of Red Army veterans therefore provide a crucial source for the 
rhetorical construction of masculine subjectivities in response to frontline experiences and 
especially the development of wartime relationships. 
 I analyze the interaction between soldiers’ views and official rhetoric by focusing on 
soldier-specific propaganda.  By this I mean the content that political workers and journalists 
produced, in speech and in print, for the specific audience of Red Army personnel.  This 
propaganda narrowly sought to affect the morale, discipline, and motivation of the troops, and 
provided content about the rear or non-military subjects only when it might have a bearing on the 
aforementioned three factors.  Recurring articles even provided direct examples of how political 
workers should use newspapers to agitate among their men.  My concern here is to trace the 
interaction between troops’ and officials’ ideas about soldierly masculinity, and focus on sources 
most relevant to examining contingent propaganda content about soldiers and military facets of 
the war effort.  I consider the different propaganda sources studied to account for many of the 
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differences among existing studies on wartime culture and between those studies and the claims I 
make.
41
  However, I judge military propaganda to be a critical element of wartime culture, and 
more essential than civilian-oriented content to studying the interconnection of soldiers’ culture 
official ideals of military service in wartime.   
 To this end, I analyze content primarily produced by military officers or PUR staff about 
frontline life and combat and intended for frontline soldiers.  The primary source of such soldier-
specific propaganda is the main Red Army newspaper, Krasnaia Zvezda, supplemented by 
smaller frontline newspapers, military orders, and the unpublished speeches of political 
commissars, which reached frontline soldiers most consistently. In fact, as the mass-circulation 
newspaper of the front, Krasnaia Zvezda served as the temporary news source for liberated 
regions in 1943, and received the Communist Party Central Committee’s approval for a 
temporary increase in its circulation numbers for that purpose.
42
  I content that the presumed or 
imagined all-male audience of frontline propaganda increases its value as a source for masculine 
ideals that marginalized non-military aspects of the war effort.  A small amount of official 
rhetoric that I include appeared in front and rear alike, especially Stalin’s and other Soviet 
leaders’ published speeches.  I also favor newspapers and printed propaganda materials over 
visual and auditory forms, such as films, plays, and songs, since studies of these aspects of 
wartime culture have great difficulty approximating how frequently and how widely they 
reached the front.
43
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 I omit the main Soviet newspapers, Pravda, Izvestiia, and Komsomol’skaia Pravda, 
despite other scholars’ use of them in studies of wartime culture.  Including those sources would 
present a different facet of wartime propaganda. These rear newspapers targeted a much more 
diverse audience engaged primarily in the non-combat facets of the Soviet war effort.  
Accordingly, their coverage of the war effort gave considerable space to industrial and 
agricultural production, as well as donation drives and other volunteer work.  Their depiction of 
the war effort, especially that of Komsomol’skaia Pravda, built on prewar coverage of young 
women’s combat skills and civil defense training and presented the successes of women in 
combat with a frequency completely unseen in frontline propaganda.  Though affected by stricter 
discipline and threatened by enemy aerial bombardment, Soviet citizens in the rear were not 
expected to fight and kill the enemy, and the propaganda that targeted them reflected the desired 
outcomes for those more militarized, but still civilian roles.  Front newspapers and soldier 
specific propaganda worked to motivate new and existing soldiers to succeed in combat, and 
therefore demand primary attention in a study of official ideals’ and soldierly subjectivities’ 
interaction.     
 I focus on heroic figures as central to the construction and dissemination of masculine 
ideals to Red Army soldiers.  Heroes are particularly valuable for a study of Soviet masculinities 
because of their larger significance in the creation of “new men” in Soviet culture.  They 
provided a key prewar precedent as examples of qualities and behavior that would inspire 
individual citizens to achieve their own potential, and then as examples of what Stalin’s 
leadership and inspiration could make possible.
44
  In wartime, heroes are perhaps more valuable, 
since they still fulfilled the aforementioned purpose, and appeared continuously due to the 
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official press’ need to provide positive news stories without military success to report and 
paranoia about providing the enemy intelligence through coverage of victories that did occur.
45
  
Scholarship on Soviet culture, with or without a particular focus on gender, has also considered 
heroes to be useful objects of study for understanding policies and values.
46
 
 Further precedents can be found for such an approach in several facets of masculinities 
scholarship.  The work of Graham Dawson on British masculinity has demonstrated how hero 
stories can be analyzed as “a means of imagining alternative forms of masculinity” and 
“possibilities for a masculine self, which men may strive to become more like.”47  Similarly, 
classics scholar Thomas Van Nortwick has demonstrated the importance of literary heroes in the 
conception of ideals of masculinity in ancient Greek culture, which reveal “expressions of 
masculine power” as well as “limitation[s] on masculine agency.”48  Karen Hagemann’s work on 
masculinity and heroism demonstrates the importance of heroic figures in a given national 
culture, since they “were supposed to act as role models for 'average men' and in this way define 
the norms of masculinity to which the state, the military and society aspired.”49  Other scholars 
of masculinity and war or military institutions pay little attention to heroes, but structure their 
studies differently or deal with military contexts or civilian cultures in ways unsuited to a focus 
on heroes. For example, Christina Jarvis’ study of American martial masculinity examines 
depictions of bodies, which relies heavily on visual media that depict anonymous soldier figures 
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or general types, rather than individual heroes.
50
  The work of both Drew Gilpin Faust and 
Michael Roper focus on aspects of military culture, individual correspondence and the culture of 
death and loss respectively, for which a lengthy study of heroes would hold little relevance.
51
  
Similarly, historian of the French military culture Leonard Smith considers soldiers’ obedience at 
the divisional level and their narratives of tragedy and trauma, where heroism, especially in 
official narratives, had a negligible impact.
52
 
Plan of the Narrative 
 Chapter 1 examines the evolution of ideas and practices of Soviet military duty from the 
Russian Civil War and Stalin era in response to actual armed conflict in the late 1930s.  The role 
of military service as a formative masculine experience in relation to men’s life stages receives 
particular attention, alongside reforms that sought to expand military duties beyond the barracks 
in a gendered manner. Chapter 2 explores the focus on devotion to the collective and individual 
sacrifice that appeared in official rhetoric in response to the invasion crisis of June 1941.  It 
simultaneously demonstrates that men’s responses to the invasion revealed a sharply divergent 
notion of what they owed the state without rejecting the idea of a masculine obligation to defend 
the country.  Chapter 3 asserts that violence emerged as the definitive element of ideals of 
soldierly conduct and soldierly subjectivity during the second year of the war.  It also considers 
women’s ambiguous roles at the front in the context of fighting men reorienting their sense of 
self to the reality of the front and expressing stronger ties to their comrades.  Chapter 4 focuses 
on the centrality of revenge as a personal and national motive that appeared as an exclusively 
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masculine prerogative, which contributed to a hierarchy of not only roles, but also nationalities, 
within the war effort.  The chapter also identifies how a revenge culture expressed through burial 
rituals celebrated masculine qualities as necessary to survive the dangers and hardships of life at 
the front.  Chapter 5 presents the war’s final phase of conquest as the culmination of wartime 
cultural developments within official rhetoric and frontline culture.  The drive to capture Berlin 
and conquer the would-be German conquerors appeared as a duty to carry out Stalin’s final 
order, and the Red Army’s misogynistic sexual culture reached its violent apex amidst the 
invasion of enemy lands and violation of foreign women.  
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CHAPTER 1 
SERVING AND WAITING: MEN’S CONFLICTED DUTIES ON THE EVE OF WAR, 1938-1941 
 
 Beginning in the summer of 1938, the Soviet Union’s established systems of civil defense 
training, youth mobilization, and patriotic propaganda quickly lost their relevance as a result of 
dramatic changes in the international situation.  A Japanese border attack in the Soviet Far East 
involved the Red Army in the first in a series of conflicts with foreign militaries.  However, 
lackluster Red Army performance prompted little reform, save the scapegoating and execution of 
Marshall Vasilii Bliukher.  The Winter War with Finland, lasting from November 1939 to March 
1940, revealed Red Army weaknesses that summary executions alone could not remedy.   The 
tactical failures and scale of losses the Red Army suffered against Finnish defenders convinced 
Soviet leaders, including Joseph Stalin, to reorient the military from ideological to operational 
priorities in command structure and training.  Soviet men’s physical and educational suitability 
to be soldiers during the Winter War emerged as a further problem, which preoccupied civilian 
and military leaders until the German invasion fourteen months later.   
 Alongside more technical efforts, the most long-term approach to improving the Red 
Army aimed at refining the draft pool of male youth.  Soviet leaders sought to improve the 
means of strengthening bodies and inspiring patriotism before young men entered the military.  
Given Soviet efforts in these areas over the past decade, successful reform required an 
intensification of military training for civilians alongside a move away from voluntary programs.  
Beginning with mobilization policies during the Finnish War, young women’s role in national 
defense plans appeared more and more as a supporting one, limited to nursing and auxiliary 
services.  Policy and official rhetoric began to transition away from the decades-long effort to 
encourage women to participate in civil defense training and acquire weapon skills, which 
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complemented a heightened focus on male youth.  However, the extra year of military service for 
conscripts and emphasis on men’s patriotic duty conflicted with paternal duties in the family.  
While official rhetoric paid minor attention to this source of conflict, soldiers’ families’ 
quotidian problems of scarcity and hardship invoked an alternative set of loyalties to Red Army 
servicemen across generational lines.  
 This chapter argues that Soviet leaders militarized ideals of masculine subjectivity and 
collective affiliation during the period of border conflict.  An emphasis on masculine duty 
constituted a revision of gender-neutral campaigns and policies to mobilize youth for national 
defense in the 1930s.  In particular, the Komsomol sought to elevate military service to a central 
affiliation and a cultural rite of passage from boyhood into manhood among ambivalent young 
men.  The Winter War prompted a corresponding shift in the mobilization and training of young 
women, which precluded combat roles and resembled the Red Army’s fraternal culture during 
the Russian Civil War.  Men’s assertion of a contradictory, but no less Soviet, paternal duty to 
family soon emerged as the main point of contention to these changes.  The Red Army and 
Komsomol reforms of the border conflict period established a pattern of variance between 
official and soldierly views of masculine subjectivity, in which disputed masculine values and 
affiliations existed alongside unanimity regarding subordinate femininities. These post-Winter 
War changes constituted a significant reaffirmation of military service and national defense as a 
masculine duty rooted in the Red Army’s founding ideals.  
Fighting to be a man 
 The mass-conscript Red Army of 1941 had been refining itself for 23 years, and rested on 
a Tsarist foundation stretching several decades further into the past. From its creation as an 
institution, it pursued two goals in combat training beyond specific military skills: creating a 
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combat-ready body and a fighting ethic.  Masculine values permeated both: strong, healthy, 
tough men’s bodies appeared as aspirational images for youth.  Motivational material stressed 
traditional ideas of courage and honor anchored in the defense of proletarian mothers, wives, and 
sisters as the foundation for victory in the Russian Civil War.
1
  Victory and demobilization 
diminished the urgency of athletic and military training for youth, and when the Komsomol 
absorbed the Universal Military Training organization (Vsevobuch) in 1923, it did not preserve 
its focus on boys nearing draft age.  While some Komsomol youth pursued recreation and 
entertainment, and others criticised NEP-era laxity and loss of wartime discipline, indifference to 
military training opportunities appeared as a common attitude among youth in the 1920s.
2
  The 
formation of conscious and disciplined young men first served the expansion of a productive 
labor force. Physical culture in the 1920s emphasized health, discipline, and collective-
mindedness without stressing military preparation as the primary purpose, although the latter aim 
became more important during the early 1930s.
3
  The collectivist and disciplinary priorities of 
physical culture mirrored Red Army training that promoted ideological education and loyalty as 
much as applied military skills for much of the decade.   
 Soviet men heard speeches about military duty as citizenship by 1938, but the two 
founding elements of that duty, a masculine body and masculine ethic, barely registered as 
priorities.  The public pronouncements of Soviet president Mikhail Kalinin reflected this generic 
appeal to citizenship, and presented military service as only one of many roles the Komsomol 
should promote: “education of the youth in the spirit of Leninism must include not only study but 
also practical activity. There are people of the most varied professions in the Komsomol: 
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scientists, writers, engineers, agronomists, workers and collective farmers, trade union, political 
and administrative workers, Red Army men, flyers, and so on.”  Kalinin borrowed heavily from 
the rhetoric surrounding labor and the inspiration to heroic acts that Stalin’s leadership and 
communist consciousness provided: “heroism as a mass phenomenon is a product of our social 
system... but we also regard it as one of the elements of our country’s defense. I think it 
superfluous to point out that an army that is heroic, other things being equal, stands a better 
chance of winning.”4 Such heroes in civilian life would succeed in national defense because they 
were special products of the Soviet system: “The new Socialist man is in the process of creation 
in our country,” and would possess five distinguishing qualities: love for one’s own people, 
honesty, courage, comradely team spirit, and love for work.
5
  Comments such as these suited 
reflected the prevailing view of military service as something expected of youth, but without any 
urgency.  
 The discussion of such issues within the Red Army showed a similar focus on ideology 
over military readiness.  On the occasion of the All-Union day of Physical Culture, an editorial in 
Krasnaia Zvezda, the newspaper of the Red Army, exhaustively described the military’s 
participation in this civilian summer activity.  The effort to justify physical culture as important 
to soldiers, the editorial could only offer Commissar of Defense Kliment Voroshilov’s qualified 
explanation that “many elements make up the power and strength of the Red Army, in the ranks 
of which physical preparation does not occupy the last place” before noting that the Red Army 
“improves itself through the principles of Marxism-Leninism” in the same paragraph.6  Later in 
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1939, after war had begun in Europe, Krasnaia Zvezda explained how “to fulfill the tasks of the 
Komsomol, all Soviet youth, all young Soviet patriots, must unwaveringly work to raise their 
theoretical and ideological level to master Marxism-Leninism.”7  Such rhetoric appears as grist 
for the mill in the official culture of the Soviet 1930s.  This generic quality created expectations 
for Red Army soldiers, and the young men likely to join their ranks, that they would become a 
“collective combatant,” hardly distinguished from citizens still in the civilian realm.  A soldier 
hero, like his counterpart in labor, might gain inspiration from Communist ideas to perform 
exceptional acts, but few examples of courage under fire were forthcoming, even after the recent 
Soviet victory over Japan at Khalkin Gol. Young men had little that was soldierly, and even less 
that was masculine, to aspire to in military service. 
 Ambivalence about soldiering began to change after forces of the Red Army, drawn only 
from the Leningrad Military District, invaded Finland on 30 November 1939.  Soviet leaders 
expected a swift and relatively bloodless victory, much like the one the Red Army achieved in 
the occupation of eastern Poland two months earlier.  The actual course of the war prompted 
considerable changes in the Red Army, the Komsomol, and the official rhetoric surrounding 
them both.  By the end of December, the Red Army had completely failed to break Finnish 
defenses, and Finnish “motti tactics” led to the annihilation of whole Red Army battalions.  
Alongside a change in leadership and the transfer of massive reinforcements to Finland, the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party sent a secret request to the Komsomol to form five 
volunteer battalions on 11 January.  The stipulated parameters consisted of political suitability, 
decisiveness, bravery, flawless physical health, shooting ability, skiing ability, and a minimum 
age of twenty.
8
  Such demands marked a partial return to the Red Army’s founding masculine 
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ideal in 1918. The Komsomol only considered male volunteers, and directed young women who 
volunteered to do their duty as nurses in Leningrad hospitals.
9
  While limited in scale, the 
volunteer battalions established a new link between the Komsomol and the Red Army, and those 
units’ composition reaffirmed the exclusivity of male military service despite Komsomol 
weapons training for men and women during the preceding decade.  
 National defense remained a male duty in mobilization policy, and received new 
emphasis as a masculine duty in official rhetoric. The profile of a hero pilot explained the source 
of his inspiration as not only Soviet, but paternal guidance: “Stalin is the father of pilots, the 
father of Soviet Aviation,” which inspired “warm, son-like feelings toward the great leader and 
teacher.” Martial heroism derived from Stalin’s tutelage to produce a “son of the Soviet people, a 
son of Stalin” who proved his worth in battle.10  Just as Stakhanovites had been model sons in 
peacetime labor, the soldier hero regained a masculine, more combat-focused persona as a model 
in the context of war.
11
  The next day, a front page article in Krasnaia Zvezda, “Sons of the 
People,” extended the theme of fathers and sons in a different direction.  These sons represented 
the young Soviet generation, which had a duty to fight: “My father is a textile worker, explained 
Peter Fedorovich Kuznetsov, while I alone [in my family] work in the Red Army.”12 Young men 
like Kuznetsov understood their military service as a generational duty, just as the older 
generation fought for the revolution or labored to build socialism, all of which were gendered as 
masculine triumphs.
13
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 However, the actual course of the Winter War and pyrrhic Soviet victory in March raised 
a host of questions about the Red Army’s flaws, including the manliness of its soldiers and 
potential recruits.  A conference of officers and top party officials met for four days in April, and 
the urgent need for military reform resulted in a relatively open discussion, which Stalin himself 
seemingly encouraged. 
14
 While the deliberations often considered the effectiveness of 
weaponry, leadership, and battle tactics, leaders continually focused on soldiers' ability in battle, 
which was a central issue in every session.
15
  The first priority of Red Army training at its 
founding, fashioning tough, masculine bodies out of the limited physical stock of recruits, 
returned as a central concern during the first session on the first day of the meeting.  After a few 
tentative comments on the subject by other officers, Colonel Roslyi, a Hero of the Soviet Union, 
focused his speaking time on the lack of manly soldiers. He criticized his men's physical stature 
to begin: A serious thing came to light in the fighting: our men and commanders are awkward 
and slow. They are poor sportsmen and lose their breath quickly. I think we must pinpoint the 
question of giving more attention to drill training, bayonet practice, and physical exercise in the 
army."
16
  In this short opening statement, Roslyi spread blame for early defeats among drill 
instructors, civilian athletics organizations, and officers setting poor examples. 
 The deficit of masculine bodies among young men to be drafted into the Red Army, and 
failure of Red Army training to improve on that condition went unchallenged.  Colonel Roslyi 
believed more masculine soldiers demanded more masculine young men, since the problem 
extended beyond military performance: "I think the question of making physical culture an 
important school subject must be raised. If a boy cannot swim, if he is a poor runner, if he is 
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cannot last, if he is a poor athlete, no girl will love him [laughter]."
17
  The sexual implications of 
his comments make clear that he linked the demands of soldiering with masculinity more 
broadly.    Without mentioning the Komsomol or The Union of Societies of Assistance to 
Defense and Aviation-Chemical Construction of the USSR (OSOAVIAKhIM), his proposal for 
reform made clear that he sought to integrate the goal of physical prowess and a sense of duty 
into every boy's upbringing before they entered the military:  
 We must create a situation for every young man in our country to deem it his duty to be 
 an athlete, a good skier, a good sportsman. We ought to have young men possessing these 
 qualities. We can hardly achieve all of this solely in the army. Therefore, applied military 
 arts should be taught at school so that our Red Army men will be capable of great 
 endurance. 
18
 
 
Roslyi's proposal called for not only the militarization of at least part of the school curriculum, 
but the cultivation of soldierly qualities, both physical and ethical, in all Soviet boys.  Later, 
Stalin himself pronounced judgment on the importance of training to battle performance: “I 
would like to touch on our troops' training in peacetime. To my mind, our men and commanders 
are poorly exercised in peacetime to endure the hard conditions of war.”  Stalin elaborated by 
drawing upon his experience inspecting units:  
 When we had field exercises, a man would get limp after working hard for three or four 
 hours. Commanders and political instructors would surround him and ask him if he was 
 tired. If the men had walked five or ten kilometers with gas masks on and got tired, the 
 regimental commander would be picked to pieces and then next time he would not load 
 them heavily, that is, would not prepare them for hard war conditions.
19
 
 
Although his assessment obviously carried considerable authority on its own, Stalin reflected the 
opinion of assembled commanders that combat training, not political training, needed to become 
a greater priority in the molding of young men into soldiers. 
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 The deliberations soon bore fruit in a vast series of military reforms, including dramatic 
changes to role of military service in young men’s lives. Both official rhetoric and institutional 
mandates changed after the Winter War and command personnel meeting, with implications far 
beyond the more widely known Timoshenko Reforms within the Red Army.
20
 
The primary structural change at the military level that affected Soviet youth was the extension 
of the term of active military service from two to three years in 1939, which made the 1940 draft 
cohort the first to finish school and consider pre-military training opportunities with three years 
of service in mind.  However, the changes planned for Soviet young men before conscription 
sought to improve their capabilities long before they entered the extra year of military service.  
 Before reforms were drafted and implemented, President Kalinin began to speak on the 
importance of military service in a young man’s development.  With the restriction of military 
service exemptions for educational, religious, or family reasons in 1939, a greater percentage of 
young men graduating from secondary school faced conscription after the Winter War.
21
  During 
a public discussion about heroism with the editorial board of Komsomol’skaia Pravda on the day 
the Winter War ended, Kalinin shared his thoughts on heroism and military service in the lives of 
young men. He presented his view of the proper process of maturation: “According to the law, 
young men finish school, then go to the army…it is better not to marry prior to military service. 
First, it is difficult to leave for three years…Second, once in the army, their outlook on life will 
be firmer. In every relationship he will become a stronger person. Then his choices will be more 
correct, and he can solidly build his life.”22  Military heroism, he explained, “is self-sacrifice, it 
is perhaps, the rejection of life and death in the name of life, in the name of the motherland.  In 
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this is the greatness of a real man. And it is necessary that from this perspective young people 
cultivate a love for military affairs, for heroism.”23  The Soviet president thus presented military 
service as central to a young man’s development.  It was not one career path of many, but a 
transformative period that provided bestowed manhood on the youth who entered, and the 
greatest of men likewise proved themselves through the military.    
 When speaking to young men directly, Kalinin emphasized the importance of military 
service to a greater degree than in his speeches before the Winter War.  In April of 1940, he 
presented Moscow teenagers in the eighth, ninth, and tenth grades with a single path: 
The time has now come when you must determine your future course, when you 
must finally decide what you are going to do. Many of you settle this question in 
too simple a fashion… To be serious in defining your future means to set the 
course for your life's journey, to fashion your character, your convictions, to find 
your calling. Each one of you must reason thus: I am a Soviet man, a citizen of a 
state that is surrounded by enemies, and for which I shall have to fight not less but 
more than past generations did.
 24
 
 
He provided little reason to doubt military service was part of their future, and the importance of 
studying hard: "the overwhelming majority of comrades will be able to enter higher schools after 
finishing their term of military service if they graduate form secondary school with a good 
showing," and then concluded: "From the bottom of my heart I wish this year's tenth graders to 
be good fighters in the ranks of our Red Army and also good students in our higher schools."
25
  
A serious duty to national defense began to replace the notion that heroism could manifest itself 
as an expression of communist zeal. 
 Just as Kalinin’s speeches reflected new priorities, structural reforms in 1940-41 sought 
to address failings in the Komsomol and voluntary organizations’ provision of defense training.  
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The Komsomol’s own mid-year report showed that by the end of June, it had only reached 
10.9% of its planned goal for defense training in 1940.
26
  On 15 November 1940, the “Resolution 
on the organization of military-physical culture preparation of members of the Komsomol” made 
such training mandatory for all members.
27
 The goals of this training included contributing to the 
"physical development of youth and preparing them for socialist labor and defense of the Soviet 
Union," and giving them "a basis of military knowledge and practical skills for [taking] decisive 
action in a combat situation.
28
   
 The first substantial product of the Komsomol’s refocused, mandatory provision of 
defense training came in the form of an all union cross-country ski race on Red Army Day, 23 
February 1941.  The initial radio announcement was remarkably frank about the purpose of the 
event, to “showcase the state of Komsomol military physical training in every primary 
Komsomol organization,” as part of a need to “expand work in skiing and other sports, so that in 
1941, the vast majority of Komsomol members will achieve the state designation ‘Ready for 
Labor and Defense.’”29  Wishing to demonstrate its responsiveness to the post-Winter War 
reforms, the follow-up newspaper article prepared for Pravda and Komsomol’skaia Pravda, 
emphasized two new themes:  It promoted training to fashion a masculine body: “Young people 
of the Soviet Union are well aware that ski training, as well as any other types of physical culture 
and sports, are necessary to harden the body for service in the Red Army.” Echoing Kalinin’s 
comments, the article emphasized military service as a critical stage of life for young men:  “For 
every young man in our country conscription into the Red Army is an event whose memory 
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remains for life.”30  An approving summary of the year’s winter physical culture events in 
Krasnaia Zvezda praised the Komsomol race, and concluded that “races are an excellent 
approach to a man’s physical development. They strengthen the muscles.”31  Although much 
more remained to be done, the Komsomol had shifted focus promoting the masculine ethic, and 
especially the masculine body required for military service.   
 However, in January 1941, Marshall Timoshenko’s report to the Communist Party 
Central Committee on youth training found that over the past year, the Komsomol had failed to 
instill into youth the idea that “To honorably do their duty in war, every Red Army soldier must 
not only be brave and courageous, but also resilient, tenacious, persistent, a great expert on 
military affairs, capable of fulfilling any task, no matter what the hardship.  They [Komsomol 
officials and writers] have weakly presented these high moral qualities of soldiers.”32  
Confirming his impression was an OSOAVIAKhIM report in February of 1941, in which 
membership was high and growing, but the number of members actually completing training 
programs was quite low, less than 10%, in the cases listed.
33
  Timoshenko’s reforms sought to 
provide boys and young men with the training to be heroes, to live up to an ideal as “Stalin’s 
soldier sons,” but this failed to materialize through the efforts of voluntary organizations.  
 A month later, Marshall Timoshenko opted to bypass the Komsomol and voluntary 
organizations entirely, and instead proposed the militarization of the Soviet school curriculum.  
He explained the urgent need for such a drastic step: “the present international situation, bringing 
war directly to the borders of the USSR, makes it imperative to strengthen and radically 
restructure the military-physical and special training of Soviet youth,” and he elaborated on the 
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existence of German, British, and Japanese military training in their respective schools.
34
  To 
solve the Red Army’s problem, he proposed that “military and physical training should be 
mandatory in all schools” beginning with three hours per week in primary school and six hours 
of training mandated per week from the fifth grade through tenth grades.
35
  Based on this 
proposal, Stalin approved a resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars that aimed “to 
educate physically strong, hardy, and disciplined school-age youth, contributing basic knowledge 
and skills in drill, rifle, and medical training” for which “measurement of achievement in 
primary and pre-conscriptions military training will be made on the same basis as other subjects 
and recorded on the certificate or certificates students receive upon finishing school.”36  While 
the German invasion prevented its implementation, the plan to institute universal physical 
training for Soviet youth sought to normalize the transformation of civilian into soldierly bodies 
as a prerequisite for the completion of school and end of adolescence.   
 
 Ambivalence pervaded the reactions of the young men engaging with official rhetoric, 
performing military service, or facing conscription before June 1941.  Many young men, even of 
politically suspect backgrounds, embraced the rationale for military service and the expectations 
surrounding it. A tenth grader in Vitebsk province, Viktor I. Karaban, remembered how near the 
end of the school year in 1941, “we, the boys, as we were completing our high school education, 
were afraid of being condemned by the enlistment commission [as physically unfit to serve]… to 
be condemned was shameful.”37 Another teenager, Dmitrii A. Krutskikh, whose father was 
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repressed as a former Tsarist cavalry officer, remembered how at graduation in 1939, recruits 
“were all promised assignment in the Far East. It was so popular then! The Red Army had just 
gone through [Lake] Khasan and Khalkin-Gol victories!”38  Mukhamet Shayakmetov, a draft-age 
Kazakh teen with relatives that fled to China during collectivization, embraced the idea of 
military service as a rite of passage into manhood: “During their time on active service, young 
men used to change beyond recognition, returning home older-looking, handsome and smart.”39 
Such young men reflected not only the general patriotism official rhetoric and education sought 
to instill, but also the new emphasis on manly bodies needed, and manly maturity provided, by 
the Red Army after 1939.  
 However, other young men proved unresponsive to the official motives for joining the 
Red Army, and instead focused on personal goals and interests.  Some young men nourished 
romantic visions of military service from childhood, without any serious patriotic or ideological 
motivation, as Georgii Minin remembered “I was anxious to be a military man…It was the 
dream of any boy,” while a fleet-watching student in Leningrad, Mikhail Chernomordik, 
dreamed of “the romance of the sea, of a handsome uniform and girls’ eyes upon you; I 
ecstatically looked out on that splendor.”40 While such childhood inspiration moved them to join, 
such motives reflected poorly on patriotic education or propaganda.  Other boys failed to think of 
military service in their futures because career training loomed larger: “My local contemporaries 
didn’t know where to move after they graduated from high school.  The matter wasn’t just to 
leave the village. Everyone wanted to acquire a profession.”41 Corporal Dymbrepov, a Siberian 
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student who left university to serve in the Far East, wrote to his sweetheart (and future wife) on 
Red Army day to sound a dissonant note: “Ania, on this holiday, raise a glass and drink to our 
friendship, to our happy future….I hope that our dreams will be realized.”42  Perspectives such as 
these suggest Soviet authorities had difficulty instilling a collective orientation or initial 
motivation to serve in youth, beyond the legal obligation to do so. 
 Among Red Army troops like Dymbrepov, military service was a tolerable obligation, 
but one in which soldiers failed to conform to a masculine culture or ideal of soldierly 
subjectivity in line with official motives.  An artillerist fighting in Finland, Nikolai Shishkin, 
explained that frontline culture, including political officers, was bound by masculine 
comradeship without ideological content:  
I think that commissars and political deputies worked well. They were men who 
didn’t spare anything, didn’t think of themselves. …they never agitated about the 
‘party of Lenin and Stalin.’ I, for example, never heard them yell ‘for Stalin’ in 
battle; there was a lot of cursing. …Mornings before a battle there were one 
hundred men in the company, and in the evening, twenty, so there were full cans 
of vodka for all. You could drink as much as you liked. I didn’t drink, but the 
guys said [by drinking it] the cold wouldn’t ‘get you.’43 
 
Such an informal frontline community could organically produce comradeship and unit cohesion, 
bonding men around their endurance of shared hardship from the enemy and the elements, rather 
than the larger motives or causes of the conflict.   
 For other soldiers, the absence of official motives and guidance proved more harmful.  
Fighting at Khalkin Gol against Japanese veterans, Anton Iakimenko let felt down by his training 
and his officers’ leadership: “we still had no battle experience. Morally, we were still not 
prepared to kill.  After learning of the unsuccessful start of our battle, the commanders 
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reacted.”44  Some officers seemed to pay as little attention as possible to explaining objectives to 
their troops, and instead focused on their own interests as men.  The diary of Lieutenant 
Matveev, an infantry officer during the invasion of Poland, reveals that he consistently led his 
men in a manner that was manly, but not quite soldierly: “19.9, village of Beniumy – Happily 
saw attractive women. Village of Teretskovshchina, captured. … 24.9, Grodno, a good city with 
a small river. The streets are filled with people, many attractive girls… 29.9, we visited the house 
of two Jewish women, and two more were visiting, so there were four in total, and three of us. 
The whole evening and night went excellently.”45  While Matveev’s womanizing likely counted 
as exploits for some troops, especially among the comrades he brought along, he paid no mind to 
Red Army ideals of dutiful service or heroism.  Units of the Red Army fighting in Finland, 
Mongolia, and Poland exhibited a masculine frontline culture, but struggled to consistently 
inculcate or reinforce a soldierly subjectivity in line with the “Stalin’s soldier son” ideal. 
 After limited success in border wars that began in 1938, Soviet leaders began to revive 
the priorities and rhetoric of the Red Army during its baptism by fire in the Russian Civil War.  
Such changes coincided with a shift away from the ideology-heavy approach of the 1920s and 
1930s, and returned to the Red Army’s more balanced roots, which combined Russian military 
traditions with revolutionary goals.  Soviet boys were the primary targets of such changes, as 
Red Army commanders suggested, in order to prepare them as soldiers before they joined the 
ranks.  This focus on youth was not new, but reforms after the Winter War produced a new level 
of militarization in the Komsomol.  Building on the established rhetoric of Stalin’s fatherly 
guidance of heroic sons in civilian pursuits, the militarization drive cast new expectations and 
programs for youth in strongly gendered terms.  The lack of masculine bodies entering the army, 
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the transition from boyhood through conscription, and the need to train boys more than girls all 
received new attention after years of relying on ideological inspiration and focusing on political 
priorities. Young men approaching or entering the Red Army produced diverse responses to the 
new ideal.  Some were drawn to its more practical priorities and the comradeship of military life, 
but many sought other paths to establishing themselves as men.  The depiction and treatment of 
women only reinforced soldiers’ and leaders’ distinction among soldiers, men, and boys. 
Combining women and war 
 As a counterpart to the militarized norms for male youth, the Soviet government 
promoted a sometimes-contentious ideal of feminine citizenship.  The expectations and 
opportunities for young women in revolutionary and national defense emerged early in the 
Russian Civil War. Alongside issues of militia or standing army as approaches to revolutionary 
defense, women’s role in national defense occupied a central role in Bolshevik debates about 
citizenship in the new Soviet republic.  Female Bolsheviks like Alexandra Kollontai aimed to 
raise women up to the status of equal citizens, and considered some degree of soldiering to be 
critical to women’s claims.  While most women who served in the Civil War were nurses or staff 
workers, an odd compromise emerged around women’s role in national defense going forward: 
women could receive weapon and civil defense training in the Komsomol and Vsevobuch, but 
were not conscripted or allowed to volunteer for Red Army service.  As a result, physical 
education for women stressed health as a prerequisite for optimal fertility: women would 
produce soldiers, rather than become them.
46
 
 Into the 1920s, hygiene campaigns promoted physical culture for women as a means of 
ensuring reproductive health, in contrast to the muscular bodies and leadership roles propaganda 
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promised similarly active men.
47
  The Komsomol emerged as a source of profound problems for 
the Soviet project’s promises of equality and opportunity for women.  Young women found their 
male counterparts unwelcoming, activities and norms irrelevant to them, and no link between the 
Komsomol’s agenda and the problems they faced in everyday life.48  During the 1930s, a greater 
variety of feminine figures emerged within the confines of Stalinist culture, and civil defense 
training opportunities, still open to women, expanded considerably.
49
  While policy allowed only 
young men to serve in the Red Army, the 1930s saw gender-neutral calls for youth to prepare for 
national defense through various institutions.  Weapons training programs for civilian youth 
enabled motivated young women to envision themselves as future defenders of the Soviet Union 
and to develop military skills alongside male schoolmates and coworkers who faced the near-
certainty of military service.
50
  This seemingly contradictory set of policies in the 1930s appears 
as a compromise solution to the early debates between military purists and populists and 
feminists about the nature of national defense in a revolutionary country and women’s roles 
therein.  
 In the military realm, official rhetoric emphasized exclusively passive or traditional 
women’s roles to support the masculine ethic of national defense.  Soviet women appeared in 
Krasnaia Zvezda as the relations of soldiers or officers, and without any role in military affairs or 
defense training.  When articles including women made their rare appearances throughout the 
year, they presented distinctly masculine and feminine patriotic roles. While a son vowed “at the 
first call of the party and state I will go with our native Red Army to crush the enemy,” a mother 
explained “My son serves on the border. He has captured many spies and saboteurs. I am proud 
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of him and joyful.  I am competing with my son. He has become an excellent soldier, and I, his 
mother, am a Stakhanovite.”51  Women appeared as patriotic and productive, but as mother-
workers, distinctly feminine and civilian as good citizens. Later in 1939, the article “True 
daughter of the motherland” profiled the wife of a Soviet commander, who “diligently studies in 
nursing courses, takes an active role in social and mass political work,” including teaching 
children in the barracks kindergarten.
52
  Articles such as these sent a clear message to soldiers: 
women, the mothers and wives of Krasnaia Zvezda’s readers, provided a complementary role as 
patriotic civilian workers and the traditionally feminine role of childcare providers. 
 The single exception to this depiction of women as soldiers’ relatives came in a brief 
article on Soviet pilot Marina M. Raskova.  While Raskova played a pioneering role as a female 
member of the Soviet air force, the article explains her significance as someone who "was able to 
show the world the heroism of Soviet women. Courageous daughter of the great Soviet people, a 
fully educated, cultured woman, she completed a number of brilliant exploits, crowned by the 
heroic, fearless non-stop flight from Moscow to the Far East."  Despite the lavish praise heaped 
upon her, the article is about her nomination to a low-level regional soviet in Moscow, where she 
was “ready to fulfill with honor the orders of the people,” reinforcing her status as a civilian 
figure.
53
  The article includes no mention of her military training, her work as an air force pilot 
instructor, or the fact that she received the military honor Hero of the Soviet Union for the non-
stop flight.  These omissions revised Raskova’s biography to conform to the binary of gendered 
defense that prevailed in soldier-specific propaganda, and reflected the contradictory ideals for 
Soviet youth that prevailed in the 1930s.  Not only did Krasnaia Zvezda focus on civilian women 
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in unambiguously feminine family roles, but it also figuratively disarmed the foremost example 
of a military woman in the Soviet Union.
54
    
 The outbreak of war with Finland on 30 November 1939 proved different from the Red 
Army’s battles against Japan earlier in the year due to its proximity to major cities, extended 
duration, and large personnel demands.  The greater intensity of the conflict revealed the 
gendered reality of national defense obligations for Soviet youth that lay beneath relatively 
gender-neutral language about national duty throughout the 1930s.  A December 4th report from 
the Leningrad city Komsomol to the Komsomol Central Committee described the response of 
young people to news of the outbreak of war with Finland:  
 Every day marked a great desire of the Komsomol and young people to go voluntarily 
 to serve in the Red Army. From the youth of the city of Lenin we received hundreds of 
 applications to District Commissioners to send them to the front, especially the girls, 
 expressing a sincere desire to work as nurses at the front, as well as care for wounded 
 patriots of our motherland in military hospitals.
55
 
 
This report suggests that service in the Red Army meant something completely different for men 
and women, so that the young men's role as fighters needed no mention, while the women's role 
as nurses, at the front or in rear-area hospitals, was mentioned separately.  
 Propaganda content mirrored this secondary place for women's service, so that during the 
periods discussed above, only five articles appeared involving women, and officers' wives and 
nurses were the only roles presented.  A speech by Komsomol Central Committee Secretary 
Mikhailov at an award ceremony emphasized that service as nurses fulfilled young women's duty 
citizens: "The Komsomol Central Committee warmly welcomes the brave patriots of the 
motherland, the wonderful female medical auxiliaries who in the moment of battle with honor 
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and dignity fulfilled their duty to the socialist motherland."
56
  While celebrating women's action 
as a praiseworthy fulfillment of duty, the speech made clear women's subordinate role, exhorting 
them to "be always the brave and courageous battle friends of soldiers and commanders of the 
Red Army and Navy."
57
   While women had a duty to serve and could even receive medals for 
their service, the Komsomol gendered volunteers' military service into separate and differently 
valued roles. 
 After the Winter War ended, Krasnaia Zvezda did not even promote women’s success as 
nurses as the primary female duty in wartime to accompany continued praise of male soldiers 
and their exploits against the Finns and Japanese.  Articles about commanders’ wives who 
became nurses appeared alongside articles about totally civilian commanders’ wives.  In both 
cases, the women exhibited motherly qualities and a soothing presence.  The front page editorial 
in Krasnaia Zvezda on International Women’s Day unambiguously stated: “To be an exemplary 
mother is the sacred obligation of a commander’s wife.”58  Recounting episodes from the Winter 
War, a soldier recalled how he forgot what happened after he was badly wounded, “but the 
memory of her, of the nurse, I will carry with me for the rest of my life, like one carried in their 
heart the memory of their mother… when I called to my mother, she appeared as my mother.”59  
The overlap between commanders’ or soldiers’ female relatives and nurses emphasized the limits 
of women’s role in national defense, as the “Sister” article explained: “When husbands, brothers, 
sons went to the front, these women, by becoming nurses, felt like they were also in the ranks.”60  
Women not only remained feminine while contributing to the limited war effort against Finland, 
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but their participation appeared as contingent on their husbands’ or brothers’ or sons’ combat 
service, not a universal duty.  A narrow focus on feminine support for the Red Army 
complemented the masculine ethic of combat motivation.  While propaganda may not have 
defined soldiers’ expectations regarding women’s roles in wartime, such coverage of the Soviet 
Union’s first declared war did nothing to challenge those expectations.  
 Mobilization and training policies after the Winter War promoted nursing in practical 
terms.  In November 1940, Komsomol and sport committees reported to the Red Army Political 
Administration (PUR) on new training guidelines that reflected military reform priorities to 
lower ages of eligibility for the Ready for Labor and Defense (GTO) norm system, "to allow 1st 
level youth and girls under 16 years old to pass the norms of GTO." A subsequent provision 
sought "to replace the requirements of the training of existing norms system (male) for the 
program of the badge "Voroshilov Shot" with norms of rifle training taken in the KOP [course of 
weapons training] of the Red Army for small-caliber rifles."
61
  Locally, this quickly impacted 
training policies, such as mandatory defense training for working youth preparing for the Ready 
for Labor and Defense (GTO) 1st level badge.  In January, a Ukrainian metal pipe factory’s 
Komsomol organized young workers youth for training: “they were formed into 14 groups: 9 
rifle, containing 108 male Komsomoltsy, two groups of nurses, into which 70 girls have entered,” 
and three mixed-gender signal groups, so that “in military training we involved 393 male 
Komsomoltsy and female Komsomolki.”62  After describing examples of men and women 
participating in the signal training, the report emphasized that "In our rifle groups there are only 
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men training."
63
   Komsomol policy had thus shifted to segregate girls’ training opportunities and 
limit them compared to the more gender-neutral approach of the 1930s. 
 Red Army commanders pressured the Komsomol to make such changes and explained 
their reasoning openly.  According to Major General Tarasov, the Red Army believed that:  
The introduction of mandatory military-physical training of male Komsomoltsy 
constituted a completely essential measure.  They will provide multi-purpose 
mobilized readiness not only of the millions of reserves mobilized from the 
Komsomol, but will also activate and improve the military-physical training of the 
whole mass of the country’s draft-eligible population.64   
 
He elaborated a separate aim, to have "girl-Komsomolki" trained in non-combatant military 
specialties, in order to have them replace men who would then go fight in a crisis situation.
65
   
Such unequivocal reform plans aimed to codify the practices of the Komsomol’s mobilization for 
the Winter War.  Only the feminine role of nurse remained open to women, or rather, it was the 
option open to them, as they bore no obligation to national defense.  This conception of national 
defense as a male duty became law in May 1941, when Stalin and Molotov approved the 
education reforms that brought training into Soviet schools. This new policy stipulated that while 
male and female students would receive the same basic training, male students would receive 
military pre-draft training while female students' training would be "with the military-nursing 
niche."
66
  The duty of youth to defend their motherland, in both rhetoric and policy, grew 
increasingly masculine during the border war period, so that women’s exercise of patriotism was 
ideally done in a feminine way, as nurses.  
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 The Red Army rank and file heaped praise on women that scarcely differed from that of 
official rhetoric.  In fact, hospitalized troops’ letters of praise to military hospitals during the 
Winter War provided the basis for nurses to receive commendations.  One January testimonial 
reported: "As if she were my own mother, she gave all her strength and all her skill into this 
work."
67
  A wounded soldier evacuated to Novgorod praised a woman doctor, Avgustina M. 
Lysenko but without reference to her professional status: “Like a mother, she attentively cares 
for, visits, and serves the wounded, checking to see if they are relaxed, have an appetite, how 
they rested, and attentively monitors cleanliness.”68  Soldiers could thus value women’s motherly 
qualities more than their medical training, and ascribe implausible duties to them to suit the 
purpose.   Some troops actively distinguished between their nurses' qualities and roles and their 
own as soldiers: "Your love and caring has produced in us boundless hatred for the enemy. Your 
love has given rise in our hearts to boundless devotion to our beloved homeland... we will fight 
to the last breath and achieve total victory over the enemy."
69
  The letter sets up a clear contrast 
between women's role to love and provide care, and men's to hate and fight, which essentially 
parallels the Red Army and Komsomol division of citizens’ duties.  Red Army fighters, 
especially during the Winter War, not only accepted women’s exclusion from combat, but also 
help up feminine and motherly qualities as the measure of women’s success in the war effort.  
 Young Soviet women had good reason to expect and learn combat skills in preparation 
for national defense growing up in the 1930s, but Red Army and Communist Party leaders 
denied them that opportunity in the Winter War.  Not expecting a war in June 1941, they also 
made plans to limit those skill training opportunities and began changing official rhetoric about 
combat roles in wartime.  Women’s horizons appeared to be shrinking as a complement to the 
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revival of old Red Army goals of developing a masculine ethic and masculine body among 
recruits.  Young men had been made to expect women’s care and help as nurses, and policy 
changes provided fewer and fewer alternatives for young women interested in military skills 
training.  While the various changes surrounding the Timoshenko reforms had scarcely made an 
impact by June of 1941, they represented a clear step toward realizing an uncomplicated wartime 
feminine ideal already apparent in official rhetoric about motherly nurses and officers’ wives. 
Reconciling men’s duties 
 Soviet men’s own commitment to serve often came second to their personal loyalties as 
family men.  Demands for military service exemptions to suit family needs appeared alongside 
mandatory conscription into the Red Army during the Russia Civil War, and posed a serious 
challenge to Red Army officials.
70
  However, such concerns ran counter to revolutionary 
priorities and the fratriarchal culture of struggle during the Civil War and 1920s.
71
  Replacing 
family with collective loyalty became a goal in the civilian realm and problem for Soviet leaders 
who sought to normalize the demands of military service and promotion of a masculine 
subjectivity that valued collective affiliation.  By the mid-1930s, the family regained prominence 
in official culture, having become a helpmate for the state and symbol of loyalty.  However, the 
family held value only when it served the state, and should be abandoned if it failed to do so, in 
favor of the national family based on political ties, not blood.
72
 
 Despite the fluctuations in Soviet views on the family as an institution, a notion of Soviet 
paternal duty developed by the late 1930s, which appeared in didactic cultural forms as well as 
legal requirements.  In the 1920s, Soviet men had a general obligation to provide an example of 
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socialist behavior, since Soviet propaganda assumed they were more politically conscious than 
women. In the 1930s, that duty received more explicit formulation, as an article explained that 
“A poor husband and father cannot be a good citizen.”73  Propaganda presented various morality 
tales and exhortations on proper behavior at home, such as an article that condemned fathers who 
were “drinking up the milk money” as a reason to foreswear alcohol.74 The “Red Don Juan” 
exemplified a key negative behavior, serial marriage and divorce, which often coincided with 
pregnancy.  Not only propaganda, but reforms to marriage, paternity, and child support laws 
encouraged men to be monogamous, as part of a larger campaign to ensure the stability of 
heterosexual families and maximize procreation.
75
  The sum of paternal duty thus demanded that 
Soviet men instill socialist values in children, provide for material needs, and display strong 
loyalty to the family unit. 
 Soldiering may not have conflicted with paternal duty for bachelors conscripted in their 
late teens, but the call up of reservists and end to exemptions brought husbands and fathers into 
the Red Army in 1939 and 1940.  Having pilloried men who abandoned their families in 
propaganda, Soviet leaders provided only the slightest relief to military families facing forced 
separation.
76
  While military reform protocols after the Winter War included various measures 
related to morale, efforts to minimize the hardship of isolation consisted only of a review of the 
field postal system, which had performed miserably during the Winter War.
77
 The most 
substantial policy change came from the Council of Peoples' Commissars, when it passed two 
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resolutions on soldiers' pensions.
78
  The first dealt with pensions for the families of soldiers 
killed in action, standardizing amounts based on rank and medals awarded.  The second provided 
for those wounded in battle or otherwise injured in service, and promised to transfer their 
pensions to their families in the event of their deaths.
79
  The new policies denied any level of 
family emergency that could affect the status of soldiers spending three years “fulfilling their 
sacred warrior’s obligation in the ranks of the Red Army.”80   Pensions rewarded only completed 
service, disabling wounds, or death, which reinforced the message of official rhetoric that service 
to the national collective superseded personal interests. 
 
 Despite minimal acknowledgement in official rhetoric, Red Army troops, and even young 
men of draft age, felt the contradiction between their obligations to state and family. Expressions 
of concern could possess a positive or negative tone.  Some servicemen sought to aid their 
families from afar by sending money whenever possible, like infantryman Nikolai Pimanenok, 
who sent his family 650 rubles from his occupation post in Latvia, and instructed them that 
"every time you receive money quickly report it me. That's the main thing that I wanted to write 
to you."
81
  In contrast to positive efforts to provide, some troops presented their concern as a fear 
of what would happen in their absence.  An infantryman from Novgorod wrote his wife to 
express concern and pose various questions about her circumstances: “Ira, I am very worried 
about [our son] Vania because you wrote that you cannot care for him always and he caught a 
cold. … how much are you getting [paid] from the factory?”82  Concern for family could 
manifest itself not only in letters home, but also in frontline behavior.  During the battle against 
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the Japanese at Khalkin-Gol, a soldier awoke to hear his comrade, Netrebko, muttering: “I’m not 
going into battle anymore.” When asked to clarify, he repeated: “I’m not going, I said, I’m not 
going. I could die here …at home I have a mother, wife, and son.”83  Netrebko failed his 
comrades, but expressed concerns about neglecting his responsibilities to loved ones that they 
likely shared.  While their duty as soldiers removed such men from their homes, it did not 
diminish their sense of duty to their families, whether they were caring for wives and children or 
parents and siblings.  
 Soldiers did more to express the primacy of their loyalty to family than write letters 
home.  In the first months of 1941, after the Timoshenko and related reforms had begun, but 
before the German invasion of 22 June, Red Army troops sent thousands of petitions to the 
Soviet government.  Those six months provide an invaluable period in which to access soldiers' 
responses to military service and the “collective combatant” soldierly masculinity presented to 
them in propaganda and political work. This value lies in the fact that soldiers did not expect 
immediate and total war, which would certainly change their perspective, and so their opinions 
and priorities reflected the tense peacetime environment in which the official rhetoric promoted 
the “collective combatant.” I argue that the primary response to military service evident in 
soldiers' letters was not the blind enthusiasm of some Komsomoltsy or the outright opposition 
attributed to later deserters, but adherence to a "provider masculinity," which appeared in letters 
to both personal and state recipients.
84
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 In as large a group of men as the Red Army, a variety of secondary perspectives naturally 
existed.
 85
 These perspectives were particularly prevalent among draft-age young men lacking 
familial commitments and driven by a personal motivation to serve.  Such young men viewed the 
prospect of military service with naive visions of glory, such as Vladlen Krasil'nikov, who 
addressed his letter "Dear Grandfather Kalinin," and requested early admission to the Leningrad 
naval school at age 16 to fulfill his childhood dream of defending the motherland.
86
  Similarly, 
A. Chiniaev asked his "grandfather" [Kalinin] for help to get into pilot school, from which he 
had been rejected due to extremely poor vision, because he had wished to be a pilot since 
childhood.
87
  Belief in their military duty motivated others, such as Ukrainian soldier Luk'ian 
Gannits'kii, who wrote to his mother and had to report his promotion to sergeant without greeting 
her,
88
 or Anatolii Avdeev, who wrote Kalinin to request reinstatement into the army after being 
demobilized because "in 1937 [his commander] was arrested as an enemy of the people."
89
  Such 
petitions were few in number and never written by married men or those who had received 
educational or other exemptions from conscription.   
 Having entered the ranks, Red Army soldiers were obviously willing to serve, but few 
accepted the idea that their first duty as men was to their country, rather than their families.  
When such soldiers could not provide for their families through remittances, they sought 
exemptions from service premised solely on familial grounds. Vasilii Balantsev explained that 
his wife had become ill, and as a result he required an exemption to care for her and his 7 young 
children, aged 2 through 11, who were “left without a piece of bread.”90  Another soldier, 
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Nadzhumuddin Agagulov explained that while “serving in the ranks of the Red Army is very 
pleasant and I enjoy it,” the death of both his uncle and mother in October required him to leave 
the army to take care of the remaining ten members of his family.  Without a working-age man 
among them, he requested “permission to go home for the service of [my] family.”91  Such letters 
reflect soldiers' priorities and belief that family duty was a legitimate basis for exemption. 
Moreover, the variety of family situations that young men felt compelled to provide for 
demonstrates the pervasiveness of soldiers' belief in their duty as providers.  Ivan Bezdenezhdnyi 
wrote to Kalinin requesting six months of leave, in order to care for his two young sisters 
because their mother had just died.
92
  Most of these men did not enter the army as fathers, yet felt 
compelled as men to act as providers for their families first, and soldiers second. 
 Soldiers' belief that their familial duty took precedence was especially strong in cases 
where they could make a claim to have done enough for national defense, even if they had not 
fulfilled a their three year draft term.  Both Pavel Andreev and Soltan-Murant Akabaev believed 
that two years of military service was a sufficient fulfillment of duty given that their families 
were suffering because their only working age men were at the front.  Akabaev assessed his two 
years of service simply: "I have repaid my debt to the motherland."
93
  Likewise, soldiers whose 
families had already sent men to the Red Army seemed to consider their duty fulfilled by proxy, 
and therefore deserved exemption to fulfill the more basic duty of provider.  Jr. Sgt. Vasilii 
Gromov began his request with the story of his two brothers' deaths in the Finnish War, the 
second volunteering to avenge the death of the first, and the recent death of his father, a twice-
wounded civil war veteran. The loss of all other men in his family entitled him, Vasilii believed, 
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to special leave to ensure "that my mother is prepared for the winter."
94
  Soldiers’ requests often 
contrasted men’s service with women’s vulnerability, possibly challenging the general notion, if 
not the formal provisions, of official rhetoric about state care for soldiers’ families. 
 Many soldiers, possibly as a strategy to avoid being ignored as cowards or shirkers, 
requested alternatives to service exemption, as long as their continued service allowed their 
families to be provided for.  Azeri soldier Razman Bakhitev's request is indicative of such 
bargaining, as he requested either release from service or material support for his orphaned 
siblings.
95  
Some soldiers, like K. Akumakh and Aleksandr Afanas'ev sought to negotiate a deal, 
in order to gain an exemption in exchange for future wartime service, perhaps expecting another 
mobilization on the scale of Finland.  With elderly mothers and young siblings struggling to earn 
enough to eat, both seemed to consider their duty to be national defense in war, but in peacetime 
his family's care. Hinting at future war, Afanas'ev promised: "My duty to the motherland I can 
repay at any minute if the motherland requires it," while Akumakh stated plainly: in the event of 
war, I am certain, that I will fulfill my duty with honor."
96
  Using these varied strategies, Red 
Army soldiers sought to fulfill their duty to their families above all, leaving no doubt that they 
accepted the legitimacy of their military service obligations, and appear to have been more 
successful than those requesting unqualified release from the military. For these soldiers, like 
others less shrewd in their approach, military duty was a legitimate as long as their families’ 
basic needs were assured.  
 This "provider masculinity" constituted an alternative to the "collective combatant" 
soldierly masculinity, because such men were unwilling to accept national duty above family 
duty, holding the latter as their foremost motivation. As a result, thousands of letters to Soviet 
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authorities requested service exemptions to deal with family problems, and thus showcased 
soldiers' weighting of the relative importance of competing masculine duties, and also the 
entitlements their service merited. Their letters make clear that peacetime service was a 
secondary duty, and when familial hardship or distress arose, their duty as providers, as the only 
men in their families, overrode military service, and they expected the government to 
accommodate them accordingly.  This "provider masculinity" motivated not only fathers and 
husbands, but men in a variety of family situations, including young bachelors, and was thus not 
simply a "fatherly masculinity." Likewise, a specific obligation to provide for their loved ones’ 
material well-being appeared as a universal motivation, as did the unspoken notion that soldiers, 
as the leading men of their family, were chiefly responsible for the remedy, in lieu of state care.  
Taken together, soldiers' views as expressed in letters present military service as a legitimate but 
secondary duty in which men participated as a sacrifice to be honored and rewarded, rather than 
a sacred task to be done enthusiastically.  
Conclusion 
 Soviet reforms after the end of the Winter War reveal a high degree of uncertainty 
concerning how young men and women would be trained and mobilized in preparation for a 
future war, as well as more obvious problems of military leadership, tactics, and equipment.  
Boys and young men became the central focus of reforms to youth preparedness for military 
training and as well as new expectations regarding the role of military service in their lives and 
in relation to their very status as men.  Girls and young women simultaneously lost training 
opportunities and encouragement to prepare for national defense roles beyond the nursing option 
afforded to women volunteers during the winter war.  An assertion of paternal duty as a counter 
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to military duty showed men’s expression of Soviet, but non-conformist subjectivities in the 
military context.  
 Studies of the Timoshenko Reforms usually focus on their brief duration and limited 
depth, or discount them as lacking a serious grasp on the Red Army’s deficiencies and their 
remedy.
97
  The extension of reform into civil defense organizations, the Komsomol, and 
secondary schools, all supported by new propaganda themes, reveals that Soviet leaders, 
Timoshenko foremost among them, planned more than just superficial tinkering in response to 
the Red Army’s poor showing against the Finns.  The reforms directed at civilian military 
preparation are significant because they marked a break from voluntary organizations in favor of 
compulsory society-wide changes to youth culture and education. The corresponding downgrade 
of women’s training marks an important, if short-lived, shift in the gendering of official 
patriotism and national defense roles.  While Soviet teenage girls and young women had 
accessed military training and imagined themselves as defenders in a future war, they were also 
more likely to face parents’ and peers’ discouragement and official images of productive 
civilian-only women for whom military training was totally irrelevant.
98
  The narrow 
mobilization of women volunteers in the Winter War and plans to discontinue women’s future 
civil defense training help explain why Soviet women were not able to immediately volunteer for 
the front when war returned in June 1941.   
 The revival of a masculine ethic of national defense demonstrates the enduring 
significance of the Red Army’s founding ideas, which included gendered notions of citizenship 
and physiological differences in military service capabilities.  These ideas reappeared in the 
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Stalinist context of the Border War Period, but lacked the resonance they once had.  The 
nostalgia for the masculine front community and simplicity of fraternal revolutionary solidarity 
that figured prominently in the 1920s had not persisted into the Soviet Union’s third decade.99  
Soviet men expressed a competing masculine duty to family rooted in Stalinist values from the 
past decade the primary basis of their petitions against military service.  This alternative duty 
represented a choice between conflicted official identities that clearly inverted the official and 
legal hierarchy of male priorities.  Soldiers’ willingness to not only consider but challenge the 
contradictions in official scripts reveals a significant limit to official efforts to reshape men’s 
views of military duty and their affiliations more generally.
100
  Soldiers’ obligation to family 
extended beyond the paternal, and thus included young men who had begun to receive more 
encouragement to see the military as their gateway to manhood.  Men’s petitions, and their 
grounding in families’ material hardship, represent a significant reinterpretation of official scripts 
and their potential to undermine official priorities without expressing overt opposition.   
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CHAPTER 2 
SACRIFICING AND SURVIVING: DIVERGENT REACTIONS TO THE INVASION CRISIS OF 1941 
 
 When Germany and its allies began their surprise attack on 22 June, 1941, the Soviet 
government and its citizens suddenly found themselves fighting a total war unlike that which had 
been predicted and planned for over the past three years.  Virtually all of Soviet society faced 
some type of mobilization for the war effort, which moved people into the military or militarized 
their civilian environment.  However, the Red Army mobilized its forces and sought to motivate 
them using overtly masculine service expectations.  After dismissing the prewar narrative of 
“defeating the enemy on enemy soil” as fantasy in light of German success, Soviet servicemen 
and conscripts faced separation from their families in a radically altered and more dangerous 
context.
1
  Official rhetoric immediately cast the war effort as a collective endeavor, but the 
ostensibly unified struggle to drive out the enemy quickly divided along lines of gender 
regarding how and why individual citizens contributed to victory.  Soviet men expressed 
masculine subjectivities that revealed difficulty adapting to the wartime context despite the 
experience of peacetime service and a steady stream of ideal heroes to emulate. 
 Both frontline propaganda and soldiers used gendered language to discuss attributes, 
roles, and power in the early Soviet war effort.  While many of these issues carried over from 
prewar debates and ambiguities in Soviet culture and military service policies, the German 
invasion created new demands on Soviet citizens and soldiers that invited interpretation as 
distinctly gendered phenomena.  Among the former, the division of front and rear as respectively 
masculine and feminine carried on from depictions of the Russian Civil War and the Winter War.  
                                                 
1
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The more recent concern of family as an alternative source of masculine responsibility also 
persisted.  In early July, a new ideal of self-sacrifice for the cause of national defense emerged in 
response to the German invasion.  Soldier-specific propaganda sought to create virtue out of 
necessity among Red Army units fighting a better-led enemy with the strategic initiative, and 
presented contrasting reports of German invaders killing Soviet women and girls as inspiring 
tragedies.  In the first days of the war, sacrifice and survival emerged as interconnected subjects 
of official and soldierly reactions to the war.  They persisted until the defeat of German forces 
outside Moscow in December stabilized the strategic situation and inspired optimism for rapid 
Soviet victory. 
 This chapter argues that the outbreak of war did not alter the incongruity between official 
and popular expectations of defense duty and soldierly heroism.  In a country as focused on a 
specific vision of war as the Soviet Union had been in the three years leading up to the invasion, 
adapting propaganda and policy to the reality of total war took time, despite the prompt 
promotion of a new ideal of sacrificial heroism.  Citizen soldiers and conscripts who had 
struggled with the demands of peacetime military service likewise adapted their sense of self 
only gradually amidst frontline hardships and combat.  A comparison of official and soldierly 
responses to the invasion shows that servicemen and Soviet officials agreed on men’s duty to 
fight, but retained separate, yet tensely interrelated notions of the importance of individual and 
collective affiliations and priorities. The ideal soldier presented in official rhetoric and his real 
counterparts contemplated the issue of sacrifice and death in combat, but espoused different 
norms of why and how they fought.  Above all, the war created new expectations for Soviet men 
and women to not only contribute to the collective endeavor of national defense, but to kill and 
die for it, and distinguished the manner and meaning of those deaths based on gender.   
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Separating home and front 
 As mobilization got underway, the distinction between front and rear grew in importance 
in official rhetoric and among the underprepared young men entering the expanding ranks of the 
Red Army.   Although massive in scale, the mobilization effort employed the same categories as 
that of the Winter War, in which patriotic women found themselves directed to nursing and 
medical roles, while men of draft age began combat training. Cities and towns quickly emptied 
of young men, and official rhetoric reinforced the idea of the front as where men belonged.  
Soldier specific propaganda emphasized familiar ideas such as Stalin’s leadership over the sons 
of the motherland and the duty of those men to defend Soviet women.  Young men and boys had 
difficulty making the transition to their new role as soldier at war.  Even among those 
comfortable in their uniforms during mundane training and garrison duty, the unfamiliar 
frontline space and experience of combat challenged troops’ views of themselves.  
 The Soviet government pursued nearly universal mobilization for the war effort, but 
exceptions crept in from the very beginning.  The resolution of the Council of People’s 
Commissars (Sovnarkom) on 2 July mandated “that citizens of both sexes – women aged 18 to 
50 and men aged 16 to 60 are required to participate in self-defense groups of the Moscow anti-
aircraft defenses,” but exempted expectant mothers and women with children under age 8.2 The 
minor difference between men’s and women’s obligations only lasted until August, when the 
Sovnarkom ordered  the “increase of military and physical training for members of the senior 
grades of high school,” adding 2-3 hours of training at the expense of boys’ study of literature, 
history, and sciences.
3
 It also ordered medical training for female students.  Then in September, 
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the State Defense Committee, chaired by Stalin, ordered “mandatory military training for male 
citizens of the USSR aged 16-50,”  but stipulated that “in the first rank for military training are 
the draft [cohort] years of 1923 and 1924.”4 These policies conformed to the pre-invasion 
changes in youth military training, and reflected the Red Army’s established character as an all-
male combat force.  One exception to this approach appeared in 1941, when Stalin approved the 
creation of three all-female air regiments during the crisis of October 1941, although the units 
would not see combat until 1942.
5
 
 At the front, official rhetoric presented the Red Army’s objectives in the terms of the 
masculine ethic of the Russian Civil War combined with Stalinist values of 1930s.  On 1 July, 
Krasnaia Zvezda synthesized these two elements in an article about the danger facing Soviet 
citizens, titled “Our thoughts are with you, warrior of the Red Army.”  On the one hand, the 
article warned that “presently the fascists’ cannons are shooting women and children, presently 
millions of people languish in fascist concentration camps.”  On the other, it promised the 
fascists’ destruction, since “Leading us is Stalin, our leader, our father, the greatest genius in the 
world.”6  The duty to defend women and children, and Stalin’s personal leadership of the 
figurative national family suggested that there could be no greater priority.  Days later, other 
articles elaborated on the importance of duty to the nation over the impact on individual families.  
A letter from parents to their six sons at the front reassured them, and by extension, all soldiers 
who left parents behind:  “Don’t worry about us oldsters.  We are working in our home kolkhoz, 
like all collective farmers, and despite the departure of our best, the collective farmers on the 
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frontline in the patriotic war, in defense of the motherland, we will handle our farming.”7  These 
articles were typical of a propaganda narrative that promoted military duty as a masculine need 
to defend women, children, and the elderly, and an obligation expected of individual families for 
the sake of the national family. 
 Despite the multi-generational recruitment of men born from 1890 to 1924, leaders linked 
military service with achieving manhood.  As the German invader advanced toward Moscow, 
Stalin’s Red October anniversary speech explained that “New Soviet men… are being and 
already have been forged in the fire of the patriotic war and will soon be the terror of the German 
army.”8  Fulfilling one’s duty and fighting made a boy a man, as Soviet President Mikhail 
Kalinin reiterated to an audience of Komsomol youth leaders a week later: 
Imagine, a twenty-year-old lad leads a group of men for a distance of fifty kilometers in 
the rear of the Germans. Five months ago, he was an ordinary youth…but in five months, 
he has changed into a fighter, into a people’s avenger. You see how quickly youth in our 
time become fighters, men. In peacetime, this would take years. For those Komsomol 
members who are at the front, youth is already past, they have become fighters.
9
 
 
These speeches, addressed to the whole country and leading youth activists engaged in the war 
effort in the rear, explicitly linked manhood to fighting, presenting successful performance as a 
fighter as the only prerequisite to manhood.  Neither mentioned the war’s impact on women, or 
the multitude of young men who would die without enjoying their new status.  Instead, both 
speeches linked being a man with being a soldier, and emphasized the soldier as an exceptionally 
masculine figure, which contrasted the implied immaturity of young men remaining in the rear.   
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 Women’s roles received more coverage than they had before the German invasion, and 
soldier specific propaganda presented them as fixtures of the rear.  As if to pre-empt soldiers’ 
concern for their families, newspapers explained the material aid their families could receive, 
including free childcare and a monthly 150 ruble allowance.  Accompanying the promotion of 
such measures were unidentified “wives saying: Let our husbands bravely fight at the front, and 
we will with all our strength help them here.”10 Other articles gave voice to women on the home 
front reminding soldiers: “Red Army fighter! We are with you.”11 On October 14, “We are 
marching to meet the enemy!” depicted contrasting masculine and feminine images of soldiers 
marching “with the sun shining on bayonets, rifles, helmets…” while “…a girl threw flowers to 
them.” After describing how well they marched, the article continued:  “There goes a soldier. His 
wife is next to him. In her hands, [their] little boy.”12  Propaganda thus lauded families that 
divided in ways that best suited the war effort, and that meant women remaining in the rear.  
Men could depart for the front without worry because the state would see to their families’ care.   
 Only a few other women’s roles received recognition in Krasnaia Zvezda in the war’s 
opening months. Like the supportive soldier’s wife, articles about women juxtaposed how 
patriotic men and patriotic women best contributed to the war effort.  On 11 July, Krasnaia 
Zvezda ran a full page of letters to soldiers, and categorized them by family relationship.  
Mothers, wives, sisters and girlfriends sent letters from the rear, alongside one letter between 
brothers at the front and a pair by elderly fathers who were Red Army veterans.
13
  Women 
usually received credit for their contributions alongside their male combatant relatives.  An 
article titled “Let our blood help wounded soldiers,” a young woman explained that “Three of 
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my brothers are at the front… and I want to be useful to the front. Take me as a donor.”14 On 
September 26 and 28, two articles about besieged Odessa reported that artillery Captain 
Denninburg had “at the front three brothers, and a sister nursing at the front,” while bread-
factory Stakhanovite M. P. Kokun’ had two exemplary children: “her son Grigorii defends his 
native Odessa, [and] her daughter Aleksandra volunteered to be a nurse.”15  All focused on the 
war effort rather than personal sentiments, and family relationships only served as a convenient 
structure for contrasting roles.  
 While such portrayals of women’s contributions might boost soldiers’ morale by showing 
their fellow citizens’ dedication to their struggle, they also affirmed the masculine ethic of Red 
Army soldiers’ fundamental motivation consisting of the defense of women and their honor.  In 
the frontline press, such articles continued to rely on juxtaposition, as with the article “In a 
military hospital.”  Among wounded men, there is much camaraderie, even at night, “at that hour 
even those on cots weren’t sleeping. ‘What division are you from?’ a soldier whispers to the 
arriving ‘veterans’. And just then news reaches them from the other floor, that ‘neighbors’ have 
arrived from [fighting near] Elna or Iartsev.” In contrast, the only female patient mentioned, 
medic Nadia Illarionova, appeared in a drastically different state: “Not long after she began 
taking the wounded from the field of battle, she blew herself up on a German landmine and there 
quietly she lays in the family of fighters, never again to retrieve them from battle,” and unable to 
feed herself.
16
  The manageable wounds and vigorous state of the hospital’s men only served to 
emphasize the seriousness of Illarionova’s condition, and representatively, of the war’s impact 
on Soviet women generally.  Depictions of women like Illarionova emphasized both the need to 
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defend women from becoming victims of the enemy and how ill-suited they were to the dangers 
of the front.   
 Leaders’ speeches provided more stark portrayals of women as victims than typically 
appeared in the press.  In August, President Kalinin explained how the Germans “rape and kill 
our women and girls, in every case without cause” as one of the reasons to liberate Ukraine and 
Belarus,  and in November, Leningrad Party Leader A. A. Zhdanov told soldiers fighting to 
break the siege that fascists “rape our women and force them into brothels.”17  Although 
discussed less openly, the specter of rape directly invoked the issue of women’s honor, and 
added an extra dimension to men’s duty.  The portrayal of women in soldier-specific 
propaganda, victim and helper alike, presented the war effort as a struggle with distinctly 
masculine and feminine contributions to be made at the front and in the rear. While articles 
hinted at the variety of women’s contributions to the war effort, even at the front, they focused 
on women in long-established feminine roles, and depicted them as victims of the war as much 
as active participants, without any of the heroism attributed to male soldiers. 
 
 Among soldiers and military-age men, the distinction between front and rear operated in 
a very similar way.  When the German invasion began, Soviet teens who had not yet begun 
military service faced distinct questions because they could choose between volunteering and 
waiting for a mobilization order from the military committee later in the year.  A young man 
with a draft-exempt mining job explained his decision-making process: “what would I be saying 
when the war is over? That the rear also needed able men, especially in the mines, to work for 
the nation’s defense? This is true. But you can’t explain this to everyone; convince everyone. 
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Even girls are summoned to the front. But I wanted to live so much!”18  The apparent incongruity 
of an able-bodied young man remaining in the rear, especially if some girls lacked that option, 
seemed to prevail over other considerations.  A recent university graduate, married but without 
children, felt the impact of leaving the rear in a different way: “It seemed pointless to sleep on 
the floor in the school when I could go home and see my wife off to the evacuation, and carry 
her trunk to the assembly point … It was our final moment together and we both understood it 
might be for good.  At that moment I felt the war more keenly than when I was issued with a 
rifle.”19  Leaving home, family, and civilian life provide a dramatic break for young men 
volunteering for combat. Moving toward the enemy and danger appeared to be their role in the 
war, while women stayed behind or moved farther away.   
 Young men felt strong social pressures to volunteer after the first days of war had past.  
Such pressures came in a variety of forms, including simple scorn from elderly citizens, as two 
recruits told their comrades after leaving Leningrad for training: “it had been impossible to walk 
the streets, as every person they encountered had been indignant over the fact that two healthy 
students were not in the army.”20  Their age, gender, and bodily integrity alone made them 
targets, and neither official justification nor their explanations of imminent departure for service 
were likely to satisfy civilian critics.  Even full knowledge of an official exemption did not stop 
criticism for some: “I had an education waiver until the completion of my technical training.  
Sometimes I could hear people around me saying ‘He’s paid them all off! Look at him walking 
around like such a smart aleck!’ Their words shamed me.”21  The range of criticism and social 
pressure extended into military training, where crude jokes were common forms of motivation: 
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“Keep your heads, noses, and checks up! Look at the girls looking at you! Their smiles say that 
they would not open their legs to you, but would at least think about it!”22  The training officer’s 
comment suggested that young men also could look forward to a positive impact on social status 
for serving at the front.  Such comments, whatever their impact on their recipients, conveyed to 
young men that their place was at the front alone, with the usually implicit corollary message 
that only women, children, and the elderly had a right to remain in the rear.  
 The rear appeared as an unambiguously feminine realm for those young men who 
remained after the first weeks of war, when the bulk of draftees, reservists, and volunteers had 
been dispatched to the front or training areas. A teenage boy, finally accepted into the Red Army 
underage in 1943, found himself among the women and children who greeted soldiers at the 
station as their train stopped:  “Some stout older women, and we teenagers, brought buckets full 
of water to the soldiers, and many peasant girls gave them eggs, milk, bread, tobacco – wiping 
away tears.”23 Recruits marching to join their units at the front witnessed similar scenes in 
villages, “where our column would be greeted by women of various ages, sometimes 
approaching us alone, sometimes in small groups…The most touching of all in these short 
encounters were the motherly parting words and the wishes for us to remain safe and unharmed, 
which rose from the hearts of these simple rural women, often as they wiped a tear.”24 While the 
kindness of women appeared to soldiers as a sort of proxy care they wished their own male 
relatives to receive elsewhere, some men experienced hospitality of a different sort.  A young 
factory committee agent reported how “there were virtually no men of military age in the village; 
they had all been called up for the army.  Sensing the covetous glances of the women, I would 
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get flustered and feel uncomfortable,” after which he had to flee from the advances of an older 
woman who found him in the bania.
25
  His experiences there prompted him to volunteer at once.  
 Young men experienced the rear as a feminine space in 1941, whether they had yet to 
join the ranks or as they moved to the front with their units. While millions of men remained in 
the rear for much or all of the war, soldiers remembered themselves as either transgressors or 
passively out of place among the civilian population of Soviet cities and villages. They civilian 
world in which they previously belonged had immediately become the part of past, and their 
future lay at the front.
26
  Mobilization policy and popular reactions brought about this change 
directly, although official rhetoric likely influenced the older civilians who expected to see no 
able-bodied young men in their midst for the duration of the conflict.  While young men 
expressed little about what their families would or should be doing for the war effort, those who 
eventually volunteered, and therefore wrote about the early days of war as a pre-military 
experience, believed that they had yet to join their proper place as young men at the front.  The 
masculine character of the front appeared only implicitly, and most young men had no more than 
a vague awareness of what war or combat demanded, but they believed or quickly learned from 
others that their wartime duty called them away from the rear.  
 For those young men who reached the front soon after the war began, the experience 
could prove as disorienting as it was for those who remained and felt that their home regions had 
transformed into a feminine rear space in which they ceased to belong.  A future tank 
commander remembered his feelings upon his unit’s first deployment to the front: “In November 
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our battalion was sent the Moscow outskirts. When we were on the road, silence was critical. 
The men were not battle-seasoned, and hence nervous.  Everyone was worrying about their first 
action and the chances of surviving it.”27  Deployed rapidly around Moscow and Leningrad, 
many young men had no time to adjust to life as soldiers, like a sniper who daydreamed of home 
on his first patrol at the front “staring at the woman, I thought of my native Belorussia. There 
were many times when my own mother had hoisted a yoke with baskets onto her shoulders… 
Kruglov’s soft voice interrupted my reflections.”28 Many men had trouble moving past their 
civilian lives and dealing with the realities of military service.  An artillerist recalled pre-combat 
hardships his comrades struggled to endure: “Most of the officers and men in the training camps 
longed for the front with only one aim in mind: to get a full stomach.  Some of the soldiers could 
not endure this life, and while standing guard at night with their rifles, shot themselves.”29  While 
such incidents were extreme cases, they reflect the difficulty with which civilian men began 
military service, even before they faced the German onslaught of late 1941.  
 For those men persevered and lived through it, their first battle allowed them to begin to 
the gradual process of thinking of themselves as soldiers.  Many sought to understand the front 
from civilian points of reference, like a sniper who thought of a childhood episode during his 
first day in the trenches: “I’m eight years old, and my father is teaching me to shoot… Was I 
disturbed by the thought that it was not hazel-grouses I as hunting, but human beings? I had 
something else on my mind.”30  After surviving the first day, and there were few first days at the 
front in 1941 that did not include combat, troops began to consider life at the front:  
And so the battle we had just been through was something of a dress rehearsal.  
Before it, we hadn’t seen the enemy, and even when he was shooting at us, we 
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couldn’t believe that he might be killed. Putting on a trench coat doesn’t make a 
soldier.  To kill – even to save your life – means turning upside-down all the 
thoughts and feelings in your mind and heart….  
 
The first battle, especially if it ended with success, not just survival, marked a real wartime 
change for men coming from civilian life or even peacetime service.  It distinguished their role in 
the war effort compared to the aspects of war their families encountered in the rear.  Moreover, 
the violence soldiers discovered they were capable of in combat seemed to be a type of 
experience that only men shared.  
 Soldier specific-propaganda and soldiers’ own experiences divided the war effort 
between masculine front and feminine rear in the first months of war.  Official rhetoric 
consistently presented scenes of families patriotically separating for their respective roles in front 
and rear to emphasize this aspect of the war effort.  The gendered division of labor also reflected 
a hierarchy of power, in which Stalin led the troops, the latter defended Soviet women and 
children, and women and oldsters in the rear worked to aid men at the front.  This hierarchy in 
soldier-specific propaganda reflected the Red Army’s foundational masculine ethic of national 
defense, but ignored military-age men working in the rear, the danger civilians faced from 
advancing German forces and air raids, and women’s early presence in non-combatant front 
roles.  Many young men accepted this division and felt compelled to volunteer for the front, 
often pressured or alienated from the rear because it no longer seemed to be a space for them.  
However, leaving loved ones proved more difficult than patriotic send-offs in the press 
suggested, and men found it even more of a struggle to gain their bearings at the front.  Once in 
forward positions, soldiers faced the test of combat, which combat proved to be a second leap 
away from the civilian rear, but did not enable an easy transition to new, soldierly selves.  
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Uniting the individual and the collective 
 Alongside the gendered distinctions between front and rear, soldier-specific propaganda 
promoted a sense of collective struggle to motivate soldiers.  This effort to explain to soldiers 
why they were fighting, which included individual examples of ideal servicemen, operated on 
two tracks.  The first emphasized soldiers’ duty to the people, who counted on their protection.  
The second presented the brotherly collective fighting men might join, which  revived notions of 
masculine community at the front, but reoriented those groups around Stalin’s fatherly leadership 
in defense of the motherland.  Soldiers echoed little of this collective affiliation with the people 
and national leadership in their response to the first months of fighting.  Personal loyalties and 
links to family remained strong among the Red Army rank-and file.  Although men at the front 
no longer petitioned for discharge, they expressed their duty in personal terms, and remained 
focused on providing for their families from afar.     
 An emphasis on the collective nature of the struggle against the German invader 
reinforced depictions of family separation as a sign of Soviet patriotism.  The day after Stalin’s 
national address on 3 July 1941, articles such as “The warriors’ oath” or “Frontline soldiers’ 
oath” began to appear in Krasnaia Zvezda.  Inspired by Stalin’s words and with confidence in his 
leadership, these articles presented soldiers made vows such as “Everyone is ready to give his 
life in the name of the motherland, in the name of Stalin, in the name of our victory!”31  The 
ideal soldiers of propaganda expressed a sustaining motivation for all soldiers in their oaths, 
without any hint of worry about their families’ safety or their local communities’ security.  As 
the crisis deepened over the summer, President Kalinin addressed a new class of Red Army 
political workers on the subject before they deployed to the front.  He presented the issue in 
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terms of what political workers needed to convey, without subtlety, not the way they should say 
it:  
The generation that is now between twenty and forty years old, has had history 
assign it the greatest honor – the struggle for communism against fascism. …That 
means: forget the grandparents, wives, and children, it means putting forth the 
struggle for communism as his main idea and goal, and to make everything else 
derivative.  That’s what it means.  And if in the struggle for communism, people 
will be giving forty percent to their children and the family in general, and only 
the remainder to the struggle, then the business will be bad.  I do not mean to say, 
that nothing should be sent to family, but that it would be only derivative, and the 
struggle for communism – primary.  That’s my point.32  
 
The connection between family and the struggle for communism had varied in Soviet culture, 
and Kalinin tapped into old Soviet fears of the family, which was often coded feminine as a 
source of opposition to revolutionary change.
33
  In wartime, this meant a zero-sum equation of 
personal concerns for relatives weakening devotion to the collective aim of defeating fascism.  
Oath- making soldiers personified this devotion, as they put no personal concern ahead of their 
contribution to victory.  
 Official rhetoric promised soldiers an eternal place in the supranational Soviet family to 
complement their unwavering focus on the national war effort.  Battle heroes received praise as  
“the embodiment of a heroic Stalinist generation of Soviet men,” and “a vast family of winged 
heroes of the patriotic war.”  The price to belong was high; such men were “meeting death with 
open eyes, but first striking the enemy dead.”34  Such heroes, proven in battle and linked to 
Stalin’s before as well as during the war, consistently situated them in a fraternal community at 
the front.  Even fighters that received scarce mention in 1941 earned a place in this brotherhood 
by following Stalin’s leadership and fighting well.  The sole Krasnaia Zvezda editorial to address 
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partisans ordered: “Brother partisans! With greater strength transform into living deeds the great 
words of Stalin” and concluded “The Red Army sends soldierly greetings to brother-partisans.”35 
An equally rare acknowledgement of non-Slavic soldiers praised the heroism of “sons of the 
Soviet Caucasus” as part the “brotherhood of peoples that has always been a powerful weapon,” 
which needed three quotations of Stalin to justify.
36
  Such articles emphasized collective 
belonging as a masculine status soldiers earned, and one that transcended individual family, 
nationality, and front or unit of combat.  Heroism remained the product of Stalin’s paternal 
leadership, which made both unity and success possible according to propaganda narratives, just 
as it had in labor and record-breaking feats before the war.
37
 
  
 For soldiers at the front, whether volunteers or conscripts, physical separation from 
family did not mean a single-minded focus on the war effort in line with Soviet leaders’ goals.  
Troops’ priorities remained focused on their families, and coexisted alongside their willingness 
to fight.  The most drastic change from the peacetime expression of these priorities was the drop 
in petitions for complete exemption from military service from soldiers claiming that “I have to 
work...” in order to support female or elderly dependents.38  Instead, Red Army men accepted the 
necessity of caring for their families from afar, attempting to provide for their material and 
emotional well-being through letters. These efforts consisted of two major approaches: showing 
concern for their families, and trying to minimize their families’ concern for them. 
Soldiers’ views regarding the home front were implicit in how they wrote to female 
relations. One soldier wrote his wife “we just deflected an enemy attack. Now we are going to 
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the front line... take care of the children.”39  Letter contents usually contrasted discussions of 
men enduring at the front and women showing patriotism by being feminine caregivers or loyal 
supporters on the home front.  In this way, soldiers wrote to thank unacquainted female gift-
givers:  “Everyone was very happy, that we in our rear have such patriots, who tirelessly care 
about their army.”40  Whether family members or generic caring girls, most soldiers wished to 
see the home front as a simple feminine complement to the masculine battlefront, where women 
performed their patriotic duty by providing soldiers with emotional support. The depictions of 
women in Krasnaia Zvezda suggest a shared view of feminine gender roles in the war effort. 
 A central component to troops’ interest in loved ones’ situation in the rear was the 
specific and limited way they discussed their own situation at the front.  Soldiers’ main concern 
in letter writing was to reassure their families of their safety, which compelled them to minimize 
the amount of detail they provided about battles, leading to simple messages such as “I am alive 
and well, standing in the ranks of the defenders of native Moscow; don’t worry about me, write 
me at the address...”41  Efforts to reassure their families complemented soldiers’ demonstration 
of concern, and some actively sought to shift the focus from themselves to the home front, as one 
soldier did in a letter to his pregnant wife: “I feel well, am alive and healthy, and wish you the 
same. Look after yourself, you have probably become plump, take care of yourself and our future 
child.”42  Such priorities also help explain why soldiers appeared so indifferent to proving their 
manliness with stories of battle or their exploits, because enduring the hardships of the front 
without complaint and continuing to provide for their families sufficed.  
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 Accordingly, soldiers were more likely to report “I am alive and healthy, and wish you 
the same. I have no special news,” than they were to provide the details of frontline exploits.43  
Such silences helped soldiers to minimize familial concerns, and avoid appearing overwhelmed 
by the trials of battle.  In virtually every letter they wrote, soldiers mentioned that they were alive 
and healthy.  This beginning or concluding status essentially became a convention of letters, but 
stands out as the only one that appeared in private and public letters, rather than political slogans, 
awards won, or enemies killed.  Variations and elaborations of this simple comment were 
integral to soldiers’ efforts to minimize the emotional strain of separation and potential loss 
through letter writing.  
 Perhaps the most basic component of soldiers’ performance of masculinity in letters was 
the consistent expression of concern for families’ health, safety, and daily lives.  These naturally 
carried over from peacetime hardship in many families that the war only worsened.  An 
infantryman remembered his pessimistic mood upon leaving for the front in late 1941: “I went to 
the army with a heavy heart; I knew that my parents would be lost without me.”44 Soldiers 
consistently wrote to ask about their families’ well-being, despite their position at the front being 
more dangerous, as one soldier wrote his sister: “write me a few words about mother and how 
her health is!”45  A break in correspondence from the front often horrified families at home, but 
young soldiers frequently wrote to their mothers to demonstrate a similar concern: “I have not 
received a single letter from you and do not know your address, old or new. I also don’t know 
how you live, or with whom, alone or with Katia,” or after a longer period of silence, “I want to 
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know if you are even still alive.”46 Soldiers almost always framed their complaint in terms of 
worry for their family, turning on its head the civilian fear over silence from the front as a sign of 
death, rather than overtly state their need to have an outlet from the rigors of frontline life in the 
letters of their female relatives. 
 Beyond the symbolic protective concern Red Army men sought to demonstrate through 
letters, pay telegrams acted as a tangible means of performing the role of “provider-at-war.” 
Some soldiers linked sending money with worry for their family’s well-being, with simple 
messages stating “I sent you money, report if you received the money. I have not received a 
letter from you in a long time,” or “I already sent you several letters, but I have not received one 
from you. Little Dorothy I sent your mother 1400 rubles...”47 Unable to fully perform their role 
in correspondence with unresponsive female relatives, such soldiers employed the alternative 
approach of sending real material aid.  Of course, material concern extended beyond sending 
pay, as one soldier wrote his wife: “you should live with my family; they will provide you with 
accommodations right now.”48  Soldiers in regular contact with home were no less willing to 
send money, since their families were often in desperate conditions. Some even sought to 
provide for the material well-being two sets of dependents, such as a Red Army volunteer who 
told his pregnant wife: “you will receive 700 rubles from which I ask you to give 200 rubles to 
[my] father and mother.”49 Financial contributions could help soldiers preserve an element of 
continuity with their civilian role in their family by simulating the cycle of work and pay.   
Sending pay also allowed men at the front to show care in a concrete manner as well as shift 
                                                 
46
 RGASPI Fond M-33 Opis 1 Delo 331 List 3; RGASPI Fond M-33 Opis 1 Delo 457 List 1. 
47
 RGASPI Fond M-33 Opis 1 Delo 116 List 2; RGASPI Fond M-33 Opis 1 Delo 474 List 1. 
48
 RGASPI Fond M-33 Opis 1 Delo 18. 
49
 RGASPI Fond M-33 Opis 1 Delo 220 List 1. 
  
80 
 
 
attention from their dangerous situation to what they could do to improve their loved ones’ 
situation at home.    
 Protective concern also appeared in the form of fathers’ efforts to remain active as 
parents. Fathers sought to demonstrate concern and assert continued status as manly providers by 
showing intensive interest in their children’s care, and especially their schooling.  While some 
asked simple questions, such as “how is Lucy studying?”, others encouraged their children to 
study as a form of patriotism: “study to help win victory over the reptilian enemy more 
quickly.”50 This specific interest in children also sought to downplay the crisis situations that 
came and went at the front, as one sapper attempted in a letter written while defending against 
the German drive on Moscow: “I was already in battle and today have a furlough in Moscow – 
and then again to battle. How are Inessa’s studies?”51  Other soldier-fathers sought to re-assert 
their masculine status by taking a still more active role, writing to each child individually, to ask 
specific questions about problems in school, teachers, and extra-curricular activities, with one 
father promising his son a “gift to make you study better and successfully complete 7th grade.”52  
Through such interventions, Red Army men sought to diminish the impact of their absence and 
alleviate their families’ anxieties by devoting time to domestic matters without complaining 
about life at the front. 
Also noteworthy is what Red Army men left unsaid. While they proved willing to make 
elaborate oaths on numerous issues, most of which were arguably obvious, few, even political 
workers or party members, mentioned the Communist party or ideology, while Stalin appeared 
only as a military leader, if mentioned at all. Soldiers frequently promised parents that “I will not 
let the Germans bring you grief,” while cadets complained “what a shame that I am not being 
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sent from training to the front because I really want to go, and strike at those man-eaters” or 
explained that “our hatred of the fascists is inexhaustible.”53  Such comments expressed 
relatively common sentiments about the enemy, and yet most felt compelled to state and often 
repeat them in letters home.  When writing to the state radio commission, with no illusions of 
privacy, soldiers consistently declared their hatred of the enemy, calling the Germans “fiends,” 
“filth,” “vipers,” and “bloody cannibals,” but provided virtually no corresponding praise for 
Stalin or the government, even among those letters selected and approved for broadcast.
54
   
This is not to say that the Red Army lacked committed party members or supporters of 
the government, but party members and even political workers were likely to state “I send you 
my Bolshevik greetings” or something similarly brief and then focus on family concerns.55  
Comments such as “I am ready to travel to the front and ready, like a Komsomol, to die for the 
cause of the Party of Lenin-Stalin” were extremely rare. 56   Such sentiments seem improbable as 
widely-held but unstated beliefs, given soldiers’ verbose cursing of the enemy, among other 
recurring comments.  Instead, the frequency of obvious oaths on subjects other than political 
loyalty suggests that soldiers’ commitment to the war effort quickly became far more important 
and more personal than the achievement of a Communist party cause. Ultimately, patriotic or 
ideological concerns remained secondary matters in soldiers’ letters home.  Efforts to provide for 
and reassure primarily-female family members shaped these letters more than any other concern. 
Red Army fighters’ sustaining motivation stemmed from their devotion to their families.  
Soldiers’ desire to defend their individual families from harm operated as both a direct 
motivation for some and as a synthesis with the national cause for those not directly threatened.   
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Among soldiers from the western areas of the USSR, the former was an urgent priority, as one 
wounded soldier referenced familiar towns as he explained his determination to continue 
fighting: “My wife, just as the war began, I was located in Tartakovo, 8km from the town of 
Sokol’...The first battle I came to fight was on June 22 in the region of Sokol’.”57  In the late 
summer, Red Army soldiers outside Leningrad emphasized the importance of directly defending 
their homes: “Finally my dream has been realized, I am defending my home city, striking at the 
fascist reptiles... I will not disgrace the name of my home city. Be sure of that.”58  Such soldiers 
did not need to fight for the figurative motherland, as they had more tangible women to defend. 
Their immediate responsibility consisted of providing for their families’ safety, and functioned 
as a clear motivation to fight.  
The rapid nature of the German advance in 1941 meant that fewer soldiers had the 
opportunity to fight for their families directly, since so many regions fell under German 
occupation within weeks.
59
  With families either in the distant rear or under enemy occupation, 
most troops accepted the link between their families’ well-being and national defense.  Some 
Red Army men made the connection directly, presenting their service as part of the larger effort 
that helped keep the Soviet people safe, whatever their family’s immediate danger: “proudly 
rejoice, that your son defends you, and the whole people.”60  Another soldier asked his wife to 
tell their children that their “father fights for their future, for our glorious motherland.”61  For 
other soldiers, loved ones remained the reason for fighting, even on a distant front. One soldier 
explained to his sister and mother “tomorrow I will go to protect the family,” and another told his 
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parents: “My dear [ones], be sure, that I will fight for your freedom to the last drop of blood,” 
despite each families’ distance from the front in both cases.62   
 While the tone of such comments varied, from proud statement to grudging 
acknowledgement, many soldiers reasoned that the successful defense of the country was 
essential to their families’ safety.  However, such a synthesis did not constitute a wholesale 
acceptance of the motives or conduct of soldier-heroes promoted in official rhetoric. Unlike 
civilian newspapers, Krasnaia Zvezda did not present family security as a motive of heroic 
figures or the army at large, and promoted the defense of the motherland and loyalty to Stalin as 
ideal soldiers’ inspiration to perform exploits and face death.   In contrast, Krasnaia Zvezda 
continued to present heroes as members of a (multi-)national brotherhood led by Stalin whose 
motives carried over from the exploits of 1930s aviation record-setters, polar explorers, and 
fictional characters of socialist realism. Even the masculine ethic of defending women’s honor 
remained situated at the national level, protecting Soviet women in general, since letters 
attributed to family members in soldier-specific propaganda omitted any mention of sons and 
husbands keeping their families from harm.   Red Army soldiers expressed a separate set of 
priorities focused on personal connections to their families that remained absent from official 
rhetoric, but lacked any treasonous or defeatist content.   Reflecting their difficult transition to 
wartime as citizen-soldiers, a synthesis of personal and national motivations kept many troops 
going in the difficult months of fighting retreat toward Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov-on-Don.   
Defending home and homeland 
 The ideal Red Army fighter received its fullest portrayal in the hero profiles that figured 
prominently in soldier specific propaganda.  Alongside the why of collective struggle, examples 
of combat heroism present troops with official expectations for how they should fulfill their duty 
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in battle against the enemy.  Sacrificial death appeared as the greatest expression of fighters’ 
personal contribution to the national collective.  Women’s deaths at the enemy’s hands provided 
a point of contrast, in which loyal women died admirably but passively, and reinforced the extent 
of the crisis soldiers were charged with stopping.  Such extreme expectations found few 
adherents among the rank and file, who sought to live and return home after the war.  The 
experiences of combat and the suffering of wounded comrades gave soldiers few incentives to 
pursue heroism over their families’ care. 
 As they realized the extent of the danger the country faced, Soviet and Red Army leaders 
sought to inspire men not just to fight, but to perform heroic exploits and make sacrifices equal 
in magnitude to the desperate wartime situation.  Returning to the form of Finnish War reporting, 
but with a drastically different message, the Red Army’s political administration presented a new 
masculine ideal for soldiers to aspire to, which differed greatly from the “collective combatant” 
examples of heroism and ideal conduct offered before the invasion began.
63
  Officials in the 
Political Administration of the Red Army (PUR) prioritized heroes and heroic exploits from the 
outset of the war. On the eve of the invasion, a ciphered telegram to political leaders of all 
regions and fronts from Deputy Commissar of Defense A. I. Zaporozhets outlined priorities for 
military propaganda as the “widespread display of the successes achieved by units, and the 
individual soldiers and commanders in these successful units.”64  Echoing this order ten days into 
the war, a July 2 article in Krasnaia Zvezda approvingly surveyed frontline newspapers’ focus on 
heroic exploits as appropriate to how the war was being fought.
65
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 On June 29, the lead editorial and hero profiles accompanying it on page 2 of Krasnaia 
Zvezda broke with prewar presentations of the “collective combatant” soldierly masculinity.  Its 
title, “Stalinist Falcons, with honor fulfill your duty to the motherland!” immediately invoked 
traditional ideas of masculine honor and duty, which were well established in military traditions 
of both the Tsarist Empire and Soviet Union.
66
  The editorial focused on two exploits, the first 
involving a fighter pilot’s cunning defensive tactics against enemy bombers, and the second on 
another pilot’s relentless desire to “finish the fascist reptile.” During his fifth sortie of the day, 
Lieutenant Kuz’min had fired all of his ammunition and been wounded several times. Rather 
than leave the battle and allow the enemy to escape, he repeatedly attempted to ram an enemy 
plane, and on the fourth try, was able to destroy the enemy plane by sacrificing his own.  The 
following paragraph, returning to an editorial tone, explained the importance of such “immortal 
exploits of the heroes of the patriotic war.”  Rather than an isolated incident of extreme self-
sacrifice, the editorial explained that “the war has only begun. There are still many brutal battles 
ahead... Struggle with a treacherous enemy requires serious effort and sacrifices.”67  Lt. 
Kuz’min’s feat exemplified the ultimate sacrifice as well as the utmost performance of 
steadfastness, because he did not immediately retreat once his ammunition ran out, and cunning, 
by using his plane as a weapon when there no others on hand.  A call for sacrifice immediately 
following an example of heroic death in battle thus inaugurated the “sacrificial defender” ideal of 
masculine heroism. 
 The new focus on the heroism of the exploit, or podvig, had its origins in Russian 
Orthodox Christianity, and retained some of those characteristics in the Soviet wartime usage of 
the term, and even in the record breaking exploits of the 1930s. An act worthy to be called a 
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podvig demanded some type of suffering or self-sacrifice.  In the Russian Christian context, the 
podvig rested on “denial of ‘the world,’ denial of this mortal life as real life, denial of material 
force as real force, denial of speech as real speech.”  More than any other, “The act of Jesus on 
the mountain denying the road that led to the empire of the world in favor of the road that led to 
an ignoble death is a podvig - denial of the world.”68  Their motives were radically different, but 
the actions of soldier heroes involved choosing suffering and denying life and survival as 
dishonorable in favor of death.  Of course, the similarities have clear limits, since Red Army 
soldiers’ objectives were decidedly of the world, and victory after their deaths did not equal a 
heavenly reward. Perhaps most importantly, soldier-specific propaganda did not consider a 
passive death to be a podvig.  Unlike Christian martyrdom, a combat podvig demanded 
destruction of the enemy as a consequence of the hero’s death. 
Perhaps the most famous of such cases, the exploit of Captain Gastelo first appeared as a 
brief dispatch on July 6, and then as a proper hero profile, discussing his motives, on July 10.  
Gastelo, fitting the mould of Sr. Lt. Kuz’min, and himself emulated in September by Lieutenant 
Mamontov, performed a sacrificial exploit with his plane.  In battle over enemy territory, enemy 
fire ignited his plane’s fuel tank. Although he could have ejected with his parachute and survived 
as a captive, Gastelo chose instead to “end his life neither with a crash nor as a captive, but with 
a [heroic] exploit,” and crashed his plane into a column of enemy tanks.69 Truer to Sr. Lt. 
Kuz’min’s original example, Lt. Mamontov “died a hero’s death” by ramming an enemy 
bomber, rather than land safely and let the enemy bomber survive.
70
  Such active deaths 
distinguished heroes from other men, presenting fearless devotion to victory as the true measure 
of a fighting man, while the devotion of soldiers who over-valued their lives remained unproven. 
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The growing number of reports of soldiers dying heroically lacked any real tactical 
imperative for them to die fighting, and instead emphasized soldiers’ active choice to sacrifice 
themselves because they were so determined to kill the enemy. Krasnaia Zvezda presented such 
exploits as ideal behavior early on.  An editorial on 8 July celebrated how Sr. Lt. Volkov 
“decided to destroy the enemy with his plane, as [if it were] an artillery shell.”  Following the 
exploit, the editorial explained that “this is how the party of Lenin-Stalin educated our people… 
Let the exploits of heroes, showing [their] quality in battle, about which comrade Stalin spoke, 
inspire all frontline soldiers, teach them bravery and courage, [and] instill in their soul 
confidence in victory.”  The editorial cited Stalin’s approval for sacrificial death in combat, and 
attributed the character required to perform such exploits to his leadership.  Stalin retained a key 
role, since the “brilliant combat quality of Soviet warriors” derived from the “Stalinist generation 
of defenders of the motherland.”71  Even though such exploits usually focused on individuals and 
sometimes small groups, heroes’ motives remained rooted in Stalin’s leadership and a collective 
duty to defend the motherland.   
The exploits of Kuzmin and Gastello began a series of examples of sacrifice presented in 
official rhetoric in 1941, which focused on the motherland as a source of motivation for 
desperate exploits.  The article “A heroic divisional commander” presented the heroic twelve day 
resistance of a unit outnumbered and outgunned by German tank units. The battle culminated in 
the death of two soldiers: “knowing that death threatened them... calmly did their duty and were 
killed, like heroes” blowing up the bridge they had wired with explosives just as a German tank 
began to cross.  Ignoring the larger military implications of such a battle, the article concluded by 
emphasizing what motivated such exploits: “Love for the motherland and contempt for death, 
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those are the distinctive features of the heroes of the division.” 72  On September 18, an article 
detailed the heroics of ten Soviet “epic heroes,” who after repulsing an enemy infantry attack, 
faced ten German tanks.  Their commander declared “Comrades, we may die, but we will not 
yield a step!” and his men followed him to their deaths, but succeeded in destroying three tanks 
and blunting the German advance.  The article presented these events in a positive light, 
explaining “Ten Soviet patriots, loving the motherland more than their lives, were killed, but did 
not falter, and did not yield.”73  In every case, stories of soldiers’ exploits emphasize how love of 
the motherland prompted them to choose to die fighting, but suggest that desperate 
circumstances helped prompt such heroics, which propaganda celebrated to normalize and justify 
the bleak scenarios soldiers faced.  
Such examples of death as an active choice, and death as an act of killing the enemy, also 
contrasted with the passive deaths of female martyrs, even though both died as faithful patriots.  
Even before Zoia Kosmodemianskaia became the preeminent female icon of the war, female 
martyrs appeared in soldier specific propaganda.
74
  Zoia’s story bore considerable resemblance 
to the one recounted in the article “Daughter of a partisan.”  The article reported how a young 
woman, Tania, refused to provide information about her father’s detachment, and instead 
attacked her interrogator.  Later, the German executed her, spilling their “innocent young blood” 
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because she would not betray the motherland.
75
  Krasnaia Zvezda depicted such deaths as tragic, 
rather than heroic events, which demanded revenge, rather than emulation.   
Combined with the broader portrayal of women’s victimization by the enemy, the 
sacrificial defender ideal marked a clear distinction between the deaths of Soviet citizens as 
active and masculine or passive and feminine.  Outside of specific tragic deaths, articles about 
events at the front contained frequent references to women suffering the consequences of enemy 
violence without causing any harm in response.  The profile of a soldier noted how he 
“remembered the enemy’s burning of villages, the streets of cities, corpses of women and 
children, shot like animals...”76  Such deaths seem to have one purpose, to prompt an angry 
response to the brutal treatment of Soviet civilians.  In a medical battalion near the front, 
“Doctors conducted operations and stitched wounds under artillery bombardment. During one 
such operation a [shell] fragment killed doctor Liberova.  They buried her at night. Making a 
small hillock, they covered their little baby girl.”77  Use of the diminutive familiar form to 
describe her burial evokes the tragic loss of a loved one, not the problems losing a skilled 
surgeon would cause for military medical care.  The senselessness of her death was typical of 
such articles, and emphasized victimization instead of a final contribution to victory.  At best, 
women’s passive deaths involved an admirable degree of loyalty to Stalin and the war, but 
marked feminine figures as unable to defend the country or kill the enemy.  Such articles 
depicted the consequences of enemy action on women in order to bolster the merit of the 
masculine ethic as a further motivation to fight.  
 Willingness to choose death to further harm the enemy was essential to the “sacrificial 
defender” ideal, but not all heroes died performing their exploits.  Hero profiles presented the 
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survival of men like Lieutenant Tarasov, for whom “there appeared to be no way to retreat. But 
Tarasov decided to sell his life dearly” and fought on while prepared to die, but  
survived with wounds in both hands and bullets in both legs.
78
 Expressed in statements such as 
“Comrade Battalion commissar, I will die, but I will do everything [you ordered],” fearlessness 
acted as a prerequisite for sacrificial defenders’ exploits. 79 A September editorial in Krasnaia 
Zvezda cited the exploit of a commander who killed an enemy soldier with his bare hands after 
being badly wounded, before concluding: “to be a hero of the patriotic war, courageously, do not 
spare blood or life itself.” 80  While some sacrificial defenders could survive through cunning or 
luck, they remained in a lesser tier of heroes compared to those who “gave their lives to the last 
breath to their motherland, to their people.”81  
 The overall portrayal of wounded soldiers in official rhetoric operated according to the 
same logic as that of dead heroes who exemplified the “sacrificial defender.”  Such exploits 
reflected both the practical need for soldiers to keep fighting in order to slow the enemy advance 
and diminish the permanent loss of trained cadres and the symbolic value of who did not 
surrender or retreat despite hopeless circumstances.  One hero profile even promised that a pilot 
who suffered multiple bullet wounds in combat “will dash back to battle with new strength 
against the hated enemy.”82 The expectation that soldiers not allow wounds to keep them from 
the front also fit the “sacrificial defender” ideal that they were so devoted to national defense that 
they would die fighting, even if death did not come easily.  Wounds, like death, were only a 
means to an end for heroes, and were not an achievement unless they brought greater destruction 
to the enemy.  Both the greater and lesser forms of ideal combat action contrasted with the 
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portrayal of harm befalling women in soldier specific propaganda. Wounded men demonstrated 
unlimited determination to fight, while women’s wounds evoked pity and involved no honor.  
The “sacrificial defender” represented a distinctly masculine ideal of heroism, in which heroes 
made extreme decisions: they played an active, rather than passive role in driving out the enemy, 
sacrificed for the war effort, not just participated in it, and chose death, rather than suffering it as 
victims.  
 
 Few soldiers expressed a desire to pursue a sacrificial role in the war effort, or even 
thought it was necessary.  An underlying and rarely stated implication of this “provider-at-war” 
masculinity was the belief that while death at the front was certainly possible, it was not a 
soldier’s duty, contrary to the “sacrificial defender” ideal.  Troops rarely considered the 
possibility of death in their letters, but often inverted their concern: “take care of yourself and 
our little boy.  You both are so dear to me that losing you would make life meaningless.”83  
Unambiguous expressions of worry hardly fit sacrificial defenders’ active choice of death or 
believe that living was less important than victory.  A father and husband succinctly expressed a 
contrary view three weeks into the war: “...death is not frightening, but why die when it is 
possible to destroy the enemy and remain alive.”84  Soldiers such as these understood the risks 
involved, but did not consider sacrifice to be something worth seeking out to speed the enemy’s 
defeat.  Having served since 1939, a former Siberian schoolteacher wrote his wife that “I will 
strike at the enemy to my last breath... but there is of course another option, that is victory in the 
full sense of the word, i.e. destroying the enemy and returning home to loved ones.”85  
Discussions of living to victory reflected the basic tension between the masculine duty presented 
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in official rhetoric and soldiers’ duties to their female dependents, namely the incompatibility of 
sacrificial death with continuing to provide for ones’ family.  
 Red Army fighters believed that their personal goals were compatible with national 
victory, just as they saw national defense as contributing to the defense of their families.  Many 
expressed their hope to simply return home, as one soldier wrote to his mother from the 
Leningrad front: “every one of my shots at the damned fascists is a shot for our future happiness, 
for our future reunion.”86  For troops interested in the postwar future, it was clear that their duty 
to fight was only temporary, and their families remained their ultimate priority, as another 
promised to his wife: “we will smash the fascist reptiles and arrive home with victory.”87  The 
expectation to return home after victory was clearly incompatible with the notion that sacrificial 
death represented the height of masculine patriotism.  Some soldiers seemed to hint at this, as 
Ukrainian rifleman,   writing to his elderly father and sisters, explained: “I hope that with victory 
I will return to you and we will again live together... We will survive victory over the enemy and 
live once more.”88 While the duty to fight remained unquestioned, this soldier, and many like 
him, did not relish the chance to prove his patriotism with sacrifice.  The “full sense” of victory 
was precisely what such soldiers fought for, a victory they lived to see.  
 Troops’ perspectives on the glory of undertaking a heroic feat usually changed when they 
witnessed the suffering, limited care, and fate of wounded fellow soldiers.  Eye-opening 
experiences sometimes greeted soldiers immediately upon arriving at the front, and bore no 
resemblance to what propaganda depicted.  A tank trooper vividly recalled the scene that greeted 
him as his train arrived near the front: “They began to load wounded men onto our train as soon 
as we vacated it.  We walked through the whole town.  We were all shaken by what we saw. The 
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town had been frequently bombed, and it was under attack again.  The wounded were 
everywhere, while corpses lay scattered in the streets.”89  Other soldiers not only saw comrades 
wounded, but had to tend to them in absence of trained medics: “The wounded were moaning, 
while the uninjured were dragging the wreckage apart, carrying out the casualties. One man, 
white as chalk, had a broken arm. I began making a splint for him…”90  Red Army fighters could 
find motivation to strike back at the enemy when comrades were wounded, but saw nothing to 
emulate directly: “Yesterday, my best friend was sent to the hospital, whom the fascists wounded 
in the neck.  My hatred [of them] grows more and more.”91  Fighting men subjected to battle 
quickly learned that few situations were likely to allow for choice and heroic outcomes at the risk 
of being wounded.  They also saw wounded comrades die or fail to receive proper treatment, 
rather than accolades for their trouble.  
 When wounded, troops considered their suffering a sufficient sacrifice without worrying 
that they lacked dedication for having lived and allowed the enemy to do the same.  Soldiers’ 
desire to direct concern away from themselves also shaped how they addressed wounds and the 
dangers they faced at the front.  This approach also characterized many soldiers’ discussions of 
their wounds, some not even using the word: “I studied in the military school in the town of 
Sumy and was later sent to the front, and well, now I’ve clearly ended up in the hospital at 
Novocherkassk.”92 While some echoed propaganda by emphasizing their present or future return 
to the front, a closer reading of soldiers’ discussions of other forms of danger suggests that their 
primary motive was downplaying the seriousness of a given threat.  An artillery lieutenant 
mentioned the state of his correspondence with his wife as much as the imprisonment that caused 
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“my further interruption in communication with you. For two months and four days I was in a 
German prison, twice being arrested again and still escaping captivity. Now I am in the hamlet of 
Peska.”93 In line with “provider-at-war” letter-writing tactics, these soldiers attempted to 
minimize the distress such stories might bring their loved ones by devoting more attention to 
their current, safe state than the life-threatening events that preceded it.  Fitting this pattern, a 
rifleman who reported to his family that “the wound has almost healed, soon there will be an 
operation, and then again to the front,” gave no mention of battle or the nature of his wound 
before changing the subject.
94
  Many soldiers mentioned being in implicitly dangerous situations, 
but were silent about the potential harm involved.  In such cases, soldiers ignored the opportunity 
to discuss either the heroics or danger involved, which further distinguished their interpretation 
of wounds from that of propaganda. 
 Official rhetoric and soldiers’ responses to war involved different understandings of 
sacrifice in wartime.   They varied not only in the extent of bodily harm considered a worthy 
contribution, but also in terms of the relationship between individual soldiers and the war effort.  
Soldier specific propaganda presented an ideal of soldierly masculinity premised on total 
subordination to the collective.  If soldiers affiliated their sense of self with the national objective 
of victory, achieving that goal demanded that they fight, kill, and die.  It also earned them awards 
and hero status, which surviving fighters lacked.  The inability of women to play the same role 
and instead suffer from enemy action, according to official rhetoric, made men’s sacrifices more 
important still.  Red Army men expressed a separate soldierly subjectivity rooted in individual 
connections to family and civilian life.  This personal loyalty to family motivated them to fight 
and defend the country, but also compelled them to try to survive.  Men’s letters reveal a dual 
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concern with retaining their role in family life in the rear, as well as defending their families at 
the front.  In their letter writing, as well as their service, they wished to spare wives, daughters, 
and mothers from the horrors of the front, but also the loss of loved ones in the fighting. Many 
saw their military role as a synthesis of personal and national goals, which motivated them to 
fight even if their sector of the front was far from home.  Nevertheless, a soldierly subjectivity 
rooted in individual desires, even if patriotic, remained incompatible with the ideal of active 
death for the collective in official rhetoric. 
Conclusion 
 The immediate depiction of gendered front and rear spaces in the wartime Soviet Union 
suggested a continuation of prewar approaches to national defense generally,  and in particular 
the continued promotion of the masculine ethic as a motive for military service.  The readiness of 
PUR officials to depict passive, vulnerable women as the beneficiaries of young men’s patriotic 
willingness to volunteer is significant as an indication of military officials’ expectations for 
wartime mobilization.  At the same time, civilian newspapers such as Komsomol’skaia Pravda 
presented an ambivalent set of ideas characterized as neither encouragement nor prohibition, and 
the head of the Komsomol, Nikolai Mikhailov, failed to specify military service as an option for 
patriotic men only.
95
  However, their perspectives provided a poor indication of the attitudinal 
context in which Soviet women volunteers might find themselves serving in the coming year.  
The immediate and unequivocal presentation of a clear division between masculine front and 
feminine rear in Krasnaia Zvezda reflected the newspaper’s approach to gender for the duration 
of the war, which few young men would pause to question in the coming months of desperate 
fighting. 
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 Personal and local loyalties played a central role in motivating soldiers to fight, as Lisa 
Kirschenbaum has argued.
96
 In the first months of the war, however, official rhetoric focused on 
pure calls for individual sacrifice and represented national defense as a collective duty.  Focusing 
on soldiers’ letters directly, unmediated by official screening or manipulation for publication, 
reveals that they expressed concern for their loved ones’ well-being while fighting at the front in 
two different ways.   Some troops fought to directly defend their family or home region from 
immediate danger, so that they directly served their personal interests at the front.  Other troops 
connected the larger war effort of defending the motherland to their families’ safety, even if they 
relied on the reciprocal service of other men separated from their homes by the exigencies of 
emergency mobilization. Significantly, these men’s synthesis of common collective and 
individual interests in response to the invasion crisis predated comparable appeals in soldier 
specific propaganda.  Red Army volunteers and called up reservists, still more citizen than 
soldier, drew little motivation from idealistic heroes in official rhetoric.  Instead, they focused on 
their own interpretations of the invasion crisis, which saw military service as a means of keeping 
their homes intact and their families safe.   
 An examination of varied and elaborate exploits of sacrificial death presented official 
rhetoric might suggest an influential narrative that defined combat in the early months of the 
invasion.
97
  However, an inquiry into soldiers’ views of sacrifice and the cost of victory suggests 
that very few soldiers sought to emulate the “Sacrificial Defender” ideal directly.  The more 
general relationship between such depictions of heroism and actual fighting tactics and 
expectations is not clear.  While many Red Army fighters and indeed Red Armies found 
themselves in desperate circumstances in 1941, surrender proved far too common a choice for 
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approximately three million servicemen for the “Sacrificial Defender” to have been a seriously 
influential ideal.
98
  Soldiers’ letters reveal a cohort of servicemen who were fighting for their 
families’ safety and hoping to return to them in triumph.  Those who raised the prospect of death 
as the price of victory at all did so to challenge it as the only option.  While the propaganda 
narrative remained consistent during 1941, it failed to shape soldiers’ expectations, and certainly 
took fewer lives than the substantive errors Stalin and other Soviet leaders committed.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HATING AND KILLING: DEFINING ONESELF AGAINST ENEMY AND NON-COMBATANT AMIDST 
DEFEAT, 1942 
 
 The Red Army’s victory outside Moscow in December 1941 precipitated a number of 
substantial changes to the Soviet war effort in the New Year.  The liberation of temporarily 
occupied territory around Moscow revealed enemy atrocities that fueled propaganda about the 
evil nature of enemy soldiers.  Frontline propaganda paid increasing attention to women’s role in 
the war effort, especially in the rear, as well as women’s wartime suffering. Over 150 000 
women entered the Red Army in 1942, though this scarcely increased their presence in front 
newspapers.
1
  The relative stability of the frontline after the German defeat outside Moscow 
allowed the Red Army to bring its divisions up to strength and provided new soldiers with time 
to acclimate to front life and become familiar with their units.  Red Army fortunes changed 
dramatically over the course of the year, which prompted propagandists and soldiers alike to 
shed many of their illusions about the nature and duration of the war.  The year began with 
restored Soviet confidence, saw Red Army offensives fail while German forces conquered more 
territory in the summer, and then ended with new Red Army successes around Stalingrad.  
Amidst these changes in 1942, three topics persisted in official rhetoric and soldiers’ views: the 
enemy, violence, and comradeship. 
 The act of killing focused constructions of gender amidst these issues, thanks to the 
unambiguous juxtaposition of men and women in relation to the motives, means, and 
manifestations of wartime violence. Unlike the Hitlerite hordes of 1941, the enemy appeared in 
frontline propaganda as a group of individual men in 1942.  Articles focused on the character and 
psychology of those men, and the bestial masculinity evident in Germans’ treatment of Soviet 
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women provided a key point of contrast with Red Army soldiers’ behavior. Carrying out 
violence against the enemy not only fell to Red Army men according to frontline propaganda, 
but required their distinctive qualities and spirit, rather than skills alone.  In contrast, both official 
and soldierly discussions of women and violence focused on their victimization.  Soviet women 
functioned otherwise as helpers, whether building weapons in the rear or providing first aid near 
the front.  Soldiers who continued to fight at the front began to express masculine subjectivities 
oriented away from families in the rear and toward the frontline comrades with whom they 
shared the danger and hardship of everyday life.  The frontline comradeship that developed 
among soldiers quickly assumed an exclusive character, which distinguished combatants from 
female auxiliaries and feminized rear service men.   
 This chapter argues that critical changes to soldiers’ subjectivities and frontline 
propaganda took place during the period between victory outside Moscow and victory at 
Stalingrad.  Official rhetoric demonstrated its responsiveness to wartime changes, even if leaders 
and propagandists reacted more to strategic developments than to the needs and views of the Red 
Army rank and file.  Propaganda messages continued to include adapted prewar ideas and new 
ideals of soldierly conduct, which remained anchored in masculine values and priorities. The 
masculine subjectivity of men at the front underwent a fundamental shift from affiliation with 
family and home to affiliation with comrades and front as time and circumstances made the 
former more distant and more difficult to imagine.  Hatred and especially violence drove these 
developments, and established much of the cultural framework for the rest of the war.  The new 
focus on killing the enemy distinguished the second year of the war as a foundational period of 
masculine frontline culture.  At the same time, the combat collective emerged as source of 
affiliation separate from the national collective or soldiers’ families.   
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The enemy as masculine other 
 Once frontline propaganda began to consistently represent the German enemy in 1942, it 
produced a new figure, unlike earlier combatants or the various enemies of the 1930s.  
Propagandists no longer sought to present a worthy foe as they had with Japanese or Finnish 
enemies during the border war period, but an antithetical masculine other, who challenged the 
Red Army hero’s honor and ethics through his attacks on Soviet women and civilians.2 The 
German enemy appeared in a battle between good and evil, not simply a battlefield struggle of 
strength and tenacity.  
Enemy atrocities began to feature prominently in Krasnaia Zvezda from the first days of 
the year based on the reports of soldiers advancing into occupied territory and “preliminary 
information” from areas further behind enemy lines.  In early January, a front-page editorial 
entitled “A Pack of Murderers and Robbers” elaborated on the scale and variety of “heinous acts 
of violence” the enemy had perpetrated in occupied territory, including the numbers of dead in 
different regions and the methods involved.  The editorial highlighted “women, girls, and 
schoolchildren” as victims and explained that the atrocities took place due to the 
“unleashing…of the most base, animal instincts among [enemy] officers and soldiers.” 3  Such 
reports continued to appear in Krasnaia Zvezda throughout the winter, including a multi-panel 
illustration of the hanging of Soviet civilians on February 6.
4
  Neither Hitler nor fascist ideology 
received more than a passing mention, if any, in the condemnation that accompanied these 
reports. 
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Instead, the German rank-and-file soldiers and frontline officers appeared as the central 
perpetrators in a consistent definition of a single enemy type.  In some articles, the scale of the 
killings received the most emphasis, such as the murder of hundreds of hospital patients, but the 
most common approach was to recount the most horrific atrocities in detail.
5
 An article about 
torture victims described, corpse by corpse, how German soldiers had “broken a jaw, pulled out 
fingernails… disfigured a face with a bayonet” and “burned genitals with a hot iron.”6 Six weeks 
later, another article detailed how a victim of the Germans had been found: “eyes gouged out and 
scorched, nose broken, covered in bruises from rifle butts. Hands cut off and wounds scorched 
with red-hot irons.”7 Such articles made clear that the enemy pursued violence outside the 
normal bounds of the conventional soldier, which suggested he would not surrender or obey the 
rules of war or accepted military conduct.  Above all, he lacked honor. 
While such portrayals of the enemy as a torturer and murderer provided an unambiguous 
impression, other articles elaborated on what motivated him to wage war and conquer.  In an 
article titled simply, “On Hatred,” celebrated Soviet writer Ilia Ehrenburg explained the 
psychology of the enemy:  
Spite drives every soldier of Fascism… One German lance corporal wrote in his diary 
that torture ‘cheers and even excites’ him… The naïve ones thought that there were 
people marching against us, but against us marched monsters who had selected the skull 
as their emblem, young and shameless robbers, vandals who were thirsting to destroy 
everything in their path.
8
 
 
Rather than traditional notions of honor or national duty, destruction and violence drove the 
enemy to fight.  Ehrenburg went on to explain that it was the enemy’s perpetration of atrocities 
during the invasion, rather than killing on the battlefield, which made them barbarians:  
                                                 
5
 “The Germans killed 530 patients,” Krasnaia Zvezda, 25 January 1942, 2. 
6
 New facts of German atrocities against Red Army prisoners,” Krasnaia Zvezda, 11 March 1942, 3. 
7
 “A savage massacre of wounded soldiers,” Krasnaia Zvezda, 29 April 1942, 3. 
8
 “On Hatred,” Krasnaia Zvezda, 2 May 1942, 4. 
  
102 
 
 
Above all, they brought death with them to our land. I do not speak of the death of 
 soldiers: there is no war without victims. I speak of the gallows on which Russian girls 
 swing, of the terrible ditch near Kerch where the children of Russians, Tatars, and Jews 
 were buried. I speak of how the Hitlerites finish off our wounded and burn down our 
 peasants’ homes.9 
 
Descriptions of the enemy as “monsters” and “vandals” were part of a consistent set of terms that 
emphasized his sadistic use of violence in war, which separated him from the soldiers of the Red 
Army.  In line with the overall portrayal of the enemy in Krasnaia Zvezda, Ehrenburg articulated 
the belief that the objects of the enemy’s violence, and the reasons for that violence, 
distinguished and diminished him as a soldier and as a man.   
 What fully set apart and vilified the German soldier in Red Army propaganda, and further 
marks Ehrenburg’s portrayal as that of an enemy soldierly masculinity, is his behavior towards 
women and children.  Articles about such crimes emphasized the exceptional nature of  enemy 
brutality, which was evident in the concluding words attributed to a woman who recounted her 
survival of a mass shooting of civilians:  “Where can I find words to curse that band of killers, 
those cannibals, drinking the blood of women and children[?]”.10  Likewise, Krasnaia Zvezda 
articles described atrocities against women and children in horrific detail: “one soldier smashed 
the child’s head before his mother’s eyes and cut him in half. Then the fascist beasts tore off the 
sobbing mother’s clothes, and raped the woman and killed her.”11 Beyond the similarities with 
other atrocity reports, the threat German soldiers posed to Soviet women had further implications 
for the presentation of the enemy in Red Army propaganda.  
 Krasnaia Zvezda explained to Red Army troops that such merciless crimes against 
women revealed something essential about the enemy’s character.  An editorial on April 10, “For 
                                                 
9
 Emphasis added. Ibid.  
10
  The terms “kannibal” and “liudoed” both appear in descriptions of the enemy, without any apparent difference in 
meaning. “We will take revenge on the fascists!” Krasnaia Zvezda, 17 January 1942, 3. 
11
 “Simferopol, Yalta, Eupatoria,” Krasnaia Zvezda, 7 April 1942, 3. 
  
103 
 
 
the honor of our women!” named several women found raped and killed by the enemy before 
elaborating on the larger ramifications of such behavior: “German fascists, brazenly mocking the 
honor of Soviet women – these are lustful animals.” Beyond the obvious love of destruction and 
violence evident in their behavior, the motive of lust reinforced portrayals of the enemy as driven 
by savage, but human impulses. The editorial emphasized that the enemy’s actions were not the 
result of wartime circumstances, but had deep roots: “They have defiled their youth in German 
brothels and made the customs of brothels the catechism of their behavior in occupied 
countries.”  The editorial continued to emphasize how the enemy’s lustful behavior and rape of 
women, rather than the torture of other civilians generally, was definitively the behavior of 
savage men: “they have no shame, no remorse, [and] no heart. In the village of Semenov in 
Kalinin oblast Hitlerites raped 25-year-old Olga Tikhonova, the pregnant wife of a Red Army 
soldier.” Young German men with lustful and violent “animal instincts” were therefore the 
typical enemy type to appear in propaganda.
12
  Such depictions helped strengthen the contrast 
with Red Army soldiers’ rational nature and ethical defense of their homeland.  
 The propaganda effort to characterize the German invader as a savagely masculine figure 
also explained how heroic Red Army soldiers should respond.  They were to hate the enemy, but 
fight differently than him, and of course treat women in an entirely different manner.  Inspiring 
hatred would help motivate soldiers, according to Stalin in his May Day speech:  
A change has also taken place in the ranks of the Red Army. Complacency and laxity 
regarding the enemy, which was evident among the troops in the first months of the war, 
have disappeared. The atrocities, pillage, and violence perpetrated by the German fascist 
invaders against the peaceful population and Soviet POWs have cured our men of this 
disease. … They have learned to hate the German fascist invaders. 
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This newfound hatred would inspire soldiers to defeat the enemy, because “one cannot defeat the 
enemy without learning to hate him with every fiber of one’s soul.” 13  Hatred did not mean 
Soviet troops should themselves become like the enemy. Their task was to kill only the enemy, 
rather than massacre prisoners and ravage civilians: “acre by acre, town by town we are 
cleansing our land of the rapists. There is no greater exploit.”14 Similarly, Red Army soldiers 
aimed to protect women from the licentious enemy: “The honor of women, sisters, mothers, 
daughters – what is more valuable for a man, a defender of his motherland, of his family?”15 
While connections between victims of the German invader and soldiers’ families were rare, the 
invocation of a man’s defense of women’s honor revealed an unambiguous distinction between 
Soviet citizens’ relationship with violence, and the masculine nature of national defense. 
 When predictions of complete victory by year’s end met no concrete results and instead 
German forces began to drive deeper into Soviet territory, the valence of the idea of the enemy 
changed, and so did the depiction of the soldier hero.  Propaganda continued to present the 
enemy as a brutal killer, but a much more dangerous one, who threatened the very existence of 
the Soviet people. Stalin used this approach when he mentioned that the enemy would shoot 
civilians if partisans prevented “some German beast… from raping women or robbing citizens” 
in his October Revolution anniversary speech.
16
  Discussions of such enemy villainy sought to 
inspire soldiers’ hatred and will to resist, as the head of the Red Army’s Political Administration, 
A.S. Shcherbakov told a meeting of Kalinin Front political workers.  Front newspapers, he 
explained, should publish more material like, “for example, the letter of a girl from Kel’n, which 
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shows how our people have become slaves.”17 Similarly, newspaper articles explained to soldiers 
directly that in response to the enemy’s invasion “there can only be one answer: death or 
victory!” because death could allow “fascist bandits…to make your wives and children into 
slaves.”18 Despite women’s actual contributions at the front, it was their place in the rear to be 
defended and their victimization under occupation that appeared in soldier-specific propaganda 
most frequently. 
 Soldier specific propaganda explicitly stated the significance of German atrocities against 
Soviet women for Red Army troops, as if to ensure political workers and soldiers understood this 
was a failure of their duty as defenders of the motherland.  An article reporting Soviet women’s 
activism surrounding children in the war reminded soldiers of women’s role in child rearing: “Be 
resolute in the war – happiness will again return to our children.  The Red Army is carrying it 
[back to you] …your husbands, brothers, [and] sons are fighting against the enemy!”19  
Similarly, at year’s end, the article “The Return” presented a family desperately awaiting the Red 
Army’s return to their German-occupied village: “The German is evil.  He hunted Mother and 
hunted us. [My] aunt says to me: ‘recite the poems about Voroshilov.’ But I did not recite them – 
lest the German overhear, he would kill me and Grandmother.”20  Both articles presented soldiers 
with the stakes of failing to uphold the masculine ethic of national defense.  This newly 
prominent depiction of the enemy, as an object of hate that preyed on defenseless civilians and 
prisoners, and defiled Soviet women, began to appear in Soviet propaganda in the first days of 
1942, and remained prominent throughout the year.
21
  As an antithetical masculine figure, it also 
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provided the foundation for defining the ideal Red Army hero in propaganda, even as the latter 
changed in step with the strategic situation.  Although life and death prevailed over honor as a 
concern, women’s need for rescue and protection appeared as a central theme.  Red Army troops 
could prevent the enemy from unleashing his violent passions on Soviet civilians, and had 
countless examples of the consequences of failure.     
 
Amidst the new focus on the enemy in propaganda, male soldiers, writing to an 
overwhelmingly female audience of relatives, wives, and girlfriends, continued to perform the 
“provider-at-war” masculinity in their letters home.  Red Army troops’ focus on family and 
personal ties continued to shape their expressions of hatred for the enemy in early 1942, rather 
than prompting soldiers to adopt propaganda language directly.  Many troops cursed the enemy 
simply for disrupting their lives, as one junior officer explained, “At the enemy that has broken 
our happy life, I strike mercilessly, to destroy every one of them.”22 Some troops expressed their 
duty to contribute to the enemy’s defeat, but nonetheless presented returning home as their 
ultimate priority. A recon squad leader on the Kalinin Front explained this to his wife and 
daughter: “the duty of every soldier should be to destroy the German oppressor in order to return 
home with victory.”23 A lieutenant reassured his wife in Baku in a similar manner: “don’t worry, 
everything will be alright. …be fully confident that I will return home only as a hero who 
destroyed the [fascist] reptiles.”24  Another soldier, lamenting that he had not yet seen his 
newborn son, wrote to his wife: “If it weren’t for these Hitlerite dogs, we would be enjoying our 
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life together.”25  For many such men, separation from family was enough reason to hate the 
enemy.   
 Some cited the potential threat to their loved ones as reason to hate the enemy, as a 
soldier from still-unoccupied parts of the Rostov oblast vowed to his wife: “I will strike so 
strongly at the enemy and give them no mercy…so that our children would live as you lived and 
not be slaves.”26  Many others in the Red Army were less fortunate, and cursed an enemy that 
had already occupied their towns and endangered their families directly.  A small group of 
soldiers from the Crimea wrote to their families via the state radio service: “We are fighting the 
German barbarians and will liberate our Crimean homeland.”27  Taken together, these letters 
suggest the continued importance of personal motives and a duty to family for frontline soldiers 
in early 1942.   The German invader threatened male soldiers’ real and symbolic status as 
defenders of the families, but suffering or fearing a personal loss due to the invasion was more 
likely than propaganda to prompt soldiers to express hatred of the enemy.   
 Expressions of hated and anger appeared most frequently among fighting men who 
witnessed enemy atrocities against women firsthand.  An artilleryman, who rarely encountered 
the enemy at a close enough distance to distinguish between individual faces, explained his 
hatred in this manner: “One could not but hate the invaders for the ‘scorched earth’ that I saw in 
the region between the Volga and Don rivers… and for the gallows they set up in a village near 
Rostov-on-Don, where the bodies of five hanged civilians swung in the winter wind.”28  Without 
such experiences, men writing to their families were less likely to have a personal reason to hate 
the enemy, and soldiers did not seem to need to hate the enemy to function in battle.  A tanker 
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explained how battle alone did not provoke hatred: “here it was a simple matter: either you 
would get him, or he would get you.  I would never shoot prisoners, though. … I ruled it out as a 
matter of principle.”29  Until personal loss or experiences of enemy violence inspired them, 
soldiers’ rarely expressed anything like the intense hatred that propaganda, and particularly Il’ia 
Ehrenburg’s articles, promoted regularly in 1942.   
 The focus on hatred of the enemy that emerged in soldier-specific propaganda in 1942 
followed the discovery of mass atrocities in liberated regions. The same pattern seemed to 
operate in individual expressions of hatred against the Germans, whether contemporary or 
remembered decades later.  Violence distinguished enemy and hero, not only as opposing forces, 
but as fundamentally different men, with women as passive figures caught in between.  As a 
mobilizing tool, official rhetoric emphasized the suffering of women and children, Germans’ 
animalistic nature, including sexual urges, and the defense of women’s honor as recurring theme 
tied to the masculine ethic.  While retaining the basic divide between front and rear, active and 
passive used in 1941, the new emphasis on enemy violence appeared as a stronger challenge to 
Soviet men, just as Civil War veterans challenged their figurative sons to do better.  Red Army 
troops appeared less engaged with official rhetoric than they had been in 1941, and instead let 
their experiences determine their views.  Still strongly oriented toward family, especially in the 
first months of the year, servicemen showed little concern for Germans’ violation of general 
ideals of honorable warfare.  Only after soldiers grew more accustomed to frontline life and 
especially combat would they contrast themselves as soldiers.   
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Violence as distinguishing action in war 
 As the Red Army prepared to expel the German invader in 1942, the violence and 
aggression of offensive operations gained greater attention at all levels of the military.  Official 
rhetoric promoted the motives and means for maximum German casualties as a labor-like 
endeavor, which would aggregate enough enemy losses into Soviet victory.  Soldiers proved 
much more contemplative, and considered how the act of killing changed them and their sense of 
self.  Killing the enemy thus varied from job requirement to rite of passage, but the desire and 
capacity to be violent assumed a masculine character.  As women began to arrive at the front in 
numbers, both propagandists and soldiers began to re-categorize frontline service roles 
hierarchically according to their exposure to, and use of violence.  
 A new hero emerged to reflect the focus on using violence differently from the enemy, 
and his motives, qualities, and combat exploits marked a departure from the “Sacrificial 
Defender” of 1941.  In his place, propagandists and political workers sought to connect the male 
soldier of 1942 with the New Soviet Man and masculine labor heroes of the 1930s.
30
  This new 
ideal, the “Stakhanovite-at-arms,” strove to exterminate the hated enemy by engaging his fellow 
soldiers in socialist competition.  Frontline propaganda presented such competitions as an easy 
task befitting the optimistic tone of the period. Official rhetoric promoted a high number of 
enemies killed as the measure of a hero, rather than the bravery or risk-taking otherwise involved 
in successful battler performance.  The difference in who and how he killed further defined the 
“Stakhanovite-at-arms” through contrast with the enemy, as the former only struck down other 
men, did so skillfully, and killed with a calm, detached demeanor, despite his hatred. The act of 
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killing also distinguished the heroic Red Army men as the foremost contributors to the Soviet 
war effort, elevating them above the women who supported them at the front and in the rear.   
 Socialist competition quickly became a central element of political work among Red 
Army soldiers in 1942. On January 20, a report about Komsomol work in the military, one of the 
first efforts to promote the new movement, demanded that “the expansion of competition among 
fighters in the destruction of fascist troops. There is too little fury [at present]. …Political work is 
needed to support this competition.”31 In February, Andrei Zhdanov, chief Party representative 
on the Leningrad Front, systematically elaborated the new agenda of political work to a meeting 
of decorated soldiers and political workers.  From the outset, he explained that military success 
was only one objective: 
Comrades, our front rally of brave destroyers of the fascist occupiers has a great 
significance not only practically, but also politically, not only significance for our 
front, but also for all of our Red Army…Comrades, it is not surprising, therefore, 
that the movement of exterminators…was launched by our leader and commander 
comrade Stalin.
32
   
 
Zhdanov’s speech therefore addressed larger plans within the Red Army for political work to 
present a new definition of heroism and a new measure of achievement for soldiers that restored 
the political content largely absent from the “Sacrificial Defender” of 1941.   
 The political significance that Zhdanov mentioned was the application of the methods 
and revival of the rhetoric of the mobilization efforts of the 1930s, which helped define the new 
heroic ideal by linking him to a central example of the New Soviet Man in the second half of the 
1930s, the Stakhanovite hero of labor.
33
  Zhdanov deliberately employed the language of 
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socialist competition and Stakhanovism to explain the heroism that political workers should 
promote: “the Komsomoltsy of a single division decided to begin socialist competition between 
units in the extermination of the fascist reptiles…there are many similarities with the 
Stakhanovite movement, and I would call our exterminating soldiers Stakhanovites on the 
military front.”34  Such heroes’ skills and optimistic belief in victory were to overcome the 
unfavorable military realities that prevailed at the front in 1942, just as Stakhanovites’ strength 
and will-power overcame the empirical limits of production. 
35
  Socialist competition to 
exterminate the hated enemy, inspired by Stalin, motivated the new hero, and the number of 
enemy dead he produced demonstrated his merit.
36
   
 After the Germans launched a massive offensive in June, a new soldierly ideal in 
propaganda developed from deteriorating military situation that culminated in the battle for 
Stalingrad. Facing a new threat from the same enemy, the “Last Soviet Man” fought out of 
desperation, killing to keep his country from being overrun, rather than as part of the march to 
impending victory.  A notion of young men’s generational duty helped define the new hero, in 
which “sons” had to defend the victory of their fathers and the gains of the Revolution.  In battle, 
the “Last Soviet Man” remained disciplined without resorting to sacrificial actions, and yet he 
refused to retreat under pressure.  Instead, he fought on and stayed alive because his will was 
greater than that of enemy.   
 As the Red Army suffered heavy losses on all fronts, and faced rapid enemy advances in 
the south, soldier-specific propaganda and political work began to present a new ideal connected 
to the strategic situation and yet consistently gendered masculine. Speaking to agitators on the 
Voronezh Front in September, formed after the German summer offensive began, Army 
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Commissar Lev Mekhlis focused on the stakes of the battles about to unfold while explaining 
what motivated the “Last Soviet Man”: 
We are talking about – whether or not the great Russian people will be in slavery, 
and all peoples of our country, who on the field of battle have bloodily linked their 
fate with the fate of the great Russian people…We are talking about – Comrade 
Stalin has highlighted this – whether or not there will be Soviet power…The issue is 
the national and social enslavement of our country.
37
 
 
The existential threat to the Soviet people and the Soviet system operated as the basic motivation 
of the new hero, and reflected desperation totally absent from the “Stakhanovite-at-arms” ideal 
soldier that preceded him.  From such simple motives, the duty of this new hero was clear, as a 
Krasnaia Zvezda editorial explained to soldiers: “The Soviet people demand that the Red Army 
staunchly defend every scrap of native territory…every Soviet city and town – that is our duty, 
the sacred requirement of every fighter of the Red Army.”38  In an October speech to senior 
political workers on the Volkhov Front, Mekhlis explained how his motives gave the “Last 
Soviet Man” the moral strength to triumph over the enemy: “Our army, led by the great military 
leader, Comrade Stalin, fighting for a just cause, defending its own homes - has every reason to 
exceed the enemy in its fighting spirit.”39  Indeed, propaganda ascribed only villainous motives 
to the enemy, as one editorial explained: “Piles of ash and stones remain in the locations of 
flourishing towns and villages, where the German has been. Everything that he can destroy, the 
German destroys.”40  
 Generational distinctions further differentiated the “Last Soviet Man” from previous 
soldierly masculinities in official rhetoric.  Such soldiers had a duty as defender not only to 
defend Soviet women, but also as “sons of October,” to defend the Revolution their fathers had 
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won and thus prove their manliness.
41
  On August 4, a Krasnaia Zvezda article presented the oath 
of a group of Don Cossacks, who, “death threatening our children, our wives…Vow on the honor 
and blessed memory of our fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers…to destroy mercilessly 
the hated enemy.”42 In September, another such article invoked the duty of the younger 
generation of men to act as defenders, this time unfavorably comparing Volga civil war battles to 
those of 1942: “when under the ruins of our homes our wives and children perish, we, the 
defenders of Tsaritsyn, decided to contact you, defenders of Stalingrad.”43   To mark the 
anniversary of the Revolution, editorials reinforced the message of inter-generational male 
contrast and obligation, “In October of 1917 our fathers and brothers went into battle against the 
forces of slavery and oppression…in battles with the hated German invaders we defend the gains 
of October.”44  
 The language of family in official rhetoric consistently presented the duty of soldier 
heroes as a generational one, and thus reflected the pessimistic tone in propaganda, raising the 
prospect of total defeat and the loss of a generation’s worth of progress under Soviet power.  
This possibility never received such frequent and honest attention at any other time of the war, 
including the months when German armies neared Moscow in 1941.  Moreover, as part of the 
break with the previous heroic ideal, soldier heroes of the “Last Soviet Man” type no longer 
appeared in propaganda as the figurative heirs of 1930s Stakhanovites, but of the inaugural 
cohort of Red Army fighters from the Civil War of the late 1910s. 
The combat exploits of the “Last Soviet Man” also diverged from those of the heroic 
ideal that preceded him, and continued to contrast with portrayals of the enemy’s use of violence.  
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Red Army soldiers became heroes not by accumulating a high number of enemies killed, but by 
overcoming larger forces through whatever means necessary, fueled by greater will and hatred.  
A lieutenant in “One against ten” demonstrated the power of hatred: “he was wounded, but his 
hatred of the enemy gave him strength. He pushed the German off him and, grabbing him by the 
throat, strangled him.”45  Killing the last of ten Germans with his bare hands, the Lieutenant 
highlighted the importance of continuing to fight, rather than panicking or retreating, not only to 
display heroism, but also to survive, as the Lieutenant’s actions helped his unit escape 
encirclement and continue fighting. Echoing Order 227, the article “Not a step back!” 
emphasized this: “Four fearless Soviet guards, Belikov, Aleinikov, Boloto and Samoilev drove 
back  the attack of 30 enemy tanks, destroying 15, and they themselves remained alive. 
Staunchness conquers death.”46 Rather than skills or kills, or sacrifice against superior enemy 
numbers, soldiers who were so driven to destroy the enemy that they would not retreat, panic, or 
even die appeared as the true heroes. An editorial quoted General Suvorov to reiterate this point: 
“death runs from the swords and bayonets of the brave, happiness crowns boldness and 
courage.”47 In this way, the “Last Soviet Man” defended Soviet women, and used violence 
against a (semi-) challenging opponent, for more honorable purposes, and with greater skill than 
the German enemy opposing him.   
 Remarkably, only two articles in Krasnaia Zvezda discussed a woman combatant in the 
Red Army in the first half of 1942.  The first discussed her service as a frontline soldier, but 
never described her as killing or exterminating the enemy. Scout Mariia Baida, posthumously 
decorated as a Hero of the Soviet Union, saw enemies “fall to the ground” while she “directed 
her submachine gun in their direction,” but her male officer did the only specified killing in the 
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battle account.
48
  Given the unambiguous and often graphic language used to describe the 
violence men perpetrated against each other, such restraint suggests a deliberate effort to retain 
the role of enemy-killer as the exclusive role of male soldiers, with the “Stakhanovite-at-arms” 
as the best killers among them. The second contained active violence against the enemy, but 
diminished Nina Onilova’s combat merit and still portrayed her differently than male heroes. 
While fighting the enemy, “a fragment of a German shell wounded the girl in the temple.  Blood 
flooded her face, and her head impotently fell to the ground. She lost consciousness, but only for 
a short while… Her comrades carried the woman machine-gunner to the field hospital.”49 Not 
only did she not fight for the prevailing motive of socialist competition, her portrayal focused 
excessively on a severe wound.  Onilova’s subsequent death, which the article linked to other 
fallen women, situated her as a tragic feminine figure more like the martyr Zoia 
Kosmodemianskaia than the “Stakhanovite-at-arms” or even the “Sacrificial Defender” of 1941.  
These portrayals represent a Soviet variation on the larger pattern of depicting women warriors 
with disqualifying flaws of excessively feminine qualities or insufficient warrior qualities or 
accomplishments.
50
  Both women fell short, the first for failing to actually kill in battle, and the 
second for her feminine vulnerability and insufficient will to continue fighting while wounded.  
 Frontline propaganda typically presented non-combatant women, rather than tainted 
fighters like Baida and Onilova, and explained what kept them from taking sustained violent 
action against the enemy.  The most basic problems, according to official rhetoric, were 
women’s lack of the mental and physical strength required for combat.  Formal inquiries based 
on the latter assumption challenged a female medic’s decoration with the Order of Lenin for 
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pulling wounded men from combat.  The investigation occurred because official were convinced 
that the medic, Olga Brazhnik, “was not capable of carrying even a fraction of [the stated 
number] of wounded soldiers from the field of battle.”51    Given such weakness, a mother could 
“send to war the best and strongest part of her soul – [her] son.  Let him fight for the two of 
them, for her too, with twice the strength, twice the hatred.”52  As if these deficits were not 
enough, most women lacked the motives and nature that drove men to fight, and were therefore 
best suited to other tasks.  A mother lamented “my children, I become weak, I have no strength 
left.”53  Better to produce soldiers and aid them from the rear, as the Central Committee’s 
International Women’s Day resolution explained.  Women could provide first aid, give blood, or 
care for orphans as laudable displays of feminine patriotism, which minimized their exposure to 
the violence and danger of the front.
54
  
 After the tone of soldier-specific propaganda changed in August, portrayals of women at 
the front declined, and those that appeared still failed to discuss women killing the enemy. In 
contrast, articles such as “A Mother’s Order,” “Women of the Town of Ivanovo,” and “Soldiers’ 
Wives” appeared more frequently, and focused on home front roles in considerable detail.55  
When women did appear at the front, as in the editorial “Glory to men and women partisans!”, 
only male partisans received individual recognition for their heroism in killing the enemy.
56
 
Similarly, the obituary of Aviator Marina Raskova credited her for civilian flights and training of 
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women pilots, but never mentioned that she or her pupils had killed the enemy.
57
  While women 
did appear in propaganda as contributors to the war effort, they failed to engage in violent acts 
against the enemy that constituted the foremost contribution to the war effort. 
 
 In response to presentations of exterminator-heroes and kill tally exploits, letters from 
Red Army troops expressed a remarkable lack of enthusiasm about the act of killing as part of 
their duty as soldiers.  While some fighters adopted the language of killing and exterminating 
enemy soldiers, making proclamations such as “I can already note a tally of 21 exterminated 
white Finns,” they more commonly failed to mention it at all.58  This likely reflected the fact that 
Soviet military failures throughout the winter and spring provided few opportunities for troops to 
match official rhetoric and exterminate the enemy in large numbers.
59
  Perhaps the most 
compelling reason that soldiers failed to embrace the socialist competition in killing promoted in 
official rhetoric was their actual experience of combat at the front.  As one politruk wrote to his 
wife, hoping to discourage his son from volunteering: “at the front, romance and poetry are much 
less [evident] than hardships and even horror. War is war. It is full of death, wounds, and other 
terrors.”60  Such sobering thoughts of combat hardly fit with propaganda constructs of a passive 
enemy and comparisons with coal hewing.  
 For many Red Army men, killing remained a basic and inevitable part of warfare, part of 
the duty they had to perform to end the war and return home.  One soldier explained this view 
matter-of-factly: “If you don’t kill the German, he kills you.”61  Others did not accept the new 
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measure of a fighting man, and understood the exterminator-hero as one role among many. 
Signaler Aleksandr Myl’nikov explained this to his brother: “I have not managed to finish off a 
single German because I am not a rifleman, nor a machine-gunner, nor an artilleryman, but a 
radio operator and such opportunities have not yet arisen…and I carry out my orders pretty 
well.”62  While Myl’nikov addressed the significance of personally killing the enemy, he 
expressed an alternative pride in his specialization, which lay outside the bounds of socialist 
competition and the sniper-centered heroic ideal.  Such responses amidst a general silence about 
the specific act of killing demonstrate the limitations of the new heroic ideal, the “Stakhanovite-
at-arms,” to resonate amidst soldiers who otherwise shared some of the hatred of the enemy 
present in official rhetoric. 
 Instead, soldiers continued to focus on their families, and their motives to fight and kill 
remained tied to a sense of masculine duty to defend the country while performing their 
peacetime role and care for their female and elderly relatives, as the “Provider-at-war.”  
Minimizing concern for their own safety, usually by focusing on their family’s well-being in the 
rear and omitting any discussion of frontline danger, remained a central element of this 
performance.  Lieutenant Ismaev expressed this concern when he wrote to his wife: “I’m very 
happy, that [my parents] are out of harm’s way… About me there’s nothing to write, I’m 
healthy.”63  Red Army men still attempted to provide for their families’ material needs through 
the unreliable option of sending home their pay. In typical fashion, one soldier promised his 
wife: “I do not know if you have received any from me, [but] I have money now from which you 
will get a sum of 750 rubles every month.”64  When faced with the prospect of confirming their 
families’ fears of frontline danger, wounded soldiers continued to downplay the seriousness of 
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their condition to minimize their loved ones’ worry.  A soldier on the Leningrad front took a 
typical approach to report his condition in a reassuring manner: “presently, I am wounded, but it 
is not serious so do not worry… Kiss [our] son and daughter for me, and tell them that papa will 
soon be home.”65  Hardship and wounds separated troops from their loved ones, but they began 
to accept the lack of alternatives to continued separation as the price of familial safety. 
 The need to kill and see fellow soldiers die increasingly separated troops’ war experience 
from that of their families in the rear as the year wore on. Men at the front often realized that 
combat altered their sense of self, as an infantryman recalled: “By nature I am a tender and 
sensitive person. I was never a hooligan or a brawler. But when I went to war I wanted to destroy 
the Fritzes: ‘Kill or be killed.’ This was my message to the newcomers.”66  Changes like the one 
Abdulin described helped very different people integrate into effective units and emotionally 
connected groups of soldiers, but often at the price of their family ties.  A submachine-gunner 
reflected on the difference between “relatives and the group on which he places his hopes in 
combat.  At times, [the group] will pull him to shelter. I would not give preference to one 
relationship – they are parallel and very important.” 67  Others more casually noted the contrast 
between the toughness of the combat collective and the comforts of home: “If anyone started to 
grumble, he was immediately rebuked: ‘You haven’t come to your mother-in-law’s for 
pancakes!’ Quite so!”68  Growing remoteness from home caused some soldiers, especially squad 
leaders and NCOs, to worry more about men who were “already married and had a baby son, 
while the rest of us were still single” or “he is an older man, most likely he has children waiting 
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for him to come home.”69  Such men might remain more anchored in their civilian lives than 
their combat duties. Troops often idealized home as a safe place as their own lives grew more 
centered on violence.  Soldiers’ feeling of distance from family and their civilian selves 
contributed to an imagining of front and rear as distinctly masculine and feminine spaces. 
 Official distinctions between front and rear linked the latter to what the state had 
provided women, especially in the 1930s, as a place for labor to continue without disruption, 
while Stalin’s men actively fought at the front, and took back land from the enemy.  Women had 
little to add to this, especially once the masculine ethic reappeared after the start of the German 
drive to Stalingrad.  Heroism was about violent action above all, quantity not quality, whether 
offensive or defensive.  Rather than simply doing other things, women in frontline propaganda 
appeared to fundamentally lack the capacity for such violence, and were better suited to help 
men do the job.  Soldiers’ participation in killing and reaction to it reveals the cultural 
transformation of citizen soldiers that took place as the Red Army replenished its ranks in 1942.  
Killing had profound meaning to individuals, in strong contrast to thoughtless kill count 
accumulation of the Stakhanovite-at-arms, which provided few soldiers with a serious blueprint 
for action.  Red Army troops believed that killing set them apart from civilians, brought them 
closer to the veterans among them, and reflected a certain masculine nature to undertake.  
Because it had such an impact on them, they believed that it defied the capabilities of most 
women.  Troops thus possessed a parallel view of violence dividing the front and rear, but 
changes to their sense of self, rather than propaganda portrayals, fueled their assessment.  
Comradeship amidst catastrophe 
 The active and effective use of violence against the enemy demanded coordinated 
collective action, which shaped and was shaped by soldiers’ relationships with one another.  
                                                 
69
 Petr Mikhin, Guns Against the Reich (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2010), 31, 37. 
  
121 
 
 
Official rhetoric changed in response to Stalin’s notorious Order 227 in July of 1942.  Military 
histories typically ignore the order’s impact on propaganda in favor of its creation of new 
punitive disciplinary policies.  The new line placed greater emphasis on individual feats and 
loyalty to the national cause or Stalin as soldiers’ motivation.  Comradeship among soldiers grew 
more quickly in the trenches than among the examples of frontline propaganda.  While the 
heroics of ideal fighters alternated between individualistic competition and unit-wide skill-
sharing, the rank-and-file began to develop relationships and norms rooted in their initiation to 
combat and frontline danger.  Shared frontline experiences, especially the life-saving knowledge 
and care veterans provided to hastily deployed replacements, provided a new foundation to 
frontline culture and the cohesion of Red Army units.  The exclusion of women from both sets of 
norms bridged an otherwise growing gap over the course of the year. 
 The start of a German offensive on 28 June quickly shattered both Soviet leaders’ and 
soldiers’ illusions about victory in 1942. The German army’s capture of Sevastopol and rapid 
drive through the Donbas prompted Stalin to issue Order 227 on 28 July, in an effort to deal with 
the month-old crisis. The first half of Stalin’s Order 227 surveyed the consequences of recent 
Red Army retreats, and argued against the option of further withdrawal, before it detailed the 
new disciplinary measures that the Red Army would implement.  The first lines of the order 
explained how the enemy “tears deep into the Soviet Union, invading new regions, devastating 
and ruining our cities and villages, raping, robbing, and killing the Soviet population.”70 After 
enumerating the cities already lost in three weeks of fighting, some blamed on premature retreat, 
the order explained that the Soviet people were “losing faith in the Red Army, and many of them 
curse the Red Army because it lets our people fall under the yoke of the German oppressors, but 
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it itself flows away to the east.”71  Such a frank admission of Soviet defeats marked a clear 
departure from Stalin’s own optimistic tone in May and the larger propaganda line of 1942 as the 
year of victory, and set the precedent for a new, pessimistic tone in subsequent political work and 
newspaper propaganda. 
 The priorities emphasized in Order 227 clearly shaped the content of political work, but 
also sought to motivate soldiers directly. Political reports gauging soldiers’ reactions to the Order 
reveal its intended impact:  to compel soldiers to accept the stakes of victory and defeat, and 
realize that the desperate fighting that faced them was more desirable than the personal and 
national consequences of cowardice and retreat.  As a result, examples of positive reactions 
included variations of: “The order is very good and if it had come out earlier, then we would 
probably not have had such disgraces, as we have endured.”  Each soldier’s belief in future 
Soviet victory provided the only difference from responses deemed negative, such as: “Now this 
order is ineffective, because it is given too late. Many of our units are already destroyed, so that 
[we have] no one and nothing to fight with.”72 Soldiers could criticize the timing of the order and 
past leadership, as long as they were willing to continue fighting. Such an assessment of soldiers’ 
views suggests that the propaganda purpose of Order 227 was to use desperation as a motive, to 
provide soldiers with not only no alternative to resistance, but also a reason to resist. 
 Within days, the order began to affect both disciplinary practices and political work 
among soldiers on every front.  When Leningrad party leader Zhdanov first addressed political 
workers after the publication of Order 227, his optimistic advocacy of socialist competition and 
frontline Stakhanovism in the winter and spring had disappeared.  To take its place, Zhdanov 
explained, “The order of Comrade Stalin…must define the themes, tone, and style of all our 
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work,” because “the burdensome and serious danger to our motherland remains.”73  In 
September, Soviet president Kalinin echoed Stalin’s order when he explained to junior officers 
and political workers defending Moscow that “We need to learn from the enemy, to adopt from 
him all the best practices.”74  Similarly, Army Commissar Mekhlis reiterated the order’s impact 
to political workers on the Voronezh Front in September, and then again to Volkhov Front 
political workers in October, “…Stalin has attached crucial importance to moral factor in war… 
if we allow cowards take over on the field of battle – then our cause is doomed.”75  Soviet 
officials and the Red Army’s PUR actively studied the propaganda impact of the measure on the 
rank-and-file during the week after Stalin issued it. A series of reports to Deputy Chairman of the 
State Defense Committee Molotov summarized the order’s impact on soldiers on every front of 
the war individually, in addition to concrete results in terms of an increase in soldiers punished 
and local combat outcomes.
76
  Order 227 thus changed the direction of political work at the front, 
and initial assessments before it could affect combat performance, suggested it had a useful 
propaganda value.  In fact, this was its most novel impact, since repression was already robust 
inside and outside the military.    
 In the context of Order 227 and the “Last Soviet Man” as a heroic ideal in the second half 
of 1942, official rhetoric also addressed the issue of comradeship.  Stalin appeared as a critical 
figure in this respect, taking on the role of symbolic NCO among fighting men. In contrast to 
battles cries of “For Stalin!” Krasnaia Zvezda reported soldiers’ individual responses to his 
national speech in November.  Among one set of examples, a soldiers explained how Stalin 
compelled them to keep fighting while wounded, as if Stalin were present in the sergeant’s 
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dugout, encouraging him to keep fighting: “Regardless of wounds, I am ready to strike the fascist 
reptiles”77  Rather than comrades or local leaders among them, Stalin appeared to provide troops 
with direction and a sense of unified purpose in battle: “It seemed as if a black cloud hung over 
me and nothing would break through it.  But then I read Stalin’s speech and immediately my 
mood changed entirely.”78  In short, soldiers acted as if they were to fight with him, so he 
provided their combat motivation.  While Stalin’s speeches and telegrams to outstanding units 
only appeared every few months, articles such as “Listening to the voice of the leader…” 
contained more reporting on ersatz comradely bonds than articles actually about front life.
79
 
 In contrast to this emphasis on comradeship, the only other German-killing woman 
combatant appeared isolated from her comrades and showed no concern for Stalin.  Liudmila 
Pavlichenko, the “Girl with a rifle” went about her day alone after receiving orders from her 
commander.
80
  As a sniper, she shared none of her combat experience with other infantry, and 
did not participate in competitions with them.  Even those favorite female subjects of Krasnaia 
Zvezda, officers’ wives, appeared to have stronger bonds to soldiers motivating them.  Based on 
a letter from the rear, the “Women of the city of Ivanovo” from a local factory collected funds to 
buy gifts for soldiers after an officers’ wife joined their factory, so that after their gifts led to an 
exchange of letters “mostly likely, the soldiers ‘of our battery’ in their leisure time talk about the 
girls from distant Ivanovo and call them ‘our girls’…”81 The personal connection of one wife 
thus motivated several women to aid a group of artillerymen at the front, even if there were 
romantic undertones to their interaction.  Beyond such token connections, the official 
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comradeship of the Stakhanovite-at-arms situated women as outsiders at the front, with even less 
in common with male heroes than their three examples of combat action would suggest.   
 
 Red Army troops’ recollections about Order 227 varied, but the most significant aspect of 
their response was neither support nor opposition.
82
  Instead, Order 227 shows the nature of 
soldiers’ affiliation at the front, and their distinction between the local collective of brother 
combatants and the larger collective of their division or army on the Soviet front.  A rifle 
company NCO noted his commander’s immediate reassurance about the order’s relevance: 
“Don’t worry, guys.  Nobody’s going to let them send you into a penal company.”83 
Gorbachevsky, and many like him, understood Order 227 as responding and applying to men 
other than themselves and their comrades.  An artillery squad leader noted the separation 
between his men and order’s targets: “The order demanded: Die, but do not retreat! It was 
necessary to halt the unending retreat of Soviet troops towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus at 
whatever the cost, while we, the troops standing in front of Rzhev, had to capture the city at the 
cost of our lives and eliminate the threat to Moscow.”84  Such troops were often more concerned 
by the news of their comrades’ rout on the southern front.  Whether blaming officers or cowards, 
or pitying men lacking training and motivation, the Order was separate from them, as a rifleman 
recalled his reaction to the execution of a deserter from another unit “The military authorities 
obviously thought that it would act as a deterrent to the rest of us; but the truth is that it cause 
nothing but indignation among the rank and file.”85  Shame and sanctions were not necessary to 
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keep him and his comrades on the firing line, and redundant in light of their own norms and 
obligations to each other.  
 As the Red Army’s crisis over the summer and fall of 1942 grew, rank-and-file soldiers 
found their ability to endure new hardships severely tested. The intensity of combat and high 
casualties, not only on the road to Stalingrad but also in battles before Leningrad and around 
Rzhev, wore down the resolve and altered the perspective of many Red Army men in their letters 
home.
86
  Soldiers began to write openly about the dangers they and their comrades faced, their 
fears, and above all, the prospect of death.  Some troops addressed this subject in terms of 
defending their families, as one sergeant wrote his wife from the Stalingrad front: “I know that if 
I perish, then it is for the future happiness of my dear children.”87  Red Army men often 
emphasized their devotion to family, but their pessimism about survival was clear, as in another 
soldier’s final letter before reaching the front outside Stalingrad: “I’m sorry that we did not have 
more time together, but nothing can be done about war.”88 While they remained concerned for 
their families’ well-being, and sought to contribute to their finances, they were no longer able to 
perform the role of the reassuring, worry-free provider-at-war masculinity in their letters home. 
 The change is particularly striking because soldiers began to make death and danger 
central subjects of their letters, rather than giving them passing mention.  Writing his younger 
brother only a few weeks into the German offensive, the signaler formerly confident about his 
frontline contribution explained the new reality of battle: “at every step, every minute, you 
expect trouble. Death awaits.”89  Providing such honest details not only confirmed family 
members’ fears about the front, but also revealed soldiers’ own anxieties and limits.  Another 
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Red Army fighter, a father in his late forties, expressed such sentiments to his wife from the 
Rzhev Front in early 1943, “I have barely remained alive, but believe that I have lost all hope of 
survival, now the fighting is large-scale and heavy and horror covers every minute.”90  A 
volunteer and machine-gun commander at Stalingrad wrote his mother “A mortar exploded five 
meters from me, but fortune smiled – I survived,” and then concluded gloomily: “Now I will 
write every five days. If nothing comes, then I will no longer be alive.”91Such letters show that 
soldiers could no longer lessen the worry of family members by performing the role of the 
untroubled defender to in their letters, and had to admit the dangers they faced and their 
difficulty coping.   
 A greater focus on comrades at the front accompanied this new pessimism about survival, 
furthering the shift away from the provider-at-war masculinity that had figured prominently in 
the first year of war.  A Crimean Tatar junior lieutenant wrote to his wife: “Many of my 
comrades from the academy assigned here have been wounded or killed. Several mortars just fell 
not far from where I am writing.”92 Soldiers’ growing willingness to share such details 
communicated not only their proximity to mortal danger, but also the development of new 
relationships and loyalties at the front.  Another soldier began a letter to his mother by detailing 
the fate of two comrades:  “Firstly, I want to report that I am alive and healthy. Ilya Baiakin was 
killed [10 days ago], and Ivan Bogatov was wounded in his first battle.”93  This focus on the fate 
of comrades underscored the breakdown of the earlier letter-writing performances amidst the 
shocks of dashed expectations and intense and initially unsuccessful battles.  Frontline 
relationships with male comrades, even if newly severed, began to appear along with concern for 
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primarily female family members.  The initial wartime performance of masculine duty in the 
letters of Red Army men thus began to break down in favor of an alternative that better 
addressed the experiences and hardships of extended frontline service. 
 Red Army soldiers, like their counterparts in most modern armies at war, must develop a 
sense of self that values the interests or approval of “some collectivity beyond himself” in order 
to function effectively.
94
   The primary group, anchored by combat veterans, provided the main 
site of this collective affiliation in the late war, when family and homeland grew more remote as 
victory drew near.
95
  While these primary groups in the Red Army did not avowedly exclude 
women, they consistently espoused values and standards of conduct that non-combatants could 
not meet.  By the post-liberation phase of the war, these primary groups, or combat collectives, 
took on a clearly gendered character that provided ample reason to disqualify female fighters.
96
  
Above all, women failed to warrant the status of equal combatants because of their role as 
objects of sexual desire.  
 A core element of Red Army troops’ collective bond was their response to shared 
conditions of service, such as living, marching, and fighting together, which linked them through 
a sense of shared hardship and danger.
97
  As a platoon of infantrymen and snipers discussed, 
battle provided the ultimate test for an individual, and revealed everything about him to his 
comrades:  
‘Mitya!’ a voice came out of the darkness. ‘You’re simply our hero! It is simply 
splendid! Just how did you reach him through that storm of fire, huh?’ A deep voice 
responded, ‘What’s there to be amazed about? A soldier here knows his own business.’ 
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‘Here, my brother, it’s not enough to be simply a soldier…’ ‘Ho-ho-ho!’ the deep voice 
again rumbled. ‘In war, brother, you’ll find out everything there is to know about a 
man.  Whether he’s dense or has an agile mind, and what sort of heart he has.  In 
combat… how should I say this… people are exposed for who they really are.  There’s 
no masking it.’ What do you know about it, guys? A strong voice hastily began to say. 
‘There’s no sort of heroism here. I managed to make my way close to this bunker 
before anyone else, and then I just stuck a bundle of grenades into it, that’s all.’98 
 
These soldiers articulated a larger process at work at the front, one in which men reshaped, or 
were forced to reconsider, their understandings of self in light of the new and extreme 
experiences of combat.  The nature of battle meant that not only individuals themselves, but also 
the men around them, could claim to learn “who they really are” in response to the demands of 
survival, killing, and sacrifice that civilian life, even peacetime military service, scarcely 
prepared them for.  Through a sort of hermeneutics of the fighting spirit, veteran fighting men 
sought to determine who merited inclusion in their fighting collective or primary group, with the 
material and psychological aid it provided.
 99
   These veterans provided models of front behavior, 
providing recruits with templates in the formation of a soldierly self.   How soldiers behaved in 
combat, not simply whether or not they survived, led to their inclusion as “brothers” or 
marginalization as men hoping “to be simply a soldier” and selfishly survive unscathed, which 
created an avowedly gendered hierarchy among men at the front, and thus provided the criteria to 
exclude women.
100
 
 Non-combat hardships at the front further contributed to the formation of primary groups 
among Red Army fighters.  Among frontline soldiers, the same action, taken for oneself or for 
ones comrades, prompted contrasting reactions.  The same submachine gunner noted without 
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criticism how “one of our soldiers slipped secretly into a food cellar adjacent to a house where an 
outside office stayed.  The officer caught the soldier red-handed and shot him down on the spot” 
and yet fondly remembered how the next evening, thanks to a thieving orderly, “The main course 
of our company’s festive table was the goat’s meat. To steal in your shelter is the highest extent 
of meanness! There we were!”101  It was with everyday aspects of front life that bonds were 
forged, even before combat, given the extent of the hardship and the feelings of separation from 
civilian life that they brought.
102
 Traditional practices of Russian working class masculinity, 
drinking and smoking also added to group bonds outside battle.
103
 A tank man remembered how 
while waiting for the order to advance, “The gun-layer Vitya Belov and the loader Misha 
Tvorogov lit up ‘goat legs’ [hand-rolled cigarettes] – how quickly they had learned from the ‘old 
guys’ how to roll a cigarette deftly around the little finger.104  In each aspect of front life, both 
the shared practices themselves and the extra effort that comrades displayed for each other 
helped build the cohesiveness of their primary group and the linking of their sense of self with it 
as a collective.
105
   
 Success in combat shaped the formation of primary group bonds, and the norms of 
combat units and the combat collectives within them.  A young mortar officer fresh from the 
academy faced serious skepticism from his unit, despite his training, which manifested itself 
during his first meal with his unit:  “Everyone drinks at the front! You should forget being a 
momma’s boy and be a real man.”106 For such veterans, absence from the front, even for training, 
diminished a man’s status, while their established presence conferred superior masculinity. This 
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was part of a larger phenomenon of primary group cohesion, in which combat veterans “were 
reluctant to offer their support because they had not yet accepted the replacements.  They did not 
want to make friends with someone who might shortly be killed or wounded.”107  In the Red 
Army as it struggled to drive the Germans back in 1942, an aversion to bonding with recruits 
existed in many units.  As one soldier explained, “Since we were a common infantry unit our 
reinforcements mainly were ineffective – semi-literate or illiterate and untrained men… 
However, there weren’t any signs of shunning or hostility among us.  All newcomers who came 
through the first days accustomed themselves to the war very soon.”108 Combat itself provided 
the limiting principle for the inclusion of new men into the front collective, so that men who died 
after their first or second day in combat did not register as lost comrades.  The initiation of raw 
troops through combat spread a set of norms and values created by veterans, rather than by 
political workers or propaganda materials alone. 
 This basis of collective affiliation also contained an exclusionary undercurrent and the 
means to judge other soldiers at the front outside formal rank structure.  In the crisis phase of late 
1942, troops assessed the status of officers through the lens of the combat collective.  
Unsurprisingly, this meant officers faced criticism for failing to fight and face danger, unlike the 
men under their command.  A sniper recalled: “I saw in a flash how Major Orurtsov glanced out 
of the bunker, and then dived back into it again.  He was a strange man: he even slept in his 
helmet.  The soldiers didn’t like him, they thought he was a coward.” 109 Even riflemen who 
joined the Communist party retained combat criteria for judging officers: “…the political 
workers, they took part in our battles, never sat behind our backs. So I can say that all our 
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political workers set examples for us in word and deed.”110  The standards the primary group 
established about combat action thus determined status and inclusion in the collective, not rank 
alone.  This sense of solidarity with a particular group of men could grow more important than 
attachment to the unit around them, the larger collective of the military, or even the national 
collective.
111
   
 While officers held a contingent status among their fellow men at the front, men serving 
in the logistical and auxiliary branches of the Red Army’s rear received universal derision from 
frontline combatants.
112
  The importance of the Red Army’s logistical apparatus increased after 
liberation, because the distance from Soviet supply depots, industrial centers, and entry points for 
lend-lease aid grew larger as the frontline moved westward.  Part of frontline troops’ sense of 
their superiority in the war effort appeared in how they defined the front, as one artillery 
observer explained: “It is interesting to compare the various definitions of ‘forward positions’ 
that existed at different levels.  For example, while some considered the command posts of first 
echelon regiments or even first echelon divisions as ‘forward positions,’ the infantry correctly 
considered even the divisional artillery’s indirect firing positions as being deep in the rear 
area.”113  Rather than simply distinguish how front zones differed, many soldiers described those 
who served away from the firing line in explicit contrast to themselves as combatants. 
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 The desire to fight, as a moral issue, proved to be the most common criticism that fighters 
voiced.  The greatest failing, then, of the men derisively called “rear rats” derived from their 
conduct in battle:  a willingness to let their fear overcome their duty to their comrades.
114
  A 
stubborn mortar crew commander explained the moral causes of Red Army tactical defeats: 
“most often men of the rear services initiated our routs.  As soon as something alarming 
happened – their wagons and trucks were already rushing at full speed.  In contrast to them, a 
battle tried unit would retreat, not flee, only if its ranks are dispersed.”115  Such contrast was 
typical of how fighters compared their units to those of the rear, focusing on the difference in 
courage between each group, with the rear units reacting in a way totally unacceptable by 
combatant standards.
116
   Rear men’s ignorance of what really counted at the front had a similar 
effect, as with an infantryman who refused aid for a wounded comrade because he was at the 
wrong unit’s field hospital: “What could I have done with that bureaucrat? I would’ve liked to 
put a bullet through his narrow forehead.”117 Not only rear service men’s cowardice and 
excessive formality, but also the impact of those tendencies on combat soldiers, constituted 
moral failings that lowered their status in a hierarchical relationship between different groups of 
men at the front.
118
    
 The obviously low place of these “rear rat” servicemen in the judgment of Red Army 
fighters appears more clearly as an expression of gender hierarchy when one takes into account 
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how troops characterized non-combatant Red Army women.  Soldiers’ assertion of a combatant 
subjectivity consistently emphasized its superiority to a non-combatant, but still nominally 
military, femininity.  Male troops discussed women’s non-combatant service, either separate 
from combat or separate from the front,  as the normal state of affairs, as a machine gunner 
explained: “Wherefrom could women appear in our trenches? All of them served somewhere in 
the rear.  The only woman whom we could see was our company nurse.”119  Other fighters 
mentioned contact with women on the rare occasions their units were temporarily relieved from 
duty on the firing line: “An amusing incident occurred while we were in reserve.  One day we 
learned that a theatrical troupe with three actresses was going to visit the regiment.”120  Another 
infantryman remembered how on his unit’s return from the rear: “We also bypassed [moving 
away from the front] army trucks full of female soldiers, either from hospitals or from medical 
battalions, or from the steam bath and laundry units.”121  Such non-combatant women were not 
only a typical sight in the rear, but also seemed to be representative of women in the Red Army, 
so that “female soldier” could be applied to them, and not reserved for women combatants in 
particular.   While their frequency of contact varied, such soldiers are representative in their view 
of Red Army women’s normal place being in the rear and in non-combatant roles.  
 Red Army fighters did not limit their observations to where women served, and were 
quick to ascribe qualities to and make judgments about the non-combatant women they 
encountered.  On the more critical end of the range of views on this subject, soldiers discussed 
Red Army women as incapable of military service beyond the rear:  
A woman is a woman, especially at the front where she was in danger at any time. 
…There was in our regiment such a woman named Katia, a stunning woman. She was 
the regimental commander’s ‘campaign wife’.  …And this Katia had the orders of the 
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Red Banner, of the Red Star and, of course, many medals.  They hung so many 
decorations on her, though she actually didn’t know what the front really meant.122 
 
For such soldiers, Red Army women gained status unfairly through sexual relationships, lacked 
combat skills, and were unable to deal with the danger and fear that successful soldiers overcame 
to survive in battle.  Other troops expressed this perceived difference in a more sympathetic way, 
but nevertheless did not expect women to display the toughness or make sacrifices required of 
their male combatant counterparts.   
 In this context, criticism of men serving as “rear rats” takes on a more explicitly gendered 
tone.  They failed to live up to not only the highest standards of masculine behavior and 
solidarity, but fell below those standards to the point of effeminacy, because their character and 
duties were no different from those of rear service women.  In their first hours and days of 
combat, men formed their sense of what a fighter was and how they would survive together.  
With a small group, usually formed around elite veterans, who had survived longer and knew 
more than rear area trainers or commanders, Soviet men developed soldierly subjectivities as 
combatants, not just servicemen.
123
  Accordingly, the skills, qualities, and attitude that allowed 
men to survive took on a masculine character as they enabled troops to gain the acceptance of a 
group of men they respected if not admired.
124
 Fighting men believed that they risked death and 
endured pain in combat not simply to survive, or show their toughness, but because they were 
reciprocating the behavior of their comrades.  Those same fighters assumed that their sense of 
collective motivation and responsibility was lacking in the rear, since new recruits and auxiliary 
personnel were unprepared for battle.  
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 Soldier emphasized the masculine character of their combat collectives by describing 
them as brotherhoods.  They used this term only starting in 1942, when their sense of solidarity 
and commitment to each other grew strong, and well after official rhetoric deployed it in the first 
months of the war.  A tank man explained that he liked to use  
The term brotherhood. The crew was one family. Of course, much depends on the 
character of the commander and on the character of the crew, but in the majority 
of cases, in the absolute majority, the crew had one united purpose, it was one 
person. It never happened, that one or two did something, and the others sat or 
watched or smoked. Everyone worked together.
125
 
 
Popular usage at the front differed from propagandists’ description of the whole Red Army as a 
brotherhood that followed Stalin’s guiding hand.  Among infantry, brotherhood could begin on 
the march to the front, as when soldiers took the packs of those who struggled during overnight 
marches: “In the war such small gestures of assistance, and others like it, gave rise to frontline 
brotherhood. …We particularly valued these unwritten rules of conduct. They eased our difficult 
army life, drew the men together, and lifted our combat spirits.”126  Troops did not discriminate 
by age or generation, but they remained selective in terms of who belonged, even among the men 
of their regiment, by ensuring that everyone received and provided mutual support.  Such 
brotherhoods were not national, nor counted in millions, but close operated as close knit groups 
that functioned as surrogate families. Individual actions counted, punishment and praise operated 
outside the rank or disciplinary structure, and men seemed to find few women interested or able 
to measure up.  
 In 1942, comradeship, despite its value for unit cohesion and combat effectiveness, 
provided for the greatest divide between the ideal hero of propaganda and the masculine 
subjectivities of the rank and file.  Order 227 and the propaganda that followed it continued to 
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ignore comradeship at the front and personal motives at large in favor of a duty to the national 
collective and to Stalin as the father of heroes and founder of Soviet military-industrial power.  
Comradeship was unnecessary beyond the utilitarian spread of tactical knowledge, since all 
heroes focused on Stalin during the period of victorious advance and the national collective 
during the period of looming catastrophe.  New attention to the people’s role and their security 
needs marked a significant change from 1941, because it reinforced the masculine character of 
the front and combat roles just as women began fighting in their own defense in larger numbers.  
Accordingly, women’s breakthrough into combat roles received no clear celebration or 
integration into hero narratives during either half of the year.  Instead, women primarily appeared 
as civilians in frontline propaganda narratives to reinforce soldiers’ motivation and the 
emphasized the gendering of military power. Order 227 also shows growing gulf between 
official narrative and soldiers’ opinions and motivations, which appear as a breakdown of 
internal hegemony within the masculine bloc.   
  Soldiers’ formation of comradely bonds and masculine subjectivities re-oriented to 
frontline life due to their greater time at front and relative stability of fighting while the Red 
Army trained a reserve of fresh units before the Stalingrad counter-offensive late in 1942.  These 
developments in frontline culture reveal that the influx of women to the front served only to 
reinforce masculine character of frontline culture and affiliation, and feminization of non-
combatant men, rather than overturning dominant culture or group dynamics.  Soldierly 
subjectivities focused on the sub-unit-sized collective of primary group, not Red Army or Soviet 
population at large, which was not inherently a problem for military effectiveness, but revealed 
the limited effectiveness of official rhetoric and political work.  The growth of frontline bonds 
also revealed the decline of family connections with no end to the war in sight by mid-year. 
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Given the articulation of two clear models of soldierly behavior in the Stakhanovite-at-arms and 
the Last Soviet Man, soldiers’ orientation toward local front groups shows how independent their 
thinking could be, especially when spurred by the incongruity between official rhetoric and front 
experience.  
Conclusion 
 The experience and exercise of violence dramatically reshaped Soviet perceptions of the 
war effort by integrating the enemy as a counterpoint to heroic masculine ideals and driving 
individual men to form new relationships and communities at the front.  With the discovery of 
heinous crimes, German forces provided Soviet propagandists with ample material for an enemy 
other to demonize, although soldiers judgments refrained from making strong judgments until 
they had experience such crimes for themselves.  Contrasting uses and targets of violence 
distinguished official heroic and enemy masculinities, while fighting men found combat and 
violence to have a transformative impact on their sense of self.  Prolonged exposure to frontline 
hardships and dangers fueled comradeship despite official rhetoric that focused on the national 
emergency along with discussions of Stalin’s personal relationship with soldiers. 
 The new focus on the enemy in 1942 revealed a greater shift from an invasion that 
threatened the state in 1941 to a horrific enemy that menaced the Soviet people.  Frontline 
propaganda’s demonology relied on written descriptions of the enemy, which reveals a vastly 
different approach than that of visual sources that scholars have primarily examined.
127
 
Propagandists focused on the character and motives of the enemy to explain his violent actions, 
which targeted Soviet women and children above all. Rather than simply dehumanizing the 
enemy, frontline newspapers presented an enemy soldier who contrasted with his counterpart in 
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the Red Army in very specific ways, but remained comparable as well as different.  He emerged 
as an “other” to the Red Army hero as a soldier and as a man, defined by opposing notions of 
honor regarding motives for waging war, the individual use of violence, treatment of women, 
and personal courage in the face of danger.  The enemy’s villainy therefore rested on heinous 
wartime behavior and motivation, rather than ideological differences, historical connections, or 
leaders’ machinations.  The depiction of the enemy that emerged reinforced the masculine ethic 
and underpinned exhortations to drive him out of Soviet territory.  Despite this sustained effort, 
soldiers’ reaction to the enemy were quite varied, and the universal hatred expressed in print 
rarely echoed in soldiers’ views, even in hindsight, without firsthand experience of atrocities.  
 The rational and justified use of violence distinguished Red Army heroes in official 
rhetoric from the bloodthirsty and bestial sexual impulses that drove the enemy.  Women 
remained largely passive figures amidst the focus on violence despite their influx into the Red 
Army’s ranks.  Those who took up arms against the enemy in official rhetoric did not fit the 
prevailing ideal of heroism, and this reinforced the idea that women were out of place in combat, 
if not at the front overall.  This lack of change complemented the narrative of men’s duty to 
protect women.   Soviet men were less likely to have anticipated their involvement in a full 
wartime scenario or personal military role than did the young women Anna Krylova studied, and 
instead seemed to have struggled with early experiences of violence.
128
 However, killing 
remained a duty, rather than an act of pleasure for most, so that it defined them as soldiers but 
was part of soldiering, part of that world, not something they were doing for themselves (like 
winning a competition).  The process and its outcome rooted them more firmly at the front, 
distancing them from their civilian lives.  Fighting became a shared experience of comrades 
locally, which affirmed their belonging with veterans, and kept them alive.  This contradicts 
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Amir Weiner’s assertion that an integral brutality and a quarter-century of violent mobilization in 
the Soviet system prepared young men to resist the German invader like no other people in 
Europe.
129
 
 The Soviet idea of enemy masculinity contrasted significantly from that of its two major 
allies, the United States and Great Britain, both in content and in the extent to which it helped 
define their respective heroic masculinities. In British newspaper propaganda, the enemy 
appeared as an overly-militarized but professional soldier: focused only on war and combat, 
always in the company of other soldiers, quick to show dominance and aggression, and utterly 
devoid of civilian relationships or interests. In contrast, British soldiers appeared as typical 
citizens above all: husbands and fathers, who retained their civilian personas and morality in 
wartime through humor, camaraderie, and reserved emotions.
130
  The prevailing American view 
of the German enemy was essentially that of an honorable foe, although a clear competitor in 
masculine vigor and physical power. However, American propaganda appeared quite similar to 
its Soviet counterpart when discussing its Japanese enemy. Racist rhetoric constructed the enemy 
as a savage killer, prone to torture and rape, and often compared him to animal figures such as 
monkeys or gorillas.
131
  In both cases, much more limited experiences of German soldiers in 
battle and occupation were likely a factor in the more restrained presentation of the German 
enemy, just as specific atrocities appeared as a consistent feature of the Soviet idea of enemy. 
Nonetheless, the differing cases of its allies show the extent and significance of the enemy in 
Soviet efforts to define the Red Army hero and motivate soldiers to fight.  
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 Order 227 introduced a critical difference between soldier-specific and civilian-oriented 
propaganda, since it was not published and letters home about it were censored.  The order is 
typically read in military context with a focus on punitive measures, but not the context of 
frontline culture, although some scholarship has recently asserted it as part of some frontline 
zeitgeist that reflected soldiers’ unvoiced opinion.132  However, the order’s emphasis on ending 
further retreats fits the larger promotion of a masculine ethic premised on defending the civilian 
population, which was consistently feminized in propaganda intended for soldiers.  Moreover, 
Stalin’s authoritative voice complemented his recurring role as a source of personal inspiration to 
soldiers, whether in their competitions or as a comradely source of advice and motivation.  
Soldiers’ sustained exposure to hardship and danger provided them with a new appreciation for 
their comrades and a diminished connection to the seemingly tranquil world of home.  The 
comradeship of primary groups, not deserters’ executions, figured most prominently in soldiers’ 
letters and recollections.  The longer a soldier remained in the Red Army, the more his sense of 
self adapted to the realities of life at the front. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AVENGING AND MOURNING: HIERARCHIES AND COMMUNITIES AFTER STALINGRAD, 1943-1944 
 
 The Red Army’s victory at Stalingrad on 3 February 1943 constituted the first 
unambiguous destruction of an entire German army. The impact of this victory extended into 
frontline culture and soldier-specific propaganda.  However, amidst feelings of great relief and 
joy, soldiers and leaders alike remained acutely aware of the battles that lay ahead on other 
fronts. Soviet leaders realized that their momentum stalled before the end of February, while 
soldiers’ sense of vulnerability persisted, even if their sacrifices enabled greater military gains.  
This chapter examines the fifteen months after Stalingrad, which saw fighting continue 
exclusively within the boundaries of the Soviet Union.  During this time, official rhetoric focused 
on revenge and liberation as primary motives for soldier heroes.  Among the rank-and-file, 
revenge had begun to emerge as a motive before the Stalingrad victory, and grew in significance 
afterward.  The basic requirement for revenge as a motivation was soldiers dying, and that 
continued in great quantities after Stalingrad, despite the overall improvement of Red Army 
equipment and leadership as the war progressed.
1
 The drive for vengeance distinguished the two: 
while propaganda emphasized vengeance for national victimization linked to national liberation, 
troops avenged their comrades as a personal duty that also included greater attention to death and 
burial practices.  Stalin’s leadership and paternal care for soldiers received new emphasis in 
soldier-specific propaganda as the basis for heroism, liberation, and national unity, but did little 
to turn soldiers’ attention from their comrades. 
 A mobilization surge that saw non-Slavic soldiers’ reach their greatest numbers in the 
Red Army in 1943 also reoriented political work.  The Red Army needed to mobilize new forces 
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after victory at Stalingrad to maintain its advance as the enemy retreated.  Non-Slavic soldiers 
provided those recruits in 1943, which raised the proportion of non-Slavs in infantry divisions to 
a wartime high of 23.19% in July 1943.  By January 1944, after the Red Army liberated most of 
Ukraine and southeast Belorussia, the proportion of those two Slavic nationalities in the Red 
Army had doubled from July.  Mobilization pressures also began to decline when the Red Army 
began to substitute firepower for manpower in 1944.
2
  The influx of Slavic recruits from the 
occupied population and re-deployed partisan forces in these areas diminished the need for non-
Slavic soldiers, so that they made up just 12.25% of Red Army personnel by July 1944, a decline 
of almost one half from a year earlier.
3
  The periods of greatest attention from PUR officials and 
greatest participation of non-Slavic soldiers in the Red Army coincided almost exactly.  
 The gendered language propagandists and fighting men used to define motives and duty 
continued to link their discussions of the war effort.  After Stalingrad, propaganda began to 
reassert Stalin’s national leadership role as well as the values of paternal guidance that figured 
prominently in the second half of the 1930s.  Within frontline culture, the personal and local 
connections of the combat collective preserved masculine predominance and established ideals 
of conduct that preceded their publication in soldier-specific propaganda.  In official and 
soldierly writings, national and personal variants distinguished the otherwise common motive of 
revenge, which appeared in every case as an exclusively masculine capability and motive to kill.  
Official rhetoric contrasted feminine martyrdom with heroic feats and the glorious deaths of 
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masculine heroes.   Official rhetoric now linked heroic fighting men to Stalin directly, while 
women fighters lacked a personal connection to the leader.  Red Army men grew more 
committed to honoring their dead because their family situations had stabilized: loved ones were 
either dead, safely in the rear, or well behind enemy lines, so they focused on their comrades 
unless circumstances changed. 
 Troops defined heroism as a masculine prerogative, but one rooted in shared risk and 
sacrifice, separate from both their families at home and the larger military collective outside their 
units.  The paternal and masculine depiction of Stalin’s leadership figured most prominently in 
the new focus on soldiers’ care, especially that of non-Slavic soldiers.  Expressions of national 
hierarchy took on a gendered form, while the paternal care of officers paralleled that of Stalin for 
the country as a whole.  While rhetoric of a multi-national Soviet family appeared, the 
multinational brotherhood of fighters included a much smaller sub-group of masculine, fighting 
nations, leaving women working in the rear to represent lesser peoples’ contributions to the war 
effort.  Among Red Army fighters, discussions of brotherhood appeared, and soldiers’ affiliation 
with their combat collectives grew stronger.  Combat skill and fighting spirit remained the 
criteria for assessing and excluding officers, women, and multi-national replacement troops.  
 Explaining the extent and limits of Stalingrad’s role as a turning point in the war 
constitutes an important problem in Soviet cultural and military history. How did different yet 
overlapping revenge motives develop in frontline culture and official rhetoric? Why did soldiers 
increasingly focus on death after Red Army victory at Stalingrad, when propaganda promoted 
liberation and victory as the tasks of 1943?  How did the emergence of Stalin’s leadership role 
and non-Slavic soldiers distinguish the post-Stalingrad period?  Why did women fighters remain 
marginal amidst these developments?  This chapter approaches the question of Stalingrad 
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constituting a turning point by examining the gendered rhetoric and practice surrounding several 
aspects of the Soviet war effort. 
Vengeful Liberator and Liberating Avenger 
 In official rhetoric, the motives of liberation and revenge both served larger Soviet 
objectives of preparing soldiers who had succeeded in defense to engage in sustained offensive 
operations for the first time.  In his instructions to the political workers of the entire Volkhov 
Front, Army Commissar Lev Mekhlis identified the problem that “because the fighting ranks of 
the infantry consider defense the normal type of battle, from your first sentence you must 
emphasize that OFFENSIVE BATTLE is the PRIMARY type of Red Army military action.”  
Such battles were “how comrade Stalin SECURED the Red Army’s victory in the RUSSIAN 
CIVIL WAR,” and were likewise essential to the strategic goals of liberation for their front, 
namely “to break the blockade of the great hero city, of the city of Leningrad.” 4  At year’s end, 
Leningrad party boss Andrei Zhdanov echoed those sentiments to Leningrad Front’s political 
workers, as the city remained under siege.  His speech at the conference explained how defensive 
victory was not enough, and that “We must show the whole country, the whole Soviet people our 
Leningraders’ honor in a decisive battle to drive the enemy from the Leningrad oblast, in the 
final liberation of Leningrad.”5  Both political leaders directed political workers to stress the goal 
of liberation, with its implicit need to advance.  As the best motive to keep soldiers focused on 
the importance of offensive operations in 1943, liberation figured more prominently in official 
rhetoric than revenge.  This shift is significant as a response to both the changing course of the 
war and a complacent defensive-mindedness detected among soldiers. 
                                                 
4
 Capitalization in original speech transcript, 2 January 1943. RGASPI Fond 386 Opis 2 Delo 2 List 71. 
5
 Late December 1943, some time before the start of the Leningrad-Novgorod Strategic Offensive that finally ended 
the siege.  RGASPI Fond 77 Opis 1 Delo 783 List 4. 
  
146 
 
 
 Much like liberation, revenge appeared in official rhetoric as something women did not 
seek or carry out.  For women at home, male relatives appeared as the main connection women 
had to the frontline reality of war, as was the case with the title character, “Katia,” in a short 
story by officially celebrated author Alexei Tolstoy.  Upon receiving official notification that her 
brother was missing and presumed dead at the front, she “read and re-read” the letter, “quietly 
cried into a pillow” and “the next day she went to the military committee.  They sent her to the 
front as a medic.”6  Although the story ends happily with a frontline reunion between sister and 
not-dead brother, at no point does revenge or even hatred of the enemy enter her thoughts or 
motivate her actions.  She simply “felt the war” and resolved to play a greater role, but took no 
violent action against the enemy.  The same was true of women official rhetoric depicted facing 
the German attacks.  A partisan woman, Marusia, “prepared food for the detachment” while her 
husband, Zakhar, “all day disappeared in scouting missions.”  When Zakhar sacrificed himself so 
Marusia could escape encirclement by the enemy, she ran and hid with an old woman’s help, and 
set off to find a new partisan unit in the forest saying “Stay alive… Stay alive… Stay alive…”7  
Both women appeared in soldier-specific propaganda as having men fight and die for them, but 
neither sought revenge directly or even tried to harm the enemy.  Such depictions of women as 
loyal but passive patriots reinforced the idea that revenge only motivated men. 
 
 Soldiers’ sense of duty and expressions of motivation responded to the dramatic changes 
in Soviet fortunes in late 1942 and their implications after Stalingrad.  Concern for family did not 
disappear, but lost its preeminence for many soldiers, who began to express the importance of 
frontline bonds alongside family bonds in their letters.  Revenge became a widespread motive 
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and means of expressing hatred for the enemy, after appearing rarely in the first months of the 
year. Red Army troops expressed their duty to avenge comrades killed in battle, as “Fighter-
Avengers,” who found motivation to fight and comfort in the face of death in their frontline 
collectives of small numbers of comrades.  Despite greater responsiveness and realism in 
propaganda during the second half of 1942, soldiers’ personal relationships and local affiliations 
grew stronger during and after Stalingrad.  Women remained largely outside such groupings 
despite their growing presence at the front, even as combatants. 
 Red Army troops’ new willingness to discuss the death and danger that faced them at the 
front was more than a reflection of the intensity of combat, and emerged as part of a new sense 
of masculine duty towards their comrades, the “Fighter-avenger,” which centered on revenge.  
Earlier in 1942, comrades’ deaths prompted soldiers to respond simply, without vows of revenge, 
as one pilot explained to his mother in February: “Rozhin died heroically, our unit will preserve 
his memory.”8 Troops also expressed a desire to avenge family members killed in the rear, which 
one tank commander described in vivid terms to his grieving wife in June: “I find it easier to take 
revenge for [our] son – I am able to destroy the enemy and watch with great joy, how the 
damned Fritzes fall before the fire of my tank.”9 Another soldier expressed the common motive 
of liberating, rather than avenging, a home region under occupation as an enduring connection to 
home and family: “our units are advancing ever further to the west and ever closer to my home 
city of Kiev… which leaves only one priority, to destroy more lousy Fritzes.”10 Red Army men’s 
sentiments show that a family tragedy or major event could break through and the declining 
sense of connection and duty to family in letters. Such crises, forcing soldiers to engage their 
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family ties beyond performance of the “Provider-at-war” masculinity, could enable family duty 
to regain prominence over their growing sense of duty to comrades. 
 After the German offensive began, and Soviet losses mounted, promises of revenge 
quickly grew more common in the letters of Red Army men. While these vows often appeared in 
letters of condolence to the surviving relatives of fallen, they were just as likely to appear in the 
regular letters soldiers wrote to their own families.
11
  The site in which such promises appeared 
is significant, because it suggests that revenge took the place of acute family concern as part of a 
new sense of personal duty, rather than customary language written out of courtesy or 
obligation.
12
  The new importance of comrades and revenge in place of concern for family 
appears in a letter from a political worker to his future wife, who explained his delayed response 
as a function of his priorities. “Zina, I received your message about [what is happening in] 
Ovecherniki already, but I simply have had to write out [my feelings] about the death of such a 
friend and commissar, and now here in my unit I have made clear my general desire to get 
revenge for my commissar.”13  The shared proximity to death, rather than simply danger, proved 
central to the bonds soldiers shared and their duty to avenge each other.   One Red Army man 
expressed the connection of comradeship and the possibility of death (which the death of so 
many comrades had made real) in a letter home: “I, after all, will also have no one to tell, if I 
return from war unharmed, about all of the frightful meetings with Germans, about tank attacks, 
when fire came from every direction, metal and death, about the dances and songs of tank men in 
minutes of rest, about the touching friendship of battle comrades.”14  Developed while risking 
                                                 
11
 Condolence letters usually contained some combination of the following: praise for the fallen soldier as a friend or 
fighter, a description of how he died in battle, whatever burial took place, and vows of memory and revenge. 
12
 Soldiers wrote such letters voluntarily, in addition to the literally fill-in-the-blanks official notification card. 
13
 He had mentioned the commissar by name and their shared experience of mortal danger in battle together in a 
previous letter. RGASPI Fond M-33 Opis 1 Delo 110 List 8.  
14
 RGASPI Fond M-33 Opis 1 Delo 62 List 189. 
  
149 
 
 
and expecting death, and prone to ending suddenly, such friendships developed into a sense of 
duty that extended beyond death during the desperate months of late 1942. 
 While soldiers’ letters allow limited access to the types of relationships and interactions 
soldiers shared at the front, they provide ample evidence about the duty felt toward their dead 
comrades. This new duty, the “Fighter-avenger,” was an all-male form of interaction and 
expression of commitment and care through the promise and act of revenge, which contrasted 
with both the writing and actions through which soldiers cared for their predominantly female 
family members.  In a condolence letter, five soldiers signed a letter that promised: “For the 
death of your beloved brother and our battle comrade we will fully take revenge on the damned 
fanatics.” A sixth comrade wrote a separate message at the end of the letter to emphasize his 
closeness to the deceased: “Aleksandr Vasil’evich and I served together in the ranks from 1939 
and we were together until the day of his death in the same communications unit. …For Sasha’s 
death, we have completely taken revenge on the enemy. And we will [continue] to take 
revenge!”15 The sense of duty connected certain groups of soldiers beyond the requirements of 
the chain of command between living fighters.   
 This sense of duty to the dead inspired hatred of the enemy and motivated soldiers to kill, 
which allowed troops to care for one another in death, since doing so in life lay outside of their 
control. A lieutenant who volunteered for the front explained the power of fighters’ response to 
the torture and killing of comrades: “Yesterday I buried eight men (corpses) of our tortured 
soldiers and commanders…Such are the actions of the enemy…Every comrade who saw this 
with his own eyes or whom we told about it has vowed to take revenge.”16  Beyond the hatred 
and motivation, this duty of revenge seemed to provide soldiers with some consolation, as they 
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feared for their own lives.  An Azerbaijani soldier expressed this combination of revenge and 
fear as he discussed the context of his writing: “In this evening’s battle alone, we lost seven. Two 
of our soldiers have been posthumously awarded [the rank of] Hero of the Soviet Union. We will 
avenge our friends. Miastan, I write this letter to you after battle in the moonlight. Every minute 
death awaits. God forbid, if I die, don’t grieve too much.”17 Given Red Army troops’ logical 
connection of comrades’ deaths to the likelihood of their own, revenge meant the comfort and 
care of both mutual defense among living fighters and vengeance and remembrance when death 
came. Performing the duty of the “Fighter-avenger” was thus something that only soldiers could 
offer each other, man to man, at the front, completely separate from the protection they 
attempted to provide their families.  
 The bonds formed between comrades could not be replaced as easily as units could be 
reinforced, and the veterans of 1942 saw their ranks shrink, leading a 24 year-old tank 
commander to report to his mother “I am already the old man in the brigade.”18  In such a 
context, revenge could continuously motivate soldiers to fight, and remained a prominent subject 
in soldiers’ letters to family members. The impact of the sudden loss continued to make revenge 
the sole focus of many letters home and displaced any discussion of conditions there. One soldier 
recalled the tragic scene of his comrade’s death: “how Grisha cried and asked me to pass on a 
letter… My heart hurts, I want to cry, but I will not cry, because the Hitlerites will not rejoice 
about this, we will [instead] leave the Hitlerites to cry… We need to have revenge [and] to 
destroy the beast.”19 Red Army men continued to discuss with family the pain and anger that 
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accompanied their need to avenge comrades’ deaths in battle, but their responses to death at the 
front also began to evolve.  
 Red Army troops’ desire to write greater and greater numbers of condolence letters in 
response to comrades’ deaths speaks to the continued development of a frontline culture rooted 
in their everyday experiences, and the constant issue of their mortality.  These condolence letters 
became a central means for soldiers’ to assert their duty to avenge the fallen, as one vowed to 
“strike at the fascist vermin, taking revenge on them for my friend Lesha,” after explaining the 
deceased was his “best friend that I trained with and knew for three years.”20  The Soviet 
people’s desire for revenge may have been relatively universal, but soldiers’ saw their ability to 
carry it out as something, like killing the enemy generally, which separated their role in the war 
from those in the rear. One soldier wrote to his brother, fighting on another part of the front, 
about women’s requests for revenge in response to his letters: “mothers, wives in every letter ask 
me to take revenge on bloody Hitler for the deaths of their only sons, whom the Germans have 
taken from her forever. I think you are right to take revenge for her sons, as you have 
described.”21 Another specifically contrasted his response to that of his dead comrades’ girlfriend 
“I have one piece of advice for you: take it like a man… you mourn his death, and we at the front 
answer with our battle successes in the task of destroying the German occupiers, and will 
ferociously and mercilessly take revenge.”22  Such letters express an understanding of different 
responses and different obligations for the female relatives and male comrades of a dead fighter. 
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 The phenomenon of more than one soldier writing to the family of a single fallen 
comrade further demonstrates the development of frontline culture around comrades’ deaths and 
vengeance.  Such letters usually reflected different relationships to the deceased, rather than 
different information for the family’s benefit, since the latter received a formal notice of death. 
Some soldiers used these letters to express the extent of their connection to the fallen, as one Red 
Army fighter described his comrade’s last moments, “My very best friend…Mitrofan died in my 
arms.  After being heavily wounded by a piece of shrapnel in the chest he lived only 3 minutes.” 
A separate letter from his deputy commander explained “First, I want to say that Mitia, as I 
called him, was my foremost good friend and commander…Remember, that this great loss hurts 
not only you but us. We vow to avenge Mitrofan.”23 Discussing comrades’ deaths freed soldiers 
to express their feelings more openly, which condolence letters different from those they wrote 
to their own families about frontline hardship.  One infantryman focused on remembering and 
avenging his fallen comrade: “our unit will never forget the name Evgenii Iakovlevich Kuzmin, 
and the enemy will receive a blow ten times as strong for the death of your son,” while another 
confessed “we lived like brothers, ate and drank from one bowl and I could not stop from crying 
when I saw my comrade had died.”24  Each letter differed in how it described the brotherly bonds 
Red Army men had formed at the front, but their shared commitment to revenge remained a 
unifying theme.  That so many soldiers felt compelled to express their own relationship to the 
family of a fallen comrade illustrates how soldiers sense of duty to each other continued to 
develop after Stalingrad, as the bonds of comradeship strengthened but the Red Army continued 
to suffer losses. 
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 Troops’ discussions of revenge also invoked ideas of soldierly honor as a distinction 
between Soviet and German forces, although they lacked consistency.  A tank gunner explained 
the limits of his vengeance: “I would never shoot prisoners, though.  Why do it? There might be 
a peasant among them – not a Nazi at all – or a Frenchmen who’d been forced to fight… For this 
reason I never shot them; I ruled it out as a matter of principle.”25  The restrained and measured 
use of violence, limited to enemies who continued to fight, limited his pursuit of revenge and 
contrasted with the enemy’s willingness to harm the helpless.  For many soldiers, honor 
mattered, but was wholly compatible with revenge.  A penal battalion soldier explained this 
combination after liberating a town:  “Yes, the judgment over two unarmed people had been 
arbitrary, but these people themselves had started the vileness – and we had finished it, so as to 
finish it forever.”26  An infantryman explained a scene that doomed captured Germans as his unit 
liberated Ukraine:  “The Nazis invented the most savage methods to torment their prisoners… 
the Germans used metal hooks to hang people by a rib, a leg, an arm, the jaw... There was not a 
force in the world that would make me stop this just punishment of the Nazi butchers.
27
 In the 
latter two cases, German criminality justified revenge against specific prisoners that local 
witnesses linked to atrocities.  Despite their apparent difference from the tank gunner’s principle, 
the infantrymen shared with him a belief that Red Army troops’ thoughtful and precise approach 
to killing distinguished them from their German counterparts.  
 Personal experience appears to have played such a significant role, and revenge proved so 
resilient a motive, because of the timing of soldiers’ formation of those bonds with each other. 
Soldiers who developed a sense of brotherhood during the worst of times only to lose those 
comrades when Soviet fortunes had improved saw little evidence of a turning point in the war, or 
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reason to change their behavior. For them, the general hardships and mortal danger of front life 
were no less apparent, which gave their methods of coping with loss and facing their own 
mortality an enduring value.  
 The Red Army’s expulsion of German forces from most of the Russian regions of the 
Soviet Union and advance into Ukraine and southeastern Belarus compelled fighters to seek out 
their families as the front reached and passed their home regions. This new concern for liberation 
was particularly evident in soldiers’ public letters, sent to the Soviet radio service.  The radio 
program “Comintern” allowed troops to communicate with civilian family members about their 
whereabouts or to relatives in the military about the status of their kin. The letters soldiers sent to 
this service only began to discuss liberation and reunion regularly in 1943.  
 Letters promising to personally free family members were the most personal way 
liberation motivated soldiers, because it combined their duties to front and home in a single task.  
Some fighters proudly expressed this sense of extra motivation in their letters: “Now with the 
nearing of our Red Army to my home, I exert even more strength and energy in order to rescue 
my dear ones from German slavery sooner.”28  Other soldiers were more honest about the 
uncertainty of their ability to fulfill their aim: “I am working effectively to speed the destruction 
of the German occupiers…but I have not received from [my family] any news since September 
1941 and have not known where they are since that time.”29  Such concern for family as a way of 
understanding the war resembles the “Provider-at-war” masculine duty soldiers expressed during 
the first year of the war (see chapters 2 and 3).  However, these soldiers were not writing to their 
loved ones directly, and had little chance of personally liberating their home city or village, 
given the scale of territory and size of military forces involved.  For those fortunate enough, 
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other Red Army forces liberated their families.  Infantrymen Panfilenko was among them, and 
wrote: “I heard on the radio the good news of your liberation from the German scum.” 30  Such 
soldiers had to continue fighting of course, and wartime experiences likely inspired fresh 
motivation. 
 Indeed, among fighters less fortunate than Panfilenko, liberation ceased to be a motive 
because they discovered that their families were dead, rather than saved by anonymous fellow 
soldiers in other units. A pair of tank lieutenants from the same region expressed their dashed 
hopes of liberation: “we came to liberate our land, where we were born and grew up.  And so, we 
arrived to find only pillaged ruins and not a single creature left alive… Seeing all the horror and 
atrocity of the German robbers we with still greater frenzy advanced to the west.”31 What linked 
such letters was who wrote to whom, and how simply revenge replaced liberation as a motive.  
While some soldiers, unlike the lieutenants, had family evacuated to work in the rear as well as 
relatives who remained behind, many more had only family under occupation or serving in the 
Red Army on a separate front.
32
  
 Typically, a soldier wrote to his brother on another front, one informing the other of their 
family’s fate: “My dear little brother, mercilessly take revenge on the bloodthirsty Hitlerite dogs 
for the death of our mother and for all the crimes the Germans have inflicted on our land.”33  
In addition to vengeance letters between brothers, others appeared between father and son, in 
which the shared masculine role of avenger superseded generational difference.  One pilot thus 
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informed his father elsewhere at the front about their family’s fate: “Dad, my mom and your wife 
and little brother Evgenii your son are not among the living…dad, avenge mom and little brother 
Evgenii and I in my realm will also take revenge on more than one fascist plane.”34  The shared 
desire among male relatives to avenge family members they could not liberate was certainly a 
common one, and only reinforced the motivation to seek revenge in battle that Red Army men 
already developed in response to their comrades’ deaths.  
 Nevertheless, there were frontline experiences that reinforced liberation as a motive for 
Red Army troops beyond the intense but unrealistic desire to free their families personally. 
Individual soldiers who first entered a populated area usually felt overwhelmed at the sight of 
devastation, suggesting that propaganda had not prepared them “to see this nightmare.”35 Their 
compatriots’ suffering underscored the urgency and justness of their drive for liberation, as a 
tank lieutenant explained: “…better to live poorly, but not to see the horrors of war. The people 
languish under the yoke of fascism and await our help, and we are applying all of our strength, 
fighting for liberation…so that this plague on our land will end.”36  Red Army troops found 
Soviet civilians’ grateful reaction to their arrival just as compelling, which inspired sympathy for 
those still occupied: “in many forests and villages the population waited for the Red Army. They 
greeted us with bread and salt. They sent us on our way fried chicken, eggs, dumplings, milk and 
so on, of course [only in] those places they had been able to hide it.”37  Personally seeing the 
devastation of occupied lands and sharing in civilians’ joy, like many intense aspects of war, 
overshadowed what little preparation propaganda provided.  
                                                 
34
 Letter from Viktor P. Orlov to Petr A. Orlov via radio committee 30 October 1943. GARF Fond 6903 Opis 9 Delo 
608 List 198. 
35
 In 1943, photos of dead women, children, and oldsters, usually in open trenches or ruined villages, began to 
accompany the vivid textual descriptions of German atrocities and violence present in Krasnaia Zvezda since early 
1942. 
36
 Letter from Leonid N. Byzov to his mother 30 October 1943. RGASPI Fond M-33 Opis 1 Delo 125 List 78. 
37
 Letter from Vekiamin Vokhovskii to his girlfriend 10 February 1944. RGASPI Fond M-33 Opis 1 Delo 598 List 
2. 
  
157 
 
 
 Soldiers’ experiences among the liberated population usually confirmed both official 
narratives of victimization and their own views of appropriate military and civilian roles.  A 
mortar unit officer described a number of newly liberated villages in his letters home, and 
observed typical scenes of the survivors of the German occupation: “what joy on the faces of 
children, women, and oldsters in every liberated village!”  Such villages did not lack male 
civilians entirely, but contained no fighting-age men.  The teen boys they encountered, who were 
too young to serve when the war began, “more than anyone else, voluntarily asked to join our 
unit, in order to drive out and strike at the enemy with us.”38  In contrast, the suffering of women 
and children underscored the consequences of occupation: “It is difficult to see such images: An 
old woman sitting, around her are three small children and everyone is crying, crying. Such 
families are not unique, but are like the whole population of Ukraine.”39 Many Red Army men’s 
experiences of liberation thus motivated them to continue fighting and reinforced their gendered 
view of the war effort, in which masculine fighters returned the victims of occupation to the 
feminine realm of the Soviet home front.  Any men found on the wrong side of the divide 
quickly sought to assert their manliness and join the advancing liberators. To the extent that it 
superseded revenge as a motive, troops’ understanding of liberation fit with the sense of being 
part of a masculine community of fighters.  
 Both liberation and revenge motives are significant as evidence of the limits of 
interaction between official rhetoric and soldiers’ views of the war effort.  Even when 
motivations and views of the enemy seemed to coincide, they differed in relative importance, and 
thus overall meaning.  Their main point of convergence remained the masculine character of 
both duties, whether linked to Stalin’s leadership or personal loss.  Women consistently gained 
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liberation, but never appeared to take up arms to liberate or avenge comrades.  Stalin’s 
inspiration or guidance in hero’s actions, yet absence whenever women combatants received 
mention, further emphasized the gender divisions within the war effort and masculine conception 
of power.  Revenge became a widespread motive among troops and norm in combat collectives 
in response to the recurring death of comrades. Concern for family did not disappear, but lost its 
preeminence for many soldiers, who began to express the importance of frontline bonds 
alongside family bonds in their letters.  Women remained largely outside such groupings despite 
their growing presence at the front, and even when they filled combat roles.  News about family 
and physical proximity to an occupied home region were the main reasons soldiers’ might 
reorient their priorities from avenging comrades to liberating loved ones.  Red Army troops 
expressed their desire for revenge much more frequently than a concern for national liberation, 
inverting the relationship presented in official rhetoric.  Nevertheless, they accepted both as 
masculine duties to be fulfilled for the honor of their frontline groups and for Soviet women not 
engaged in combat. 
Burying and honoring the dead 
 Soldiers’ deaths in combat received no shortage of glorification from soldier-specific 
propaganda from the outset of the invasion, but the practical task of frontline burial was another 
matter entirely.  Troops began to create graves for their comrades: sometimes individual, 
sometimes mass, as circumstances at the front allowed.  Alongside this improvised effort to show 
respect, funeral service and serious contemplation of the loss of their frontline brothers 
developed into a central element of frontline culture.  Official rhetoric did not ignore the issue 
entirely after the Sacrificial Defender ideal faded away in late 1941.  However, it focused only 
on the loss of the most decorated and exploit-accomplished heroes, whose memorialization 
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purportedly promoted future heroism. Meanwhile, practical treatment of the dead and wounded 
still suffered from deficiencies and required reform after two years of war.  
 Heroes and self-sacrificing exploits remained critical to both Red Army tactics and 
propaganda narratives after Stalingrad.  The former value came through clearly in the personal 
report of General Rotmistrov to Marshall Zhukov after the battles around Prokhorovka in the 
Kursk salient. Explaining his army’s victory, Rotmistrov concluded that: “The arms, armor, and 
accuracy of fire by German tanks were substantially better [than ours], and only the exceptional 
courage of our tank men and the greater number of our tank units’ artillery deprived the enemy 
of the means to fully exploit the superiority of their tanks.”40  General Rotmistrov’s assessment is 
particularly compelling because it lacked any self-serving interpretation of the sources of victory.  
Moreover, the need for individual heroics to tip the balance in what many military historians 
consider the Red Army’s definitive victory in the course of the war, speaks to the enduring 
importance of heroic exploits in Red Army success.
41 
 
 Dead and wounded heroes drove the propaganda discussion of burial and 
memorialization in 1943, before and after the summer’s Kursk salient battles.  The Red Army’s 
fallen since 1918 and during the current war, explained Krasnaia Zvezda, “educate the soldiers 
of the Red Army and all Soviet people in the spirit of hatred of the German invaders and 
confidence in victory,” but only when they are properly honored and their names burn with 
glory.
42
 Such articles emphasized proper burial and memorial construction only for the most 
celebrated of fighters.  Subsequent articles later in the year reiterated the theme of honoring 
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certain soldiers for propaganda purposes and ignoring others.  Not only did “the motherland 
demand” such treatment for its heroes, but the propaganda value of memorializing and 
decorating fallen soldiers would boost the wounded friends of the fallen comrade.
43
 The most 
important measure of worth in official rhetoric, Stalin’s fatherly care, applied most of all to 
heroes: “We know that the people will not forget the exploit of [their] son… our dear father 
Comrade Stalin will not leave us.”44  Combined with fathers standing in to receive medals for 
fallen sons, Stalin chose his symbolic sons among the battle dead.  Dead heroes retained their 
pride of place by earning not only medals, but Stalin’s personal approval, unlike those who fell 
without an exploit. 
 Personal burial may have emerged out of some level of necessity, as even Soviet officials 
complained that the Red Army “shows complete lack of concern for the corpses of the fallen. On 
the way from Kamensk in the Rostov oblast to Kharkov I came across many dead Red Army 
soldiers, whose corpses had been left lying for up to a fortnight by the roadside in mud, ditches 
and fields.”45 President Kalinin himself affirmed, “I have written to the Chairmen of the 
Executive Committees of Soviets asking them to see to it that all common graves are put into 
proper order.”46 
  
 Red Army soldiers expressed their dedication to each other by first ensuring that dead 
comrades were secured for burial.  While circumstances certainly prevented its realization, 
members of a combat collective strove to uphold the principles that “we never abandoned our 
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wounded or killed.”47  Frontline culture valued reciprocity in most aspects surrounding danger 
and hardship, and recovery of the dead and wounded figured prominently among those 
expectations.  The slowly improving proficiency of auxiliary services often appeared unworthy 
of the task of caring for comrades, an infantry scout learned firsthand:  “there was no need for 
them to risk their lives for me: there were orderlies specially detailed to pick up the wounded and 
take them to the medical battalion.  But my comrades did not have much faith in them, and 
decided to do the job themselves.”48  Such dedication to each other revealed the strength of 
loyalty within combat collectives, but also reflected their exclusive character: troops judged the 
dispatch of non-combatant orderlies as a dereliction of their duty to one of their own, and 
uncertain to succeed, given the perceived weaknesses of non-combatant servicemen.  In some 
cases, burial involved a combat operation, as an infantry squad leader recalled:  “We buried our 
comrades on the battlefield.  Two of them, Panichev and Endrikhin, were my good friends. 
…Barely having left the village, we faced off with the Germans, [who were] trying to encircle 
us.”49  Such efforts emphasized soldiers’ willingness to risk their immediate personal safety in 
order to ensure their dead comrades received a proper burial.  Whether dead or simply wounded, 
comrades sought to preserve each other as a personal obligation that could not be left to others. 
 Frontline troops viewed a formal burial service as an honor owed to all fallen comrades, 
irrespective of their medal-worthiness of final acts in battle.  The rituals that surrounded 
comrades’ deaths held important emotional value for survivors.  The burial of a comrade 
followed a pattern, and involved all of his fellows:  
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If there were time, we dressed the body in clean underwear and uniform.  We 
would wrap deceased tankers in piece of tank tarpaulin, and infantry soldiers, as a 
rule, in their own greatcoats.  We lined the bottom of the grave with pine boughs 
or straw or whatever was available.  We carefully lowered the body into the 
excavated grave, being attentive always to inter from west to east [head west, feet 
east].  We did not use caskets.  Accompanied by a volley of rifle fire or main-gun 
salvos, we threw the dirt in on top of our comrade and then we installed a simple 
pyramid with a star.  Right there, at the fresh grave, we drank our daily ration of a 
hundred grams of vodka, in memory of the fallen. And then we returned to 
battle.
50
 
 
As a group process, burial could bond survivors closer.  While funerals reminded men of their 
own mortality, they were also a time to reflect on how much they had survived, and the nature of 
their friendship.  An infantryman recalled how “I felt especially sorry for him for some reason.  
Maybe because I did not make it to warn him, or because the last minutes of his life passed right 
there in front of me.  I also could not understand his last words.  …I saw a lot of death in the war, 
but that death I remembered especially.
51
 Unlike official rhetoric, troops considered honoring 
their dead to be a fundamentally local and front specific practice: “We had to write all of their 
data [from their dog tag], and there was a superstition – when you finished writing, it meant that 
you’d killed him.”52 There was little to be learned or emulated, since it was survival skills, not 
heroic death, that replacement troops needed to learn.   The surrogate family of the combat 
collective had a duty to perform, which formed part of their sense of brotherhood and collective 
affiliation 
 Amidst these renewed efforts to promote heroism in battle, significant numbers of Red 
Army soldiers finally began to discuss the subject in 1943.   Writing about fallen comrades, 
troops did not apply the term to every man they lost, but employed a consistent definition of 
what constituted a heroic death.  However, this was the essentially the only written context in 
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which they used the term, as it failed to appear in either letters home or letters sent to each other 
via the radio.
53
 Soldiers did not always describe their brothers-in-arms as heroes, even when 
those deaths demanded revenge.  The primary reason why Red Army fighters applied the term 
hero, in addition to vowing revenge, was that the letter writer personally witnessed his comrade’s 
death, rather than writing because of their friendship alone.  In a typical condolence letter of this 
type, one pilot explained what he saw: “during a dive bombing run against a tank column near 
the city of Nevel’ was badly hit by a tank and crashed his burning plane into the mass of the 
column.”54 Another soldier described his comrades’ final movements in battle before dying 
heroically, and explained: “I left the battle wounded and wrote this letter according to his 
wishes.”55 Such personal experiences before a comrade’s death stand out as the distinguishing 
element of letters that acknowledged fellow soldiers as heroes, although the term failed to 
replace vows of revenge in either individual letters or as an expression of brotherhood. 
 A central element to soldiers’ definition of heroism was a comrade’s willingness to take a 
risk for the good of his men. An artillerist emphasized this when he explained his commander’s 
heroic death during an encirclement battle at Stalingrad: “we were together in the battery when 
he decided to counter-attack against the larger number of German tanks using anti-tank rifles and 
several grenades. He alone stood to use the anti-tank weapons and I gave him ammunition. Only 
his resistance gave [the rest of] us a chance to stay alive.”56 Selflessness and concern for 
comrades figured prominently in such accounts, as one fighter explained how “his best fighting 
friend” reacted to being mortally wounded in fighting off a tank assault: “He spoke little and 
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when I asked him how he was feeling, he answered that it was nothing and added ‘take this 
ammunition for your machine gun, you’ll need them, and I will only leave them behind.” 57 
While the letter focused on the aftermath of his exploit, it shows the centrality of putting 
comrades before oneself to soldiers’ definition of heroism. In each of these cases, comrades saw 
sacrifice for each other as heroic, mirroring their determination to fight and kill the enemy to 
avenge each other.   
 Burial rituals were not universal at the front, and those who died dishonorably received 
little attention or commemoration.  In fact, larger numbers of soldiers received no such 
commemoration later in the war, because “the highest losses were always among the green, 
untried soldiers.”58  The difference appears clearly in a artilleryman’s memoir treatment of losses 
in two consecutive battles after the Kursk operation.  The loss of unknown replacements barely 
received mention: “the Germans had destroyed two self-propelled guns from our regiment and a 
heavy one from Gromov’s regiment.”  In contrast, lost comrades appeared in full.  “Guys on my 
old crew had been killed: the gun-layer Valeriy Korolev, the driver Vanya, Gerasimov, and the 
gun-loader Kolya Sviridov.  Some of the vehicle commanders had died too:  among them Sasha 
Minin, Mikolay Samoilov, and Vanya Tomin,” while the death of his closest friend among them 
prompted “bitter grief.”59  Such a reaction fit the dynamics of small group cohesion, as the new 
men had not survived long enough to earn equal status in their unit’s combat collective, and their 
deaths therefore provoked no personal feelings of loss among survivors.   
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 The other type of loss that warranted no commemoration or revenge from veterans was 
death through incompetence or carelessness.  Unsurprisingly, this often involved replacement 
troops, as a machine-gunner observed while being redeployed after Kursk: 
While we were on the way [to the front], about 20 men from our train died – 
everywhere around us was filled with landmines.  One character, a sailor, 
detached a bounding mine. How did he manage it?! What a blockhead! A bunch 
of young inexperienced onlookers gathered around him: “Look here,” he said, “it 
will jump up, I’ll catch it and it won’t explode.” It jumped up and exploded. His 
arm was torn off and intestines fell out.
60
 
 
Such incidents were common, if less preventable, even in later stages of the war, since 
replacements joined the ranks even in 1945.  Death from carelessness or incompetence, when 
combat inevitably took men who fought well and had saved their comrades in the past, was not 
something Red Army fighters took time to mourn.  Such a death among replacements, rather 
than due to enemy action, merited less concern still.  Soldiers considered such deaths neither 
tragic nor a real loss to their unit, unless they harmed fighters within the combat collective (as 
“rear rats” were sometimes accused of doing).  Fighting men had to earn the right to be mourned 
and avenged by comrades, and those died before doing so faded away namelessly. 
 Women’s deaths proved noteworthy for reasons quite separate from those of male 
comrades.  The significance of the loss of a woman, whether or not she was a combatant, had 
little to do with her success in her frontline role.  As an artilleryman recalled, “I didn’t even have 
time to shout ‘Get down!’ to her, when she was hit and fell… It was painful to see this cute girl, 
who was only about 18 years of age, and my heart was breaking over the injustice of what had 
just happened – having had no time to live her own life fully.”61  An infantry sergeant 
remembered a similar reaction among his comrades:  
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“Natasha from Krasnaia Presnia,” who was generally considered the best-looking of 
all the female snipers, slipped as she was descending a slope down into the trenches 
and tumbled downward.  Just before she reached the trench, a burst of automatic fire 
caught her.  A bullet penetrated her right shoulder and buried itself in her chest.  
Everyone turned out for her funeral.  Her friends sobbed without embarrassment. We 
all tried our best to comfort them.  I can recall no other occasion at the front when 
anyone offered someone else so much consolation.  They loved Natasha in the team, 
praised her beauty, and thought she had a promising future in the movies or the 
theater.  The young woman herself was thinking about something completely 
different; she dreamed of getting married and quickly having three children.
62
 
 
In typical fashion, each woman’s death garnered significant attention in spite of her carelessness 
in battle.  Instead, men focused on the pleasing appearance of the deceased and the tragedy of 
their postwar life lost.  There was no discussion of comradeship, fighting skills, or revenge.  
There was no sense of a shared bond of hardship, vulnerability, and loss, but of injustice, as if a 
woman’s death ought not to happen, even in wartime, and thus touched servicemen who lacked a 
personal connection to the deceased.  Reactions to women’s deaths resembled the loss of loved 
ones in the rear more than the mourning of male comrades.   
 Frontline burial remained a problem for military officials and an uncertain honor for 
soldiers due to the circumstances of war.  The uncertainty of burial opportunities changed 
somewhat after Stalingrad, as the Red Army faced fewer reversals, but large scale defeats, 
especially around Leningrad and Kharkov, still took place.  While frontline propaganda began to 
treat burial as the honor of select heroes who receive Stalin’s personal attention, common 
soldiers’ treatment had scarcely improved.  The logistical failing as much as symbolic ones 
prompted fighting men to take action. Their ceremonies, complete with eulogies, tears, and even 
shifts of sentry duty while still in danger, further distinguished front culture and front experience 
from soldiers’ families in the rear.  Families could not participate alongside comrades at their 
relatives’ funerals, which increased soldiers’ sense of isolation from home at the same time it 
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strengthened their comradely bonds.   The simple feeling that they might soon join their 
comrades limited any desire to celebrate the tactical gains of a heroic death. Like revenge, 
fighting men considered burial a masculine duty, which only their fellow combatants could ask 
of each other or carry out.   
Hierarchy in the national family of fighters 
 Amidst the continued celebration of heroic exploits and exhortation to liberate more 
territory, paternal themes regained importance in official rhetoric after Stalingrad.  The role of 
non-Slavic nationalities in the war effort appeared through the framework of Stalin’s paternal 
care for the Soviet people.  Stalin’s gifts provided all the motivation they needed to sacrifice for 
the war effort, but this negatively distinguished them from Slavic troops fighting to liberate their 
homes and families. Red Army fighters showed no interest in paternal leadership from their 
officers, and judged the latter according to their own, fraternal masculine norms of frontline 
conduct.  Their reaction to non-Slavic soldiers in their ranks came down to a single, utilitarian 
criterion: language skill.  
 After Stalingrad, Krasnaia Zvezda articles continued to promote fatherly care as a 
priority, asking rhetorically: “If a commander is not interested in what his soldiers eat, what kind 
of foodstuffs his unit has, then how is he a commander, how is he a father to his troops?”63 A 
January 1943 editorial explained that “soldiers are the best sons of the people,” and officers “are 
required to pay daily attention to every question of life and living conditions, and more than ever, 
provide the fatherly care of a commander to soldiers,” which was ultimately “care for the 
motherland, care for victory.”64  Fatherly care emerged as an essential duty for officers to 
provide to their men around midyear.  This change in approach took place because “Comrade 
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Stalin requires from all of our commanders, that they carry out the best traditions of the Russian 
army, and learn from Suvorov and Kutuzov how to act in a fatherly way to care for soldiers’ 
needs.”65  The change in approach thus reflected apparent past success, creeping promotion of 
Russian national symbols, and gradual improvements in Soviet logistics and lend-lease aid.  Into 
1944, editorials continued to explain: “the daily care of a commander for the needs of his 
soldiers – that is care about heroes, who have travelled the glorious path from the Volga to the 
Prut, it is care about victory.”66  The recurring language of fathers and sons within units 
borrowed from the generational masculine duty rhetoric of late 1942, but shifted focus to the 
duty of officer-fathers to play a tutelary role in their units. 
 Beyond Stalin’s role as a father for officers to emulate, he appeared more and more in 
official rhetoric as a national father of the Soviet people, including its diverse nationalities. Stalin 
brought unity, as President Kalinin explained: “Comrade Stalin, whose own effort in establishing 
the strength of the Soviet Union has been so great in itself, was also able to fuse into one all the 
force of the community, to inspire them and direct them towards the main and most essential task 
of the moment: the defense of the Soviet State against the German Fascist bandits.”67  His 
national and military roles coincided, and were credited with inspiring all the national republics’ 
contributions to the war effort.  However, not all peoples contributed equally, especially 
regarding their relative importance in front and rear.  The feminine motive of benefits, 
sometimes expressed as thanks to Stalin “for your personal care for the peoples of Kazakhstan,” 
singled out certain nations as passive, dependent, and not seriously fighting for revenge against 
the fascist invader or liberation of Soviet lands.
68
  Alongside this feminine, non-combat role, the 
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Tatar people pledged to Stalin to “honorably fulfill our duty before the fatherland and the front,” 
suggesting that they only assisted the front, without sending Tatar men to fight directly.
 69
  Their 
treatment was typical of that received by non-Slavic peoples, as women and civilians represented 
them first and foremost in frontline propaganda. Though unidentified as such, they seemed to 
figure into the national hierarchy as little sisters to the Russian “elder brother”70  Much like 
Slavic Soviet women combatants when the press first covered them in 1942, other nationalities’ 
fighting men did not share the revenge and liberation motives of soldier heroes in official 
rhetoric.  These associations provided troops with a message of national hierarchy based on 
value to the war effort, in which non-Slavs appeared as feminine nations, and their few fighting 
men as second rank heroes. 
 Discipline problems spiked alongside non-Slavic replacement troops’ numbers in the Red 
Army.  They posed a new challenge to political workers, since existing motives and ideals 
appeared to be ineffective.  In response, a report on the “Liquidation of errors in party-political 
work in the Red Army” criticized typical problems, including how “Kabardians and Uzbeks 
gathered in groups and shared with each other in tobacco, but if they were asked to share tobacco 
with a Russian, they refused.”71  Negative reinforcement altered agitation policy little, and kept 
the focus on nationalities’ failings.  In a similar way, Krasnaia Zvezda diminished the 
significance of non-Slavic troops’ combat wounds when it noted “especially greater attention is 
required to deal with the wounded soldiers and commanders of non-Russian nationalities” after 
highlighting the brave recovery of various Russian soldiers and even patriotic civilians wounded 
when they fought back against the Germans.
72
  Such efforts produced poor initial results, but 
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provided Red Army troops with an unambiguous assessment of the relative combat roles, and 
thus masculine status, of the various nationalities that Stalin had called to serve.  
 The growing number of non-Slavic soldiers in the Red Army after Stalingrad eventually 
prompted reform.  A central directive to this end was the “publication in thirteen languages of 
hundreds of mobilization pamphlets, leaflets, and slogans in multi-million print run. Publishing 
dozens of front and army newspapers, and also many combat leaflets in the languages of Non-
Russian nationalities.”  Likewise, officials took concrete measures to improve morale, such as 
facilitating “how soldiers of non-Russian nationalities maintain their correspondence with home, 
if they are getting letters and sending answers.”73  These reforms ostensibly sought to ensure all 
troops felt motivated and fought effectively, but Red Army officials also believed that political 
work should further integrate non-Slavic soldiers with other Soviet peoples, because “the great 
trouble that befell the peoples of our country united them all into a single brotherly family… 
blood on the field of battle made eternal the great friendship of the peoples of the Soviet 
Union.”74  Efforts to deal with the perceived problem that “soldiers of non-Russian nationalities 
are defective as fighters” also acknowledged and addressed real “manifestations of chauvinism” 
in political work along with other army-wide reforms.
75
  However, existing ideas and priorities in 
Red Army political work regarding Slavic soldiers’ centrality to the war effort, and the decline in 
mobilization demands for non-Slavic troops’ capabilities limited the pursuit of this aim.   
Civilian women appeared as the main actors in national republics’ contributions to the 
war effort, and although heroes and medal winners merited a greater level attention than before, 
a clear hierarchy emerged in coverage of the multi-national war effort.  Indeed, the home front 
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was the most common site of non-Slavic nationalities’ appearances in propaganda.  In such 
articles, women appeared as the main representatives of the home front, “in these days, when our 
brothers, husbands, and fathers, bravely and selflessly, not sparing their own lives, fight the 
Germans and their henchmen, all of us, remaining in the rear, are helping you beat out the enemy 
with our dedicated labor.”76  These women, and the nations they represented, contributed to the 
war effort but remained far removed from the front: “Uzbekistan is the deep rear of our 
fatherland, but here with great effort and exertion people are working on military tasks, knowing 
that the fatherland needs their labor.”77  Civilian visits to the front further established the place of 
non-Slavic nationalities in the war effort, as one article detailed how “the delegation of Kazakh 
workers…brought soldier and officer gifts, care packages, and letters.”78  Unlike Slavic soldiers, 
other Soviet nationalities appeared most commonly as non-combatants, as either women or a 
civilian people (Narod), separating them from the manliest and most important role of fighter.  
 In some ways reminiscent of their propaganda role in the First World War, non-Slavic 
women appeared at the front in soldier specific propaganda alongside mentions of fighting men 
displaying cowardice.
79
  The article “Heroine-machine-gunner Manshuk Mametova” narrated 
how “a wounded woman machine-gunner shifted her position and again opened fire on the 
enemy” allowing male soldiers to storm an enemy position.80  While she killed no one, a Kazakh 
woman fighting alongside Slavic men sent a message about the Kazakh peoples’ role in the war 
effort.  While Slavic women appeared in combat, they were a small number compared to Slavic 
men, while Mametova served as a representative of Kazakh battle success, since so few of her 
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people appeared in front propaganda at all.  Articles featuring men and women confirmed this 
message.  In “Husband and Wife,” a Kirgizh couple both served at the front, he as a soldier, and 
she as a medic.  In an improbable scenario, they meet at the front, but she rescues him after he is 
wounded, saying “Light of my eyes, flower of my soul, joy of my heart, look at your Zeinab and 
just speak to her.”81 Such a clear inversion of Slavic combatants as saviors of women in front 
coverage signaled a serious deficiency in a given nation’s contribution to the military facet of the 
war effort.  In the context of war coverage and discussion of hierarchy through family 
metaphors, Central Asian peoples ranked as more feminine, and their men abject according to the 
standards depicted used Slavic fighters in soldier specific propaganda.  
 Krasnaia Zvezda actually presented soldiers with a hierarchy of national masculinity and 
contributions to the war effort, which emphasized the predominance of Slavic and Russian 
fighters and heroes.  The Russian people’s place at the top of the hierarchy received frequent 
reinforcement in official rhetoric. Articles titled “The great traditions of the Russian people,” 
“Russian strength,” and “A heroic people, a warrior people” made clear that “the Russian people 
since ancient times were predisposed and loved to wage war.”82  The link between masculinity 
and national fighting ability appeared in articles that explained the “role of the Russian people as 
the older brother in the family of nations of the USSR,” was that of combatant, in which “we, 
Russians, must grit our teeth, tense our muscles, and gather all our will and energy to fight.”83  
The Russian people and Russian soldiers thus provided an example to the “children of the great 
family of nationalities as warriors of the country going to battle for their homeland.”84   
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 Russians’ preeminence helped define the position of lesser members in the hierarchy of 
the multinational fighting brotherhood that made up the Red Army, measured by the closeness of 
each peoples’ relationship to the Russian and the duration of their connection.  Rather than 
proximity alone, a history of fighting together meant more time to learn from the Russian martial 
tradition and acquire the masculine and soldierly traits that distinguished members of the Soviet 
fighting brotherhood.  Ukrainian fighters were logically in the penultimate position of this 
hierarchy, which the celebration of seventeenth century hero Bogdan Khemelnitskii emphasized: 
“intimate union of two brother peoples has since then become a threat to the enemies of the 
Ukrainians and Russians.”85 Adding “valorous sons” and “legendary sons” to the ranks of Red 
Army ensured the status of “their Belorussian brothers,” since the occupation of most of the 
Belorussian SSR limited the possibilities for celebrating a historical military relationship.
86
  
Marked as the most heroic of Caucasian and non-Slavic nations, Georgia could boast this 
prerequisite to military success, because “for the past hundred years the sons of the Georgian 
people fought together with the Russians for their shared homeland and shared fate. Even in the 
Patriotic war of 1812, the Georgian people gave the Russian army …brave officers and 
courageous soldiers.”87  Heroic exploits in such articles underscored that alongside support from 
the rear, these more senior nationalities provided capable fighters to the war effort. 
 
 Red Army fighters found little value in officers’ efforts to exhibit paternal qualities after 
Stalingrad or at any point in the war.  Instead, they valued officers who cared for their men’s 
survival.  An infantryman who fought to Berlin explained his distaste for officers who “were able 
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to send rashly their detachments toward a certain death without hesitation.” 88  Another 
infantryman posed a rhetorical question about officers’ priorities: “Were there times when it was 
clear after our first effort to storm the [enemy] position that we wouldn’t be able to capture the 
collective farm, but the commander of the regiment or division interfered and took soldiers to the 
start line and saved a hundred lives? No, they had orders.” 89 For troops who judged others 
according to their combat collectives’ norms of shared sacrifice and hardship, such officer did 
not deserve respect.  Leadership meant leading men into battle and fighting with them.  A 
Georgian fighter explained how he and his comrades viewed political officers who did not fight: 
“We called them ‘popes’.  I did not think they were necessary.  I myself understood what kind of 
soldiers I served with, and what kind of spirit they had.”90 Such officers violated men’s 
expectations of frontline behavior and lost respect because they refused to share in the danger 
that the rank and file could scarcely avoid.  Their formal power endured, but their relationship 
with their subordinates could extend no further without a dramatic change in their relationship to 
combat, not the food and rest improvements official rhetoric recommended.   
 The troops saw no more merit in the hierarchy of national war contributions that appeared 
in official rhetoric after Stalingrad.  Concerned with battle merit, they judged replacements by 
their conduct at the front and especially in combat.  The only limit to this emerged as language 
skill. Skill had been a key issue in prewar conflicts between men and women workers, but at the 
front, language skill provided a fundamental barrier to comradeship.
91
 Kazakh infantryman 
remembered how, early in the mobilization process, “to deal with the language problem at least, 
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the regimental command appointed half a dozen young Russian-speakers, including myself, as 
section commanding officers. Nobody was concerned about what sort of leaders we would make 
or what we could teach the men: we were just glorified interpreters.”92  Aside from the critical 
service they provided their co-nationals, knowledge of Russian removed the only barrier to 
acceptance for capable soldiers.  The opposite was true for men who lacked Russian language 
skills.  Such recruits faced isolation and ostracism, or at best pity, as Vasily Grossman observed 
on a troop train: “A soldier, an Uzbek, is singing loudly in Uzbekian [sic].  The whole carriage 
can hear him. The sounds seem absurd to our ears, and the words are unfamiliar. Red Army 
soldiers are listening to him attentively, with a caring and embarrassed expression.  There isn’t a 
single grin or smile.”93  While Slavic troops displayed obvious chauvinism about language 
learning, they usually included Russian speakers from the national republics.  Skill could 
function as an individual attribute that trumped national stereotypes. 
 The revival of Stalin’s dual paternal role as father to Red Army troops and to the Soviet 
people highlighted how existing Soviet ideas adapted to wartime circumstances.  Stalin’s 
relationship to the troops extended beyond leader, inspiration, and surrogate comrade to caring 
father, on which officers were to model their behavior.  This change proved far less drastic than 
Stalin's renewed role of national father, which accompanied a gendered hierarchy of peoples at 
war as much as multi-national unity.  The feminized non-Slavic nationalities’ sudden 
prominence in frontline propaganda coincided with their mass entry into the ranks and ensuing 
disciplinary problems.  Heroes were few among them, and female heroes seemed to be a 
mockery as much as showcase of their wartime role.  Among the troops, each man could prove 
himself, if he spoke Russian, regardless of how his homeland appeared in the newspapers.  Many 
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among them failed to measure up, but they joined the ranks of Slavs and Russians in the rear that 
had no language difficulties.  Although their respective barriers are difficult to compare, 
Russian-speaking non-Slavs seem to have been far more successful entrants into combat 
collectives than Slavic women, especially given the Red Army’s Russian majority.  
Conclusion 
 The year following Stalingrad provided few radical changes to the Red Army’s rank and 
file.  Propaganda narratives and soldiers’ view of the most notable change, an influx of non-
Slavic soldiers, challenges existing scholarship on the Soviet national question during the war.  
The post-Stalingrad period saw both the introduction and high water mark of non-Slavic 
soldiers’ visibility in soldier-specific propaganda, which suggests a much more complicated 
policy process than is possible with the existing idea of a linear “wartime line” on the national 
elements of Soviet culture, operating separately from wartime practice.
94
 Despite their sudden 
prominence, the feminine valence of most coverage of non-Slavic peoples in Krasnaia Zvezda 
suggests official dissatisfaction with their overall military performance.  A leading scholar of 
Central Asia military forces has assessed the Communist Party’s agitation about military service 
and national defense as having been highly effective in Central Asia in the years leading up to 
the war.
95
  However, the problems of discipline and motivation that purportedly prompted a 
dramatic increase in focus on non-Slavic demonstrates that non-Slavic soldiers were not prepared 
for military service, at least not on the scale that the military officials demanded.  The sudden 
propaganda focus on non-Slavic contributions and interest in improving political work among 
non-Slavs suggests the need to reexamine the universal implications of growing wartime 
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Russianization of priorities and narratives in the historical profession.
96
  Among Russian 
soldiers, the primacy of practical language skill and military performance capabilities reveals no 
rising tide of national chauvinism or even national pride; even if the Red Army’s prevailing 
language requirements served Russians and Slavs before other Soviet peoples.  
 Soldiers’ overwhelming interest in burials and revenge suggests a far less optimistic 
mood among Red Army troops than some scholars have asserted.
97
  This discrepancy in soldiers’ 
mood is significant because it reveals a more complex picture of the post-Stalingrad landscape 
than other studies have identified.  Specifically, official rhetoric presented sober themes, such as 
the burial of heroes and the unsatisfied need to liberate millions of Soviet citizens from captivity.  
Heroes remained central to this process, despite the gradual increase in Red Army forces’ 
mobility and the firepower of heavy weaponry.  Moreover, official rhetoric sought to direct 
officers to provide for their men’s needs and policymakers undertook a massive campaign to 
translate agitation materials from Russian into other Soviet languages.  Neither effort stands out 
as a marker of restored confidence and overwhelming superiority over the enemy.   
 Both liberation and revenge were motivations rooted in loss, and much danger and hard 
fighting remained before land or people were recovered.  Convergence between official and 
soldiers’ motives remained limited, even when both included liberation, revenge, and 
brotherhood, which reflected the power that frontline circumstances had over soldiers’ motives. 
Witnessing comrades’ deaths in battle or seeing the ruins of home regions trumped the macro-
level objectives that propaganda heroes pursued. Soldiers displayed no greater receptivity to 
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propaganda after Stalingrad than they had before it.  The relative convergence of the two ideas of 
duty resulted from a shift in propaganda that brought official ideals closer to troops’ existing 
motives to fight.  The Red Army’s victory at Stalingrad prompted change, as other major battles 
had, but failed to produce a distinct turning point in frontline culture. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LOVING AND LUSTING: THE PERILS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF CONQUEST, 1944-1945 
 
 As spring gave way to summer in 1944, the Red Army finally enjoyed several advantages 
after three years of desperate fighting.  For the first time in the war, Red Army commanders 
could dictate where and when summer campaigns would take place, building on the liberation of 
the Leningrad region, Odessa, and the Crimea in winter and spring operations.  The Red Army 
also achieved a permanent superiority in size and equipment compared to its adversary.  The 
Normandy landings in June marked the overdue opening of a true second front against Germany, 
in which Allied casualties rates actually surpassed Soviet totals, if only for those three months.
1
 
These factors resulted in a Red Army summer offensive that began by driving the Germans off 
Soviet territory in certain sectors, and finished entirely beyond the 1940 frontiers.      
 However, the success of the Red Army’s liberating drive brought with it new challenges 
in propaganda and political work, and prompted soldiers to reconsider their expectations and 
opinions.  How to maintain motivation, morale, and discipline once war continued after the 
liberation of Soviet territory emerged as a critical issue. For many soldiers, liberation revived 
earlier divisions between notions of collective and individual duty, and their connection to 
changing official war aims. Frontline depictions and perceptions of women also evolved along 
with the new strategic context and the peak in women entering the Red Army.  Encounters with 
foreign territories and populations proved particularly jarring after engaging a generally 
welcoming Soviet population since 1941.
2
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  The defense and liberation of the Soviet people had appeared as gendered motives for 
national mobilization and sacrifice from the outset of the German invasion.  The centrality of 
liberation as a core propaganda goal of the war effort became clear when propagandists tried to 
preserve it by emphasizing the micro-liberation of Soviet citizens from captivity on foreign soil. 
Nevertheless, the gendered subjectivities soldiers expressed in their personal and public writings 
shifted in response to the transformation of liberation from a goal to an accomplishment. Soldiers 
reevaluated the longstanding tension between domestic and military demands when they left 
Soviet territory.  These reflections involved their views of their comrades, loved ones, and the 
enemy, as well as expressions of the hatred, fear, joy, and pride they experienced as the war 
entered its final stages.  After the onset of liberation, official rhetoric included new gendered 
depictions of the foreign terrain of combat, the altered status of the Soviet home front, and the 
role of Soviet power in both realms.  New heroic ideals, both masculine and feminine, emerged 
to highlight the different ways in which the Soviet people could best fulfill their wartime duty 
and would be commemorated in victory.  Among the troops, greater opportunities for intimate 
contact with foreign and Soviet women revealed the overlap between violence and sexuality in 
frontline culture and soldierly masculinity.  
 An examination of these subjectivities in contrast to the gender scripts of official rhetoric 
from the 1930s and Russian Civil War also reveals the capacity for soldiers to influence the 
propaganda directed at them, even after the cultural “breathing space” created by the mortal 
danger of Nazi subjugation had passed.  Elements of prewar propaganda and policy returned in 
1944, including Joseph Stalin’s omnipresent leadership role, and Soviet pronatalism. 3  However, 
the relationship between the 1940s war effort and the 1930s social and political order that victory 
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would restore remained complex. I argue that this revival in frontline propaganda remained 
incomplete due to the need to respond to unanticipated changes in the military situation and 
soldiers’ actions after liberation.  The continued incongruity of official ideals and soldiers’ 
values after liberation reveals a rise in alternative subjectivities at the front as victory grew near, 
an intensification of masculine hierarchy and expressions of superiority over women in the war 
effort, and the emergence of a cultural and moral context for the Red Army’s mass rape of 
German women.  
Conflicted loyalties after liberation 
 
 The Red Army’s foreign surroundings after liberation began to trump official rhetoric on 
the subject over the course of the summer of 1944.  This turnaround in Soviet wartime fortunes, 
reversing the circumstances under which the war had been fought from its first hours, challenged 
the motives espoused in propaganda and the idea that the Soviet government guided active men 
to fight the war for passive women.   Propaganda presented family differently in terms of 
national metaphor and individual examples. These changes sought to reconcile the clash of 
individual and collective loyalties that might arise for soldiers who thought of remaining with or 
returning to freed loved ones.  Small changes took place in the hegemonic masculinity and 
emphasized femininity presented in frontline propaganda, in contrast to the momentous impact 
on soldiers’ subjectivities, which again focused on domestic loyalties and individual affiliations. 
While Stalin’s role as leader and symbolic father of male heroes received greater and greater 
attention, soldiers dreamed of their loved ones, rather than greater glory on foreign soil. 
 Frontline propaganda continued to embed notions of gender hierarchy in its narrative of 
the Red Army’s liberating mission in the spring of 1944.  Krasnaia Zvezda articles such as 
“Girls’ Grief” unambiguously linked liberation with the restoration and protection of women’s 
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honor, along with that of the country at large, but pushed it beyond territorial limits.  After 
representing several tortured girls as universal Russian feminine figures as in the work of 
Pushkin and Turgenev, Ilya Ehrenburg asked Red Army men:   
 “Russian soldier, hero of Stalingrad, Kursk, Korsun, the Dniestr, are you listening 
 to what the Germans do with the Russian girl Zina? If you know love, if you have a 
 heart, you will not forgive this. …Your honor will not allow you to refuse to defend 
 these girls’ honor. …You can save them. You must save them. They are our 
 flowers, our birds, [and] our love. They await you, soldier of Russia.”4 
 
Ehrenburg’s appeal rested on traditional associations of defending women’s honor as a 
masculine duty, of flowers, birds, and love as feminine, and challenged the heroes of such great 
battles on these terms, contrasting their strategic success with a more basic and personal duty that 
awaited fulfillment.  Ehrenburg’s focus on passive feminine beauty and virtue evoked an almost 
chivalric martial ethic, but contributed to a new emphasis on fighting for Russian women beyond 
Soviet territory.    
 A secondary facet of such depictions of liberation in frontline propaganda acknowledged 
soldiers’ motivation to free their families from captivity.  Originally published in the divisional 
newspaper Suvorovets, “A Mother’s Letter” appeared as the direct publication of a mother’s 
praise for the efforts of her five sons to liberate her, and the eventual success of her second 
youngest (along with his unit): “For two years we found ourselves under the yoke of the German 
occupiers. For two years I thought of my sons, and waited: and here they are, my sons - 
liberators!”  The report from a special Krasnaia Zvezda correspondent, “Meeting on a Frontline 
Road,” depicts the personal motivation of Sgt. Ivan Grabovskii, who lived in Leningrad Oblast 
and fought to lift the siege of Leningrad.  He returned home when the frontline passed through 
his town, and found a note from his sister that changed him as a fighter: “‘Red Army soldiers, the 
Germans have taken us. Come quickly, help us. Ania.’ That note explained everything. From that 
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time forward Sgt. Grabovskii began to fight with even more fury.”5 This fury brought him two 
medals and distinguished him among his comrades. Resting with his unit after a successful 
offensive, “on the road moved a throng of people” among whom he found his sister, after the 
Germans abandoned a group of civilians intended for deportation to Germany.
6
  While these rare 
and rather improbable cases of direct liberation highlighted the importance of personal and local 
motives rarely present in frontline rhetoric, they operated within the same gender framework, 
replacing a universal Soviet girl passively awaiting liberation with a specific mother or sister 
doing the same.  
 Moreover, these articles were at best ambivalent about the importance of the familial 
motive as a sort of micro-liberation.  In each case, they subordinated the achieved liberation of 
family members to the Red Army’s larger liberating mission, and concluded with a call to 
continue fighting to free those fellow female citizens still awaiting their liberators.  Soon after 
reuniting with his sister, Sgt. Grabovskii addressed his comrades, providing the report’s 
conclusion: “Have you seen my sister? She is all of 19 years, but looks like an old woman. Her 
entire face is wrinkled, she walks like a hunchback. This is what the Germans are reducing the 
Russian people to. My mother and sister are free, but how many victims still await us.”7  Along 
with the contrast of active and passive roles, the article emphasized how a soldier’s individual 
family circumstances changed nothing about his national duty.  The nameless mother published 
in Suvorovets concluded her letter not with a personal message, but an order to her sons: 
“honorably and boldly fight for the liberation of the Motherland. Crush, hero-sons, the wild 
hordes of German invaders, to speed the liberation of [our] towns and cities from that scum.”8 In 
                                                 
5
 “Meeting on a Frontline Road,” Krasnaia Zvezda, 5 October 1944, 3. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 “A Mother’s Letter,” Krasnaia Zvezda, 5 October 1944, 3. 
  
184 
 
 
contrast to civilian publications, which emphasized personal and familial relationships 
throughout the war, such content marked a new theme in frontline propaganda, slightly elevating 
the significance of the family in the war effort, and only as victory appeared on the horizon.
9
 
However, the national family, and service or sacrifice for it, outweighed duty to soldiers’ 
biological or local relations. 
 Beyond the gendering of roles of liberating soldier and liberated sister, frontline 
propaganda further distinguished between the active and passive response of Soviet citizens 
seeking liberation.  In “Two Meetings,” a single Krasnaia Zvezda article presented two 
contrasting cases of meetings of liberated family members. The first reunion was between 
siblings Liza and Stepan, where “Liza spent a long time telling her brother about her suffering 
and deprivations for three years of German occupation.”10  As in the other family liberation 
scenes presented above, the personal triumph of a soldier and his sister appeared as one example 
of the larger liberation effort.  Stepan’s comrades took inspiration from his sister’s tragic story: 
“All the artillerymen of Koloskov’s battery came to console the girl, [vowing] ‘for the death of 
your mother, for all your suffering we will brutally make the Germans pay.’”11  Such a response 
from his comrades suggested the universal power of women’s suffering to motivate soldiers 
beyond family ties, and the passivity of women in this process, as sources of inspiration, but not 
active agents in the Red Army’s mission of liberation.  
 The second meeting detailed in the article, between father and son Sviridov, provided a 
counter example of liberation.  A lieutenant met his father at the front, and the latter explained 
his place in the Red Army ranks: “When the Germans broke into our city of Borisov, I joined the 
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partisans… There I fought, and we liberated most of Byelorussia, I volunteered for the Red 
Army… but look at you, how well you’ve done for yourself. Already an officer!”12  Rather than 
await his son’s return with the Red Army, father Sviridov joined the liberation effort, and kept 
fighting once his city was free.  Father Sviridov’s example, in juxtaposition to that of Liza, 
presented its frontline audience with an unambiguous distinction between men’s and women’s 
roles in liberation, and in each case depicted all the men in a family as fighters.  Such examples 
further reinforced the compatibility of universal and personal liberation motives for soldiers.   
 Ideal soldiers had multiple motives in these cases of extra-territorial liberation. However, 
specific heroic exploits provided two elements to distinguish the masculine role in liberation 
according to official rhetoric: Stalin and family.  Krasnaia Zvezda’s profile, “Hero of the Soviet 
Union Roman Smishchuk,” approvingly reported how the experience of occupation, and a 
beating at the hands of a Romanian gendarme, caused “Hatred and a thirst for revenge to ignite 
in the chest of the collective farmer,” unlike the disfigurement and disability suffered by Soviet 
women and girls described above.  The 46-year old Smishchuk joined the Red Army after it 
reached his village, making liberation the beginning, rather than the end, of his time on the 
frontline.  He entered the community of fighters and found himself transformed, as he explained: 
“I don’t know where within me such rage came from. I had always been a quiet and peaceful 
man. But there [in battle], I did not remember myself, I only wanted one thing: to strike, to burn 
the reptiles.”   Smishchuk’s exploit, destroying six German tanks with only grenades and 
Molotov cocktails, integrated him fully, so that his comrades: “Greeted the hero with cries of 
‘Ura’. They gave him friendly handshakes, thanked him, and hugged him.” The Soviet leaders’ 
congratulatory telegram explained that he showed his “love for the motherland and for the great 
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Stalin, and also served “as a symbol of courage, fearlessness, and epic-hero strength”13  
Smishchuk thus exemplified the qualities of the “Brother Liberator:” occupation strengthened 
him, Stalin inspired him, and he looked forward to advancing with his new comrades, not 
backward to home. 
 Frontline propaganda had long explained the nature of the community of fighters at the 
front in familial terms, and by mid-1944 revived the idea of a “great family” by presenting actual 
brothers to illustrate the relationship of individual families to the war effort.
14
  Krasnaia Zvezda 
presented this link in “The Exploit of Aleksandr Matrosov’s Brother,” honoring not only the 
celebrated hero himself, but also the brother he inspired to fight through his sacrifice.  The article 
explains that “In the heart of every son of the Soviet people live the Stalinist words: ‘The great 
exploit of comrade Matrosov must serve as an example of fighting bravery and heroism for every 
warrior of the Red Army.”15  Among thousands of other sons of the Soviet people, Vasilii 
Matrosov still had a duty to fight, despite his family’s sacrifice of one son in the cause of victory.   
 A full discussion of ideal family contributions to the war effort appeared in the frontline 
newspaper Za Rodiny [For the Motherland], with the article “The Serovs, a Family of Patriots.”  
It profiled the Serov father and three sons, each of whom had served with distinction since the 
war’s outbreak, and celebrated a fourth son, who “following [his] father’s example, became a 
machine gunner and now fights at the front,” while “wife Nikolaia Gerasimovich and three 
daughters work in the collective farm fields.”16  These contrasting types of patriotism and 
contributions to the war effort appear in sharp relief, applicable to both the biological unit and 
people as a whole. Discussions of women who “rendered invaluable services” extended beyond 
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mothers in the rear, but women remained secondary figures in the liberation effort led by 
frontline heroes.
17
 The shift from Martyr Heroine to Victim-Helper emphasized femininity and 
reflected the optimistic and triumphal tone of Brother-Liberator discourse, but remained as 
disconnected from women’s actual involvement at the front as it did from men’s reaction to 
continued fighting. 
 
 For Red Army men, the final battles to liberate Soviet territory raised fundamental 
questions about the Soviet war effort that frontline propaganda failed to consider.  While these 
new concerns registered somewhat in their letters home, a flood of petitions to the government 
mostly clearly expressed soldiers’ sense that a decisive change had taken place.  Red Army 
troops began petition the government after the Red Army had all but completed the liberation of 
Soviet territory during the summer of 1944.
18
  The number of Red Army soldiers’ petitions to the 
Supreme Soviet (usually addressed to President Kalinin, and rarely to Stalin) continued to 
increase monthly during the final year of the war. The most common requests were for assistance 
with early discharge or leave and more modest requests of material aid or preferential treatment 
for their families in return for the successful fulfillment of their wartime duty.
19
    
 These petitions linked the individual author to both the war effort and the family whose 
condition compelled him to write.  Troops challenged the incongruity between their reality at the 
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front and the homogeneity of propaganda narratives.
20
   Soldiers presented their requests within 
an extended biography, in which they situated themselves as citizens, combatants, and even 
heroes, in order to bolster their personal demands on the state.  Embedded in these discussions of 
self, family, and frontline service, fighting men expressed a gendered subjectivity that drew from 
wartime and prewar official narratives as well as frontline adaptations of them.
21
   
 Many soldiers believed that liberation from German occupation should include an end to 
the hardship it caused, which they sought to achieve for their own families, especially if state 
care was inadequate or non-existent.  Junior Lieutenant S. M. Naslednikov presented himself as a 
willing participant in the collective endeavor of liberation until his personal interests diverged 
from those of the official war effort: 
I had no contact with my family for three years. They were in territory temporarily 
occupied by the Germans (BSSR Mogilev Oblast’), and I was at the front. 3.08.44 I 
received a letter from my family, from which I learned that remaining alive were my 
elderly mother and sister born in 1929 [who] in the past, specifically 1943 were 
deported by the Germans to the Minsk region.  The returned to their home village 
15.07.44, where they found hardship and devastation.  For these reasons they are in a 
poor state - without food and means to exist.  My brother born 1925 was captured by 
the German field gendarmerie [as a partisan] and his fate is unknown. My father was 
already dead [before the occupation].
22
 
 
Naslednikov’s petition situated his military service alongside his family’s time under occupation 
to justify their need for care as a reason for discharge.  Such a rhetorical strategy illustrates how 
soldiers could re-interpret official scripts as grounds to assert personal motives, rather than 
emulate the Soviet ideal of subordinating personal desires to those of the collective.
23
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 The biographical sketches soldiers provided in their leave and discharge petitions 
reinterpreted the official script of whole families of brothers, fathers, and sons serving in the Red 
Army simultaneously.    To gain leave to help his wife and two surviving boys, Private I. M. 
Kazirov emphasized not only his own three years of service, but explained how “During the 
second [sic] patriotic war two of my sons have died in battle with the fascist German invaders, 
and one son born 1919 is missing in action.”24 To enhance the significance of their own military 
service, and underscore their family’s plight in the rear, soldiers like Kazirov recounted the 
losses of their brothers and fathers in the war effort. 
 Corporal Ivan G. Abashkin presented his wounds and medals as further reasons, 
alongside his family’s difficulties, that he should be granted an early discharge:  
like a soldier of the RKKA I have fulfilled and am fulfilling my sworn duty as 
expected. Mikhail Ivanovich, as a participant in the Patriotic War, I have been 
contused twice and wounded once since October 1942 in the course of fulfilling the 
orders of commanders in battle at the front with the German occupiers. I have 
received the decorations “Medal from combat service” and the badge “Excellent 
artillerist.” I, as a warrior of the RKKA appeal to you with a request for aid that I 
need for my family life.  My mother died [померла] in 1942 and my father and 
brother perished [погибли] in battle for the motherland.  Two sisters, 13 and 10 
years old remain [in my family], who had been evacuated [but have now] returned to 
our region near the front line, and at present they live in poverty and are not in our 
home and without the limited means they had earlier in the war. And so I have 
received a letter, in which they write from the first lines they cannot last any longer 
and ask me as their brother and only surviving relative to come and help them.
25
 
 
Abashkin’s request highlights petitioning soldiers’ shared use of official measure of dedication 
and achievement: male relatives in combat, wounds, and medals. These merits all pertained 
exclusively to the front and combat, all functioned as evidence of ideal soldierly behavior 
according to official scripts, and all contrasted with female relatives’ role in the war effort and 
that of the feminized Soviet rear at large.  
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 The petitions of Naslednikov, Kazirov, and Abashkin represent the typical elements of 
soldiers’ biographical petitions: a dual commitment to frontline duty and family care, a family’s 
liberation in their home region as the reason for him to leave the front, and distinguished military 
service as a basis to make personal claims of the state.  When their families regained their 
freedom, but the war effort continued beyond Soviet borders, their personal motives as citizen-
soldiers resurfaced.
26
  Across nationality, age, rank, party status, and family type, petitions reveal 
soldiers’ agency in adapting and combining official scripts to assert a self that remained aligned 
with the collective while asserting personal motives rooted in official objectives.  Moreover, the 
assertion of an avowedly masculine soldierly subjectivity constituted the most enduring aspect of 
those official scripts within soldiers’ adaptations.  
 Typical of such requests, these soldiers echoed official rhetoric in presenting men as the 
only contributors to the war effort in their families, and as the only alternative to state care for 
their wives and children.  Red Army troops’ alternative concept of reduced obligations for men 
with relatives who formed a family-at-the-front did nothing to alter the passive place of women 
in official scripts.  Red Army fighters also asserted an alternate significance to medals and 
official scripts of heroism, which they rooted in a personal focus on the family care that 
liberation necessitated.  Rather than measure their “usefulness to society” through official 
recognition of their contributions, soldiers used their military service to demand personal 
benefits, suggesting that such value to the collective, along with the liberation effort itself, was a 
hollow achievement unless their families’ conditions improved accordingly.27  
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 Many soldiers accepted the official script of combat wounds as evidence of their 
contribution to the war effort and a marker of patriotism that legitimized their status as soldiers.
28
 
However, they presented themselves as having endured this hardship not only as a sort of down 
payment on their contribution to victory, but as part of the larger pattern of contributions that 
entitled them to make claims and justify a renewed focus on concern for their families. While 
similar to other claims for family leave and discharge, soldiers who invoked their wounds in such 
cases presented contrasting meanings of bodily harm and suffering in line with official scripts 
about the gendered experience of liberation.  Male soldiers’ wounds marked a dedication to 
victory and source of pride in contrast to women’s suffering because of the deprivations of 
occupation, which was neither heroic nor patriotic, but simply tragic.  The former strengthened 
soldiers’ status and sense of entitlement, and the latter reinforced ideas of feminine dependence 
and passivity. 
 As Michael Roper has asserted, studies of gendered subjectivities, rather than simply 
ideological constructs of gender, must consider why men make emotional investments in 
particular cultural representations of masculinity.
29
  Abaskhin and his fellow petition-writing Red 
Army troops revealed a sense of subjectivity through the range of correct or desirable behaviors 
they exhibited in battle, but broke from official scripts by asserting intense feelings of guilt for 
their families’ hardships.30  Rather than reject the official masculine ideal, soldiers’ self-
presentation deviated from it in order to address the failure of a sort of social contract 
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underpinning soldierly masculinity: state care for the families of frontline troops.  These soldiers 
could not subordinate their familial duty to the collective war effort because of this unfulfilled 
state promise, even if their petitions seemed to express a masculine subjectivity that blended the 
soldierly with aspects of 1930s scripts of paternal responsibility.
31
  A constant issue for Soviet 
citizens even in peacetime, the difficulty of reconciling reality with “revolutionary truth” in the 
context of liberation (as with earlier stages of the war) compelled soldiers to improvise and adapt 
in response to the conflicting demands placed on them from front and rear.
32
   
The fears and joys of conquest 
 
 In addition to the petitions presented above, soldiers’ discontent with fighting after 
liberation and in foreign territory registered with Soviet leaders through a variety of channels. 
Frontline political workers faced complaints and communicated their difficulty repeating the 
same narrative to soldiers’ about the continuation of the war, explaining that “[our] seminars do 
not suffice… we lead them monthly and almost all are on the same themes and problems, only 
the wording changes.”33  Throughout the summer and into fall, censors read soldiers’ letters 
home about how “we have been on foreign land for a while now. What a frightful bore! It seems 
as is if the sun and air are different than ours, to say nothing of how things look.”34 Likewise, a 
Hero of the Soviet Union complained, “we do not get a word of the Polish language, but they say 
[in Russian] ‘you have come. Okay, but better if you hadn’t, you are not on our side.’”35  Such 
experiences contrasted the optimistic editorials that proclaimed “in the name of the liberation of 
the long-suffering fraternal Polish people - forward to the West!”, which tried to drag the popular 
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goal of liberation far past its logical conclusion.
36
  Soldiers’ expressions of discontent with 
fighting on foreign soil to liberate seemingly ungrateful foreign peoples proved minor in 
comparison to the undisciplined behavior of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe that summer.  
 It was in Romania that the Red Army waged its first battles against Axis forces outside 
the Soviet Union, and there that discipline suddenly collapsed.  A July report to the Red Army’s 
political administration (PUR), including its chairman, A.S. Shcherbakov, provided the macro-
statistics as well as details of specific incidents of rape, drunkenness, desertion, torture, self-
inflicted wounds, and looting.  Beyond the assessment that such incidents had increased every 
month the Red Army had spent in Romania, the report concluded: “The content of agitation and 
propaganda very poorly reflected the special conditions of war in enemy territory.”37  The special 
conditions consisted of Soviet soldiers lacking the restraint they showed to civilians and their 
property within Soviet territory.  The report also included recommendations to resolve the 
situation, which focused on improving and adapting political work among the forces in Romania, 
but lacked specific orders about how to explain the new frontline context. In October, new 
reports reached Shcherbakov and his first deputies in the PUR, detailing 3,763 disciplinary 
infractions in a single air army in one month, and again lacking in any specific changes in the 
content of political work.
38
  Indiscipline continued and exhortations for soldiers to exhibit 
“culturedness” on foreign soil and among foreign women failed.  In this context, Stalin issued an 
order that signaled the beginning of a new narrative in propaganda, based on his personal 
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leadership and the Red Army’s final objective: the destruction of the enemy, capture of Berlin, 
and total victory.
39
 
 In November of 1944, a shift took place in frontline propaganda and political work.  
Stalin’s Order 220, marking the anniversary of the Revolution, explained: “The past year has 
been the year of the complete liberation of Soviet territory of the German-fascist invaders …Our 
remaining task is to crush Hitlerite Germany in short order with a rapid onslaught in concert with 
the armies of our allies.”40  Stalin’s definitive announcement of a new objective reverberated 
through Red Army political-morale during the two months of military planning and preparation 
for the invasion of Germany.  Stalin’s implication that conquest held equal importance with 
liberation seemed to respond to the growing incidents of indiscipline and reports of discontent 
amongst Red Army troops already fighting outside Soviet borders.
41
  
 Krasnaia Zvezda articles and editorials paid considerable attention to Stalin’s Order 220 
in the days and weeks that followed, using it to address the central question of why soldiers must 
continue fighting.  Stalin’s personal role grew immensely in these efforts to motivate soldiers, 
evident in a 10 November Krasnaia Zvezda editorial that described him as the “father of all our 
historic victories,” credited him with “inspiring the spirit of all soldiers for the final destruction 
of the German-fascist invaders,” and exhorting soldiers to “fight as Stalin has taught and 
demanded [you to fight].”42  To reinforce this message, Shcherbakov stressed to senior military 
political workers: “our Red Army, under the leadership of our leader - the Supreme Commander, 
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Marshall of the Soviet Union, comrade Stalin - completed a historic feat.”43   Another editorial 
described the army as “led by Stalinist commanding genius,” while the fact that with “Stalin’s 
leadership, [the Red Army] surpassed the army of the enemy in strength, experience, and the art 
of war” provided further reason for  praise.44  The attribution of all Red Army victories to his 
leadership served to justify his order for a final battle for Germany as an unquestionable 
decision. 
 This renewed focus on Stalin in late 1944, which echoed propaganda depictions of him as 
a father to the country in the 1930s, extended beyond praise for his strategic leadership and 
linked him personally to individual Red Army fighters, their exploits, and the heroism that would 
bring victory.  Frontline newspapers reported on soldiers’ positive reactions to Order 220.  In 
Krasnoarmeiskaia Pravda, Sergeant Kornienko relayed his determination to do his duty: 
“Listening to the order of comrade Stalin, I thoughtfully responded to it: ‘We are fulfilling your 
words, comrade Stalin. We are striking at the fascist beast in his lair!’” In Krasnoe Znamia, 
private Ovcharenko expressed his inspiration: “I am confident that my contribution will lead to 
the decisive blow against Hitlerite Germany and I foresee the banner of victory raised above 
Berlin.”45  In each case, the soldiers quoted a part of the order, and embraced their new objective 
without hesitation.  Such articles did not single out soldiers who performed exploits, but those 
who expressed praise and loyalty to Stalin as he led them to Berlin.     
 While such praise for Stalin had appeared earlier in the war, a new type of article 
provided lengthy reports of regular soldiers’ reactions, all of which emphasized Stalin’s renewed 
role as the primary source of motivation to continue fighting. Testimonials about how “I am 
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immensely happy and joyful that I heard Comrade Stalin’s speech… It has added to my strength” 
and “Comrade Stalin is speaking about us… now [our] objectives are clear,” demonstrated the 
inspiration and clarity of purpose that only Stalin could provide.
46
  The happiness and joy that 
Stalin inspired in such fighters implicitly freed them from any fear, whether of death in battle or 
of dying after certain victory appeared on the horizon but sacrifice and loss blocked the path to it. 
Such articles emphasized the new iteration of late war frontline heroes: rather than the exploits 
they performed, the correct sustaining motivation distinguished the best fighters from the rest, 
and Stalin’s leadership alone provided that motivation.  These “Total Warriors” exhibited a 
fearless desire to keep fighting on Stalin’s orders, and this loyalty proved their greatest virtue, 
rather than any specific exploits or combat prowess.  
 Beyond his role providing inspiration and motivation, Stalin acted as symbolic teacher for 
frontline soldiers.  Sniper N.S. Afanas’ev killed 179 Germans to earn the title of Hero of the 
Soviet Union, but his front-page profile in Krasnaia Zvezda focused on his new role as a unit 
commander, rather than his exploits in battle.  As a commander, Afanas’ev explained to his men 
that in “preparing for the decisive battle with the German-fascist invaders,” they would have to 
“learn the degree of military mastery demanded by Supreme Commander comrade Stalin” to 
replicate Afanas’ev’s success.47  Rather than justifiably claiming he could impart skills to his 
men, Afanas’ev cited Stalin’s teaching of military mastery as the most important lesson the 
snipers could learn.  While the profile mentioned his exploits, the article tellingly concluded with 
an emphasis on Afanas’ev’s loyalty to Stalin and the assertion of mastery as a core trait of future 
heroes.  Even with a Hero of the Soviet Union, the increased use of testimonials endorsing 
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Stalin’s orders or “the Stalinist school of military art,” rather than reports of battle heroics, 
distinguished the “Total Warrior” ideal from counterparts earlier in the war.48   
 Alongside such individual examples, Stalin received credit for creating such heroes from 
ordinary Soviet men from the start of the war.  In “Three Years of Vsevobuch,” Krasnaia Zvezda 
explained that it was “On the initiative of Comrade Stalin that the State Defense Committee on 
17 September 1941 ordered the creation of the universal compulsory military training of citizens 
of the Soviet Union.”  While training was compulsory for both men and women, the article only 
listed men when boasting that “Many [trainees] in battle for the motherland covered themselves 
in undying glory. Famous are the names of Heroes of the Soviet Union…”49  The liberated 
Ukraine likewise thanked Stalin for “defending the honor, independence and freedom” of 
Ukraine and producing “heroes of the Patriotic war from the best of the best sons of Soviet 
Ukraine…” along with “the sons of the other peoples of our multinational country,” for which 
“from all their heart they say to their leader and teacher: thank you!”50 In both cases, propaganda 
represented these mass mobilizations as the successful harnessing of Soviet manhood for the war 
effort and omitted women’s roles as combatants, so that heroes appeared as symbolic “sons” to 
their “father” and “teacher,” Stalin.51  
 The masculine character of the “Total Warrior” appears clearer still when compared to 
the rare depictions of women in Red Army service in late 1944. The article “Young women - 
military cooks” presented the contrasting case of typically feminine work that remained 
unconnected to Stalin’s inspiration and teaching:  “Young women learned not only culinary arts, 
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but also military affairs. Theoretical work in classes on the organization of nutrition in the Red 
Army and practical work in kitchens contributed to the training of qualified military cooks.”52  
Both the routine training and non-combat role of these women provided a sharp contrast between 
the transplanting of a typically domestic feminine task into the military realm and the celebrated 
exploits male heroes achieved under Stalin’s guidance.   
 While combat certainly appeared as the exclusive undertaking of the “Total Warrior,” 
what fully distinguished this heroic ideal as masculine was Stalin’s connection to him in a 
symbolic father-son relationship.  Soldier-specific propaganda failed to present any link between 
Stalin and individual military women, and even the Central Committee’s International Women’s 
Day resolution lacked any mention of Stalin’s relationship with women’s contributions to the 
war effort.  The “Total Warrior” was also an ideal Stalinist subject, expressing his loyalty by 
subordinating any hint of personal motive to the collective goal expressed in Stalin’s order for 
the capture of Berlin. In this way, the new ideal represented a re-assertion of the external 
hegemonic masculinity in response to the internal masculine challenge of soldiers’ liberation-
based assertions of their duty of family care in their petitions.  Rather than incorporate elements 
of that alternative masculinity, the “Total Warrior” reaffirmed the connection between Stalin’s 
leadership, state power, and masculine hero ideals as the basis for victory.   
 
 Rather than the confidence that Stalin’s guidance inspired, Red Army fighters’ letters and 
recollections of battle beyond the Soviet frontier reveal a heightened focus on fear, which 
permeated both sides of the frontline.  The rise in troops’ references to manageable levels of fear 
in letters and memoirs constituted part of a specific late war reaction to combat, given that Red 
Army doctors documented an increase in the number of cases of neuropsychological breakdown 
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or shell-shock.
53
  As an emotion, fear should be understood as socially and contextually defined, 
as connected to specific behaviors and actions, and as part of individual subjectivities.
54
  In the 
military realm, fear constitutes an emotional response to combat conditions that is responsible 
for, but distinct from, acts of cowardice.
55
  This section examines troops’ expressions and 
memories of fear as a state of mind to be dealt with in and around battle, what they believed 
caused such feelings, how soldiers should respond to it, and the fear the retreating enemy 
experienced as evidenced by his actions in combat.  Red Army men distinguished between 
different sources of fear and expressions of it as legitimate or not based on the larger set of 
standards collectively established in their units.  While frontline rhetoric mentioned fear only in 
describing German soldiers in defeat, Soviet fighters saw no shame in comrades’ fears of 
permanent separation from their families on the liberated home front.  Combat troops thus 
judged fearful feelings and actions according to the group-defined norms of a soldierly 
masculinity, in which certain fears after liberation were specifically masculine, while others 
irrevocably diminished the status of men who expressed them in battle. 
 The understandings of fear and cowardice that soldiers developed within their units 
shaped their judgment of enemy fighters in the late war, a time when the latter received renewed 
attention amidst the Red Army’s advance into foreign territory.  Soviet troops appear to have 
focused more on the enemy after liberation because they were fighting on his soil, whether in 
Germany itself, the territory of German allies such as Romania and Hungary, or German-
occupied non-Soviet lands such as Poland.  Soldiers ascribed fear to explain the behavior of 
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enemy combatants who behaved in a cowardly manner, especially by surrendering, running from 
the field of battle and abandoning their weapons or equipment. As an artilleryman explained, 
“…already at some point in 1944, the relationship [between us and the enemy] changed.  I 
remember how we took many Germans prisoner.”56 Another soldier made this link in a way that 
was typically flippant for discussions of the enemy, describing how the “Romanians run to the 
Seret [river]” because “they had been scared shitless.”57  Such frontline writings focused on the 
character of individual enemy soldiers and their emotional state.  A tanker writing home 
elaborated on conclusions that could be drawn from battle performance: “So that you understand 
their current feeling and mood… the Fritzes run, we beat them and soon comes the day of final 
victory.  Now already their bravery is not what it was earlier, in all, they have fallen to such a 
state, that they will soon be finished.”58 Victorious Red Army fighters thus cited enemy soldiers’ 
fearfulness to explain the defeat and retreat of enemy armies.  This assessment suggested that the 
moral quality of opposing soldiers explained the outcome of the war, rather than the structural 
changes in the course of the war that had taken place since June 1941, such as German defeat in 
North Africa and US entry into the war.   
 When observing individual enemy fighters, Soviet troops believed they could read 
emotions on their enemies’ faces.  An artilleryman described a close encounter with the enemy: 
“The Nazi froze for a second, waiting to be struck with it or shot… Flushed, deformed by fear 
and hate, his narrow eyes were looking up at me.”59  Red Army fighters thus chose to present the 
enemy as a collection of individual soldiers too afraid to fight effectively, rather than units 
lacking the logistical and numerical means to sustain a strategic defensive posture.  This 
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approach to describing combat emotions and actions, and the judgment of enemy soldiers that 
accompanied them, corresponds to what Jan Plamper describes as the new language of modern 
war in the era of modernity, in which “the possibility of destruction of self – for example, by 
death in a war – then produces much greater anxiety than if the potential for death remained in 
the realm of transcendent forces that control man and his world.” 60 With these judgments in 
mind, Soviet soldiers cursed the enemy not only for the laundry list of established grievances, 
but because he violated the norms of soldierly masculinity that governed membership in combat 
collectives.  German fearfulness thus reinforced the superiority of normative Red Army soldiers 
for possessing personal qualities to endure the fear-inducing experiences of combat.  
 Soviet soldiers presented a distinct emotional response to late-war combat because of 
their feelings of joy in battle as well as a lack of fear.  Some Red Army men discussed their 
feelings only briefly, possibly to minimize questions about which potentially frightful events 
surrounded them, as a rookie machine gunner explained to his mother and sister: “When my 
[first] day at the front came, I felt no fear.”61  Others utilized civilian sweethearts and wives as 
inspiration, including an Azeri infantryman: “When I know you’re thinking of me, I am not 
scared while advancing under the machine gun fire of the enemy.”62  Showing a lack of fear was 
both a source of pride and acted as a sort of “’psychological assault’” in the words of one 
infantryman, which was so powerful in battle that “the enemy could not stand this and fled.”63  A 
sense of joy replaced feelings of fear among many soldiers, who relished the opportunity to act 
heroically and punish the enemy:  
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The Germans approached the river, and we came under heavy fire.  We fired at them 
as well, man to man.  It was a fierce fight… Instead of fear, I felt a kind of joy that I 
was firing directly at approaching German soldiers.  I saw them coming and I took 
aim at them.  …That change from fear to calm confidence confirmed for me the 
many stories of heroic behavior by ordinary soldiers.
64
 
 
Fear and joy thus appeared as opposite emotional responses to combat.  The absence of fear 
marked the Red Army’s superior battlefield performance over the enemy on the tactical level, 
and even constituted an emotional component to heroism. 
 Post-combat conversations occasionally turned to recent battles, and in these informal 
discussions soldiers assessed and synthesized fighting experience into collective norms at the 
front.  Soldiers sometimes joked that a comrade was frightened in battle after his fearlessness led 
to victory, thus singling out his behavior as a model for the group: “In order to relax we all took 
a shot of vodka. They started to joke about me: ‘Bessonov, why did you run along the front, not 
forward, during the attack? …Lads, he was so scared that he forgot the direction of the attack!’ 
…Those big lads thought it was funny, they laughed like horses.”65  Fear and joy operated as part 
of an emotional competition with the enemy and among Red Army men, in which feeling and 
especially showing fear diminished men on both sides of the front.  Critical comparisons of how 
“our men were less sensitive and more stoic.  We were better adapted to… physical and 
psychological stress [than the Germans]” not only asserted the superiority of Red Army men, but 
also invoked ideas of feminine softness as antithetical to military success.
66
  Contrasting their 
fearlessness and joy in battle with their enemy’s displays of cowardice, Red Army soldiers 
appeared to express the “romantic” view of combat fear that Jan Plamper has identified with 
Stalinist military policy, which “saw fear as an aberration from the norm of brave, fearless 
                                                 
64
 Adam Bronner, My War against the Nazis, (Tuscaloosa: Fire Ant Books, 2008), 100-101. 
65
 In fact, he had run along the front in order to rouse his men and show them that the enemy machine guns were not 
as dangerous as they thought; his example helped them overcome their fear. Bessonov, 115- 116. 
66
 Mikhin, 87. For a discussion of late Tsarist and early Soviet ideas of masculine and feminine roles and virtues 
regarding citizenship and military service as consonant with European ones, see Sanborn, 162-164. 
  
203 
 
 
soldiers.”67  Some men, and many officers and political officials, undoubtedly felt this way, 
particularly as they rose in rank and had less and less firsthand experience of battle. 
 However, Red Army fighters did not exclusively adhere to this perspective, or retain their 
optimistic focus on German forces’ weakness, in the post-liberation phase of the war.  Battle-
hardened troops openly expressed different feelings of fear in response to fighting after liberation 
and outside Soviet borders, when their deaths no longer seemed to hold any relevance for the fate 
of loved ones and the condition of the home front.  This change in perspective emerged despite 
the end of a threat to soldiers from within: confidence in soldiers’ performance and the closeness 
of victory led Stalin, on 29 October 1944, to abolish the blocking units established to shoot Red 
Army men retreating without orders.
68
  To be sure, cowardice remained shameful and grounds 
for official punishment and social ostracism among comrades.  Yet it was a less immediate but 
more inescapable sense of vulnerability that plagued many soldiers, stemming from a split in 
their conceptions of self between the battlefield reality surrounding them and the civilian world 
they had left and imagined was once again free from war.  
 Soviet troops’ concerns centered on their diminished chances for survival as the revised 
strategic goal of unconditional German surrender seemed to prolong the war.  This resulted in a 
mix of optimism about a given operation amidst fears for the enduring possibility of death and its 
impact on family at home, as an artillery scout noted in his frontline journal: “But I, in the heat 
of battle, in anticipation of an offensive breakthrough, and in preparation to live, and of course, 
to defeat the evil enemy, I thought about family – children, wife, mother, imagined them, how 
they could right at this moment become orphans.”69 Such ambivalence about battle and victory 
reflect historian Leonard Smith’s assertion that “a grey area existed between command 
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expectations and what soldiers in the trenches determined was possible” which did not 
necessarily lead to mutiny or even overt discontent while still revealing limits to the influence of 
military institutions over soldiers’ views.70  A political worker writing from Germany expressed 
this sense of frustrated frontline vulnerability in reply to his wife’s impatient questions: “When 
will the war end? This question weighs down on us.  We understand perfectly well, that you are 
no less fed up with the war than we are, but [think of] our situation, [where] men stare death in 
the eye.”71   Even among soldiers who met the expectations of their comrades and joyously 
fought the enemy, a new fear emerged, a fear of meaningless death, which subtly questioned an 
official strategy that diverged from the liberation goal in which soldiers felt a personal stake.
72
   
 The same letters reveal a sense among soldiers that this new fear was not only legitimate, 
but a specifically male burden borne by fighters while women at home enjoyed the return of 
peace.  Such a distinction emerges from the soldiers’ juxtaposition of front and rear events, as 
they saw them, such as a Komsomol mobilized into the infantry:  
As you know, I survived typhus and a concussion.  I have just tried to leave the hospital without 
orders, in order to catch up with my unit.  However, I was not successful, and they ordered me to 
another unit, and we are already on the second day of our offensive.  Yesterday we threw the 
enemy back 30-35 kilometers, all [fighting to] drive the occupier to his own lair.  In a few days 
we will be on his territory … and always with us have been dear examples of wives, fiancées, 
and mothers [who have been] faithfully waiting for the return home of your loved ones.
73
  
 
Like these contrasting burdens of late war, another infantryman juxtaposed the news of front and 
home: “Well Boris, I can report the latest news from the front to you.  It is that in the Budapest 
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region Pavel Stepanov and Ivan Iakovich were killed. …what news is there in Moscow, how are 
people living [their] lives in peace?”74  A junior officer from Leningrad (who had adopted a 
family he stayed with on leave), highlighted similarly gendered differences:  “I congratulate you, 
Tatiana Vasil’evna, for your order of ‘Maternal Glory’ for giving birth to seven children. …The 
end [of the war] will be difficult and many men will not make it, and like all of them I want to 
live, but not all will survive it and there will be great joy only for those who remain alive!”75  
Such an active discussion of differences between front and rear and especially women’s 
activities grew as a preoccupation in letters sent from foreign soil.  
 The timing of such concerns varied among men and units, but soldiers consistently 
remembered the movement into foreign territory on their sector of the front as the trigger for 
these new feelings.  The first main consequence of leaving Soviet soil was soldiers’ greater sense 
of separation from home, as one artillerist recalled that during fighting outside Budapest.  He and 
his men “wanted to talk to civilians, even if they were foreigners. We would spend hours staring 
out the open doors of our cattle car, hoping to catch sight of a woman or child, because we had 
missed them so much after six months.”76  The second was a heightened fear of death, and a 
sense it would be pointless.  An infantryman, also fighting outside Budapest in late 1944 
explained: “You knew that the war was quite possibly coming to an end tomorrow and at the 
same time you knew that you could be killed shortly before. By my personal experience – I was 
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afraid. I asked my fate to let my life last longer.”77  The combination of fear and separation gave 
rise to a realization among troops that their role in the war effort, including death, had become 
separate from that of the national collective remaining at home, making death more frightening 
just when the enemy ceased to be.
78
   
 The details that preoccupied soldiers’ mentions of home suggest a widespread perception 
of life in Soviet territory after liberation as an increasingly female space, one detached from 
frontline realities.  Such letter-writers imagined a liberated home front that complemented their 
sense of a masculine vulnerability rooted in fears of unnecessary risk and isolated sacrifice that 
those already enjoying peace would neither understand nor appreciate.  Despite the continued 
hardships that prevailed in most of the Soviet Union, soldiers focused on those elements that 
highlighted their own vulnerability and endurance of such circumstances.  Soldier, including 
components of a civilian life that emphasized normal femininity such as women giving birth, 
leading lives of peace, and facing no greater stress than waiting for their men to return.  With 
such deliberate contrast, Red Army men depicted themselves as enduring the burden of war 
alone, and possessing the qualities required to fight on in spite of their isolation.  
 Despite their difference, both official rhetoric and soldiers’ culture reacted to frontline 
fears of continuing the war after libration.  The “Total Warrior” that appeared in frontline 
propaganda in late 1944 marked the sustained return of Stalin’s leadership role.  Fighters’ bonds 
to their comrades strengthened after they lost hope of petitioned return before victory, and their 
affiliation with the national collective, whether through state or family, diminished.  Ultimately, 
fear in late war Red Army propaganda content and among its rank and file focused on control or 
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mastery, rather than elimination, reflecting a change from the zero tolerance policy exhibited by 
Stalin’s “Not a step back” order at the height of crisis in 1942.79  
The essential wartime roles of mother and lover 
 
While the success of the Red Army’s liberation efforts prompted changes in official 
rhetoric about war aims, heroism, and leadership throughout the final year of the war, the most 
pronounced shift came in the depiction of Soviet women.  Among soldiers, women at the front 
became a greater preoccupation than they had been earlier in the war, but troops remained 
fixated on an understanding of themselves as members of a masculine fighting collective.  The 
thousands of women who had distinguished themselves in military service were no more visible 
at the end of the war than at the beginning, but another category of women gained acclaim with 
liberation.  Front propaganda after October 1944 focused on the fertility of the Mother Heroine, 
combining the specific wartime emphasis on heroism with prewar pro-natalist goals and ideas 
about motherhood as a civic duty.  For Red Army troops, sex, rather than motherhood, justified 
denying frontline women the status of comrades-in-arms.  However, sexual potential was one of 
several reasons male soldiers judged women to be lacking the collective experiences of combat 
and front life, which prevented the formation of gender-inclusive primary group bonds.  The 
sudden fascination of both soldierly and official attention on different incarnations of wartime 
femininity shared a common goal: to re-assert women’s subordinate status. 
To properly understand the significance of the new emphasis on women’s fertility and 
sexuality in official rhetoric and male combatants, it is worth briefly considering the military and 
domestic policy context in which they emerged.  Militarily, the Red Army moved out of the 
                                                 
79
 As Jan Plamper notes, the assumptions underlying Stalin’s order situated him in the “romantic” camp regarding 
fear, which asserted that real men did not feel it, making all who did cowards and unworthy of soldier or veteran 
status. This contrasts with the “realistic” perspective that accepted feelings of fear as inevitable, and sought to 
prepare men to cope, which had emerged in western military thinking after the First World War. Plamper, 282. 
  
208 
 
 
Baltic States and into East Prussia, in addition to capturing Debrecen, which opened the path to 
Budapest by the end of October, 1944.  Further south, the start of the siege of Belgrade began in 
late October, marking the high point of uninterrupted Soviet success before progress temporarily 
stalled in the winter.  It was in this context that the number of women serving in the Red Army 
reached its highest point, both in terms of sheer presence, with recruits peaking in June, and 
sacrifice, with casualty rates rising until July.
80
  The policy context of the October shift consisted 
of the divorce reform of July 1944, followed by education the reform of April 1945.  The former 
change limited support to unmarried mothers and further restricted divorce in anticipation of a 
decreased birthrate, while the latter aimed to create distinct masculine and feminine elements in 
the curriculum, in order to deal with the supposedly natural differences between young men and 
women, which included their interest and capabilities in national defense.
81
  Amidst these 
developments, the final dozen women of the war to be decorated Heroes of the Soviet Union 
received no mention in Krasnaia Zvezda, while the first fourteen Mother Heroines received front 
page attention in November and December.  As part of a pattern surrounding women’s wartime 
and planned postwar roles in Soviet military service, the Mother Heroine emerged as a key 
legacy of wartime change in Soviet ideas about war and gender.   
The simple title of the lead editorial in Krasnaia Zvezda on 28 October, 1944, “Mother 
Heroines,” introduced a new ideal figure to Red Army soldiers.  The editorial explained that this 
explicitly civilian heroism emerged from the wartime context, demanding recognition for “the 
role played by Soviet women… in the titanic battle for the honor, independence, and prosperity 
of the Motherland.”  Despite its radical difference from the types of heroes normally profiled in 
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propaganda and awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union medal, the editorial borrowed from the 
established language of combat heroism, thus linking the two as ideal behaviors in the rear and at 
the front, respectively.  The editorial thus explained the contribution of such women:  “…in the 
days of fierce battle for the complete destruction of the enemy, the Soviet state has elevated to 
the highest national glory and honor the multi-child mothers’ exploit” with which “every one of 
them has completed a great service to the Motherland.”82 While such a quantity-defined exploit 
bore a slight resemblance to oft-celebrated sniper kill counts, the editorial borrowed more 
directly from the frontline coverage of combat heroism and the Hero of the Soviet Union medal 
to introduce the new award.  Krasnaia Zvezda published a list of the inaugural group of 14 
Mother Heroines next to the editorial, just as it had for military heroes, listing occupation and 
region in place of rank and branch of service.   
The editorial also used the language omitted for lesser exploits and reserved only for 
Heroes of the Soviet Union.  This language emphasized how the women had been “awarded the 
honorable title of ‘Mother Heroine,’” evoking a permanent change in status, rather than the 
“marking” or “decorating” of lesser badges which brought associations of school grades or one-
time remuneration.
83
 This parallel language did not signify actual equality, however, but instead 
marked a shift to an explicit gendering of heroism as a masculine-feminine binary.  Earlier in the 
war, frontline propaganda allowed some space for women’s contributions to the front, although 
rarely in combat, while portraying them primarily as victims in contrast to enemy-killing male 
soldiers.  The Mother Heroine ideal removed this space, and instead produced an “emphasized 
femininity” to complement the masculine ideal, in which a hierarchical relationship existed 
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between a feminine domestic heroism, restricted to non-combatant and home front activity and 
men’s heroism in combat.84  
The women featured in the editorial’s individual profiles, and the details surrounding 
their exploits illustrate the unequal relationship between the heroism of prodigious mothers and 
that of men at the front.  The first exemplary Soviet woman profiled, Anna S. Aleksakhinaia, 
earned Mother Heroine status not only because she “gave the fatherland 12 citizens,” but also 
because “she gave the Red Army 8 manly warriors.”85  To further highlight the significance of 
heroic motherhood as producing not simply children, but sons and soldiers, the woman to receive 
second billing, Kseniia I. Zotova, actually produced more children, 13, but only 5 soldiers.  
Every other Mother Heroine given specific mention also had both her total children and 
combatant sons noted.  One mother, Maria M. Ryzhkova, provides an exception, because from 
her 10 children, “Six of her sons and one daughter are in the ranks of the army.”  This single case 
of a non-mother woman in the article demanded a shift in language from combat to participation 
at the front, and simultaneously provided an example of another wartime role for women, but 
one not deserving of such praise or hero status.  The sum of these Mother Heroines’ 
contributions played a role in the war effort that was not only physiologically female but also 
ideally feminine.  The quantitative output of motherhood merited hero status without front 
service, because ideal Soviet women produced their defenders.  The lone woman to serve at the 
front alongside her brothers appears as implicitly less valuable to the war effort, despite her 
proximity to the fighting, because gender, rather than age, should have ideally determined her 
opportunities for wartime heroism.  
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 The editorial elaborated how women’s maternal traits, along with female their capacity, 
defined women’s contribution to the war effort, irrespective of age, class, or nationality.   All 
Soviet women were to aspire to the Mother Heroine ideal, since “among the first Mother 
Heroines there are both peasants and representatives of our working class, there are daughters of 
the many peoples of the Soviet Union…” and “every Soviet women can raise citizen-patriots for 
the Fatherland.” As if to remove any ambiguity about a potential generational basis for the strict 
division of front and home front roles illustrated above, further individual examples included 
notes such as “Evdokiia P. Soldatovaia’s two sons and husband are fighting at the front” and 
how Valima G. Asadullina “raised and educated 10 children. Her husband died in battle at the 
front of the Patriotic war…”  The editorial thus provided a direct contrast between mother 
heroines in the rear and their husbands, who fought and died alongside their sons.  To punctuate 
the wartime importance of this civilian role, the editorial concluded by explaining that Mother 
Heroines both raised and inspired their sons to fight: “…having Mother Heroines bless their sons 
in battle with the enemy, the Motherland tells our fighters: in the name of our mothers, in the 
name of all of our peoples, strike at the enemy even stronger, move forward even faster to total 
victory!” This inspirational role linked maternal care and soldierly ferocity and subordinated the 
feminine heroism of the rear to the masculine counterpart fostered at the front that revered 
mothers.
86
 
Frontline propaganda also presented the Mother Heroine as dependent on the Soviet state.  
Amidst the praise extended to these new heroes, the editorial thoroughly marginalized the 
contributions of other Soviet women in both front and rear in order to emphasize the credit due 
to the state for the “greatness, wisdom, and warmth” involved in creating and carrying out the 
new policy, through which “The Soviet state is widely and generously helping the families of its 
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defenders, and fully rewarding the dedicated efforts of mothers.”  The implied value of the new 
policy to boost soldiers’ morale appeared elsewhere as a core consideration: “Red Army soldiers, 
like all Soviet people, with a deep sense of satisfaction understand the new Decree… This order 
clearly demonstrates that the socialist state, and the Bolshevik party by creating conditions for a 
happy mother… support our army, and help them in their struggle for victory.”  Beyond 
motivating soldiers, the new policy used gender to express the preeminent role of the Soviet state 
in the war effort and justify its power:  “Every one of our families, every Soviet mother raises for 
the Fatherland citizen-patriots, true builders and warriors of the great socialist state”87  Through 
care for women in place of absent husbands, Soviet state power appeared as specifically 
masculine, and validated its management of the war effort through its care for the feminine 
Motherland along with Mother Heroines.  The Mother Heroine ideal thus reinforced the 
dominance of masculine values in the exercise of state power and justified the state’s 
management of the war effort.
88
 
 The Mother Heroine ideal introduced in late October persisted as the framework for 
portraying Soviet women in frontline propaganda for the remainder of the war.  In mid-
November, “Mother of a hero” reiterated the theme of maternal inspiration when it explained 
how “the letters of Russian mothers” contained “tender words, simple advice… and an absolute 
order: strike the enemy, take revenge on him, without care for your own life.”89  December saw 
the publication of two awards lists without comment, as was the standard for military orders: one 
for 107 prodigious mothers still under the 10 child threshold, and a second announcing a further 
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31 recipients of the title “Mother Heroine.”90  Other women performed roles more directly linked 
to the Red Army, but these remained apart from combat and firmly in the sphere of motherly 
tasks: “The 75 year old Russian woman actively aids the front.  For three years of war she has 
knitted nearly two thousand pairs of wool socks and sent them to the front as a gift to the fighters 
of the Red Army.” 91  Her exploit aided the front while remaining feminine and non-combatant, 
and included the passive contribution of producing five sons to fight for her at the front.  These 
examples illustrate how the creation of the Mother Heroine title transformed coverage of Soviet 
women in frontline propaganda in the final months of the war.  Beyond the direct connection of 
new medal winners, such articles illustrate the renewed focus on women as feminine, domestic, 
and rear-area contributors to the impending victory, in contrast to the silence about the final 
surge of women recruited into the Red Army’s fighting ranks. 
 The novel Mother Heroine ideal that emerged in wartime contained the familiar prewar 
theme of Soviet pronatalism.
92
  The wartime ideal was not a case of old wine in a new bottle, 
however, as significant differences appeared from the outset, reflecting both the wartime policy 
context and the gendering of propaganda messages aimed at a frontline audience.  Material aid or 
bonuses appeared in propaganda to legitimize the Soviet state, as they had in the 1930s, but in 
wartime, articles such as “Aid to the families of frontline soldiers” targeted fathers, rather than 
mothers, by explaining that their families received special attention in the rear, implicitly as a 
reward for frontline service.
93
  Mother Heroines themselves were different from the exemplary 
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women of the 1930s, as their heroic output of children no longer accompanied productive 
working lives: their production of soldiers for wartime received much greater emphasis.
94
  
Publicized women such as medal-winning Novosibirsk housewife Kseniia P. Pokryshkina, as 
well as the subject of “9 Sons – 9 fighters,” Evdokiia V. Ilina, a pensioner, made this clear.95  
The fact that their lack of other contributions to the war effort provided no barrier to hero status 
speaks to the value placed on motherhood in wartime, and its difference from the prewar ideal of 
Soviet worker-mothers. 
 As usual, front coverage of International Women’s Day in 1945 acted as once-yearly 
acknowledgement of the breadth of women’s contributions to the war effort.  Nevertheless, the 
advent of wartime pro-natalism focused coverage on Soviet mothers and their fertility as 
foremost among women’s contributions.  The editorial connected the significance of women’s 
contribution to the success of Red Army troops, because “Every Red Army warrior, with great 
reverence and love, preserves the image of his mother in battle.  He understands what it means to 
[undertake] daily, long-hour tasks, a life, full of alarm for a father or husband, a son or brother, 
fighting at the front, lovingly raising children in the conditions of wartime life!”96  Krasnaia 
Zvezda presented women’s maternal duties, without other labor, as analogous to their male 
relatives’ service at the front, and thus elevated motherhood above women’s other contributions, 
and reinforced the status of the Mother Heroine title as a counterpart to the Hero of the Soviet 
Union honor for soldiers.   
 This final wartime discussion of Soviet women’s wartime contributions on 8 March 
continued to prioritize a maternal, rear-only femininity that was reproductive rather than 
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productive or destructive.  Such an approach prefigured postwar silences about women 
combatants, and seemed unworkable as an actual vocation for women given the needs and 
privations of the war effort.  As an emphasized femininity, the Mother Heroine provided a final 
counterpart to the masculine soldierly ideal, whatever its late war form.  The emphasized 
feminine ideal also recast Soviet pro-natalist propaganda as an appeal to soldiers that showed 
state care for families as a benefit received for military service.  
 
 Among Red Army troops, Soviet women also figured more prominently in the final 
months of the war, but with a distinct focus on those at the front.  This new expression of interest 
in women comprised part of the post-liberation shift in soldierly subjectivities.
  
Examining 
soldiers’ views of their front experiences through the theoretical framework of a masculine bloc 
reveals the complexity of their relationships with official ideals and their own commanders.  
Grounding such a study in theories of combat motivation helps explain how and why soldiers 
excluded women in their articulation of individual soldierly subjectivities and frontline 
collectives in most units, but accepted them in rare cases.
97
 Feeling a greater sense of separation 
from women in the rear and less dedication to the Red Army’s revised war aims, heterosexual 
romance (which involved varying degrees of coercion) emerged as a preeminent concern just as 
the number of women at the front peaked.   Male soldiers ascribed separate motives to men and 
women engaged in romantic relationships that reaffirmed masculine power and superiority at the 
front based on an exclusively masculine definition of comradeship and combatant status.  A 
masculine soldierly subjectivity resulted, and denied front women equal status, regardless of 
training, position, or performance in combat.  Like the Mother Heroine ideal of official rhetoric,  
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the Auxiliary-Lover femininity articulated by soldiers after liberation proved to be the final word 
on Soviet women’s roles and the gendering of duty during the war. 
 Many Red Army combat veterans found themselves newly able to interact with the 
growing numbers of Red Army women in the summer and fall of 1944, as the conditions of 
supply, medical care, and entertainment for frontline units improved.  As part of a larger shift in 
wartime opinion discussed above, soldiers overwhelmingly considered these interactions as 
opportunities to fulfill long-denied romantic and sexual interests.  In her work on the “gaze,” 
Laura Mulvey claims that “in a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been 
split between active/male and passive/female.  The determining male gaze projects its fantasy 
onto the female figure, which is styled accordingly.”98   Red Army troops often described their 
encounters in this way, as Lieutenant Pyl’syn described his treatment for a leg wound:  
I thought that my new doctor was rather cute.  Captain of Medical Corps Rodina, 
that was her last name, was an amazingly slim, bright brunette of amazing beauty, 
with large brown eyes and beautiful rich hair under a pilotka that fitted her very 
well. We sang the song about the Motherland which had a line saying “We love 
our Motherland like a bride,” much more often than any other songs.99 
 
While extraordinary in its detail, Pyl’syn’s assessment of his doctor is typical of frontline 
soldiers’ reactions to meeting new women at the front, in which they focused on physical 
qualities, and sexual attractiveness eclipsed all other characteristics.  The evacuation of wounded 
soldiers just behind the lines in liberated Byelorussia and Ukraine was a common site of such 
encounters in the war’s final months, as one mortar crewman recalled his comrades’ 
unambiguous reaction to meeting their nurses: “The men are staring at the women around them.  
Some soldiers have not seen a female face for a couple of years.  The women begin with soaping 
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the heads of the wounded, so they would not be looking them with those begging, eager eyes.”100  
Their potential as sexual objects, whatever the actual outcome, consistently framed mentions of 
Red Army women in the late-war phase of male soldiers’ recollections, interview talks, and 
letters.   
 Soldiers rarely wrote about romantic or sexual interests in letters from the front, since 
their primary audience was female relatives.  However, on the occasions they did broach the 
subject, the pattern endured.  “That’s all of our news, the squad wants to return to Ukraine, it was 
of course better to fight there and all the women were more agreeable,” as an artilleryman 
fighting in Yugoslavia wrote to his wounded comrade in hospital.
101
  For such soldiers, the 
pursuit of women emerged as a central preoccupation along with rest between operations or 
recovery from wounds: 
“The war continued but life was going on, too.  You should understand: we were 
gals and young guys.  Not far from the tents on a hillock an awning was constructed 
for storing hay. So, towards evenings, guys and girls stole away into it,” “…[and 
we] became acquainted with local girls and disappeared into the village even during 
nights. … I don’t remember any objections from the hospital personnel against the 
self-reliance of their patients.”102   
 
These romantic and sexual pursuits marked a distinct period in the war experience of many Red 
Army fighters.  They afforded soldiers a sense of autonomy and even power amidst the 
heightened atmosphere of compulsion that characterized post-liberation service.  By expressing 
and acting on their personal interests, male troops’ encounters with frontline women preserved a 
gendered power dynamic in which men maintained their active role in the war effort, first as 
defenders, then as pursuers of women.  Red Army women remained the passive objects of male 
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attention, after being the passive victims of enemy violence, which diffused the potential threat 
of women’s penetration of the masculine front realm. 
 Soldiers and officers in a given Red Army unit seemed to hold similar views of frontline 
women.  However, the men’s rank shaped how they acted towards the women they encountered, 
as did their perceptions of each others’ behavior.103  Red Army troops expressed little concern 
with officers’ interest in sexual relationships at the front, as one explained: “I cannot comment 
on different stories related to the “campaign wives” at the front.  The fact is that there were no 
couples of such sort at the level of platoon commanders, at least in our regiment.”104  However, 
fighting men proved unforgiving of officers who placed their own interests above the concerns of 
the unit or its mission.  An artillery commander thus earned the scorn of his men when he left his 
unit mired in mud, and his soldiers were happy to inform his superiors about his behavior at the 
first opportunity: “our battalion commander was just passing through here with some Polish 
mademoiselle and forced our guns off the road. That’s how we got stuck.”105  A junior 
Lieutenant recounted in detail his feelings about having to serve as lookout while his Regimental 
Commissar’s lover visited: 
 The regimental doctor, Lidia Nikolaevna, was coming to visit Ivan Iakovlevich; I 
was to take a post in front the dugout and not let anyone enter. My sentry duty lasted 
for almost three hours.  “Damn it, what does he think I am?” I cursed to myself.  
What I encountered on my first day in my new position, seemed shameless to me, 
especially after life on the front lines.  I decided there and then, as I stood in the cold 
outside the door, to contrast everything I would see in the future among the top brass 
with [my] life at the front.  Did Tolia Razumov also stand guard over the amorous 
affairs of the commissar? I told myself next time I would refuse such an 
assignment.
106
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Such sentiments were typical of combatant soldiers and NCOs who experienced officers’ 
prioritization of sex and romance.  Troops aspired to a higher standard of conduct than officers 
exhibited in their relations with women.  Rank-and-file men did not seek to treat women 
differently, but wished to put their comrades first, which signaled the importance of collectively-
established norms to their sense of self.  
 Rank-and-file men emphasized the selfish character and acts of personal indulgence that 
distinguished officers and the women they pursued from collectively-oriented fighters. Yet some 
troops found that the late war provided two avenues for the rank and file to pursue sexual 
partners without compromising their duty to their comrades: being wounded after the mid-war 
expansion of medical care, and the liberation of deported Soviet women on foreign soil.
107
  A 
married penalty battalion lieutenant sympathetically observed his comrades pursue both: Our 
nurse was a Tatar girl Aza, a well-educated and knowledgeable person. It was interesting to talk 
to her, and soon relations between her and Nikolai grew into something more than friendship” in 
1944, and then in 1945, what he described as the “call of the flesh:”  “So I could understand 
George when he failed to date the beautiful young Polish girl Stefa and then switched his 
attention to a Russian woman.  She was a repatriate as we called women who came back from 
German slavery or concentration camps.  Stefa was thin, starved, unattractive and noticeably 
pregnant.”108  In both cases, fighting men could undertake such liaisons without behaving as  
dishonorably as their officers had, because they did not pursue women at the expense of their 
duty.   
                                                 
107
 Immediate care, requiring more staff near the front, expanded in 1943 to save lives and return a higher percentage 
of soldiers to combat duty. Amnon Sella, The Value of Human Life in Soviet Warfare (London Routledge, 1992), 
80-81. 
108
 Pyl’tsyn, 77, 123-124. 
  
220 
 
 
  Although few memoirs or interviews more than hint at it, soldiers asserted informal 
superiority over their officers by competing with the latter for Red Army women as lovers.  Such 
competition typically hinged on the official status of women holding low ranks spending time 
with rank-and-file soldiers as well as or before moving away from the forward-most positions at 
the front to the safer quarters of officers.  In one such case, Tasia, a telephone operator, having 
become the lover of Captain Bondarchuk, quickly became the lover of a Lieutenant, Savushkin, 
once Bondarchuk was ordered to army headquarters temporarily.  As one might expect, “when 
Bondarchuk returned, Savushkin tried to arrange Tasia’s ‘transfer’ back to him, as the battalion’s 
official roster stipulated.  That attempt just caused a fit of rage and a torrent of threats from the 
major.”  While she remained the lover of both men, Savushkin, the younger and apparently more 
handsome of the two, refused to end his relationship with Tasia, and faced the wrath of the 
“jealous and vengeful major,” receiving no new decorations or promotions for the rest of the 
war.
 109
  Red Army women could thus provide soldiers and NCOs with the means to claim power 
outside of the military rank hierarchy.  Male soldiers and officers shared a view of women at the 
front as sexual partners first and foremost, so that ensuing conflicts over soldiers’ equal pursuit 
of those women played out as a conflict between men, not as insubordination or indiscipline.  
Overall, the motives and differences soldiers ascribed to officers’ behavior with frontline women 
constituted part of their self-definition as fighting men.  Within a masculine-dominated frontline 
hierarchy, soldiers asserted group solidarity and moral superiority separate from the system of 
rank that officers dominated. 
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 Male soldiers assumed that women’s unwillingness to deal with the harsh realities of 
front life motivated female soldiers to engage in sexual relationships.  Troops freely ascribed 
motives to women based on assumptions or rumors and generalized about all women at the front 
based only on information or gossip about women in their units, thus asserting a gendered binary 
about participation in sexual relationships.
110
  As one soldier explained about the 20 women who 
served in his rifle regiment: “usually, women didn’t refuse such a fate and agreed readily… It 
was clear in advance that any commanders’ PPZh [field wives] would have privileges not only in 
protection but also, within the limits of what was possible at the front, to have a dry warm shelter 
and a steady supply of food.”111  Worse still, these soldiers asserted, were those women who 
sought to leave not only the firing line but the front altogether: “There was talk at that time that 
some servicewomen became pregnant purposely – to leave the frontline’s risks and difficulties,” 
and “another woman of our brigade became pregnant and left for her home,” and “she wanted to 
get pregnant and as such be released and go home.”112 These alleged motives thus constituted the 
core of a frontline femininity which provided sharp contrast to combatant norms, since fighting 
men remained acutely aware that “Unless heavily wounded and afterward released from 
hospitals, soldiers could not normally go home for any period of time, even if they had been on 
the front for many months or years.”113  Casting judgment using their norms of frontline 
behavior, Red Army men this used the subject of sex to diminish the status of women and 
complicit officers. 
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 Soldiers thus ascribed the selfishness to frontline women as well as feminine softness in 
dealing with front conditions in order to separate them from the combat collective and assert the 
power of male fighters.  For soldiers who “divided all men into two categories: frontoviks and all 
others,” women seeking the rear or even home appeared as antithetical figures in the war effort, 
earning declarations that “I felt pity for young girls in forward front lines” as much as respect 
and inclusion.
114
  Such critical judgments can also be seen as an effort by soldiers to restore the 
power relationship between women, who seemed to be able without fail to make gains using 
sexuality, and the men, mostly officers, who allowed them to do so in slavish obedience to their 
carnal desires.
115
  As external and incorruptible observers, those fighters condemned women’s 
apparent manipulation on grounds of soldierly morality, while themselves adhering to the 
combat collective’s standard of only pursuing sex when it would not come at the expense of 
fulfilling one’s duty. 
 The oppositional nature of the masculine combat collective found its greatest expression 
in the figurative and functional disqualification of Red Army women fighters.  Unlike that of 
non-combatants, women fighters’ daily presence on the firing line, and avowed combatant role, 
provided a greater challenge to the masculine values and solidarities that underpinned frontline 
units.  Nevertheless, male fighters identified military policies favoring frontline women as a 
means to maintain their status in the frontline hierarchy.  Take the example of penalty battalions 
institutionalized under Stalin’s order 227.  As one Junior Lieutenant explained concisely: “There 
was the strictest order not to send women to penal battalions,” while men accused of the same 
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infractions were sent precisely to face what seemed a certain death.
116
  This exact contrast in 
order played itself out in late 1944, when a divisional newspaper editor, Captain Berezkin, was 
“sent to a punishment battalion for three months… and the proofreader, a woman, was 
discharged from the army and sent home” because a typographical error in a divisional 
newspaper reduced Stalin to the title of “гавно-командующий.”117  Other, more local policies 
gave men similar reasons to count their female comrades as separate, as in a mixed-gender air 
regiment, where a pair of pilots discussed the evening’s flight duty: “The girls from the regiment 
led by Evdokia Bershanskaia usually flew at that time to attack Kerch, but we did not hear the 
engines roar.  ‘Our ‘owls’ must be forbidden to fly in such weather,’ said Nikolai.”118  Whether 
all-army or unit-specific, such regulations presented Red Army men with a cohort of female 
comrades shielded, however partially, from some of the dangers and hardships they defined as 
aspects of soldiering and the responses that shaped a masculine soldierly subjectivity.  
 Male soldiers likewise proved keenly aware of cases of favoritism shown to female 
soldiers, whether provided by negligent comrades or cultivated by women themselves.  In an 
artillery unit fighting in Hungary, an evening inspection of the battery revealed improperly 
deployed and unmanned anti-aircraft artillery, for which the captain sought an explanation:   
“‘The female gunners asked to set up near us, Comrade Captain, so they wouldn’t 
have to dig emplacements in the frozen ground… They’re warming up inside our 
guys’ huts, Comrade Captain’… ‘You are quite the gentleman, Senior Lieutenant! 
You felt sorry for the girls and practically let them into your beds together with their 
machine guns! Remove them immediately!’”119 
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The women’s request for a dangerous shortcut in deploying their weapons, and the implied 
carousing that followed, prompted sharp criticism of both the men and women involved.  The 
favoritism men showed to female combatants compromised the shared norms of the combat 
collective by prioritizing the interests of sub-groups and creating separate relationships among 
pairs of soldiers that withdrew them from the larger group.  As with non-combatant women, 
male soldiers’ perceptions, assumptions, and gossip, rather than female fighters’ actual battle 
performance, shaped men’s responses to the growth of women combatants in their midst.   
 The ultimate disqualification for female fighters as equal comrade combatants rested on 
their role as objects of male soldiers’ heterosexual desire, which was in no way limited to non-
combatant women.  Men at the front considered the primary difference between women’s and 
men’s bodies at the front to be the potential for heterosexual sex partners, rather than physical 
capabilities in combat.
120
  This difference constantly appeared in soldiers’ descriptions of 
frontline women: “Soon there came a blonde with a child’s face and full lips… her boots sat well 
on her slender legs, and her wasp waist was laced with a wide belt.”121  Along with the bodily 
difference that distinguished women combatants was the resulting heterosexual desire it 
produced, which was incompatible with the combatant solidarity that had developed within units.  
An infantry NCO described his unit’s most sought after woman “…she was the eighteen-year-
old blonde Olya Martynova, a former inhabitant of the city of Rostov-on-Don.  She was short, 
chubby, and blue-eyed.  So, if she hadn’t been wearing a soldier's uniform and boots, one would 
have taken her for a senior high school student.” He explained how:  “From the first hour of 
serving in a unit like our regiment, every woman became a subject of undisguised craving.  Very 
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few of them remained without a sexual partner.”122  Male soldiers thus saw women combatants 
as sex-objects-in-uniform, utterly unlike their male comrades.  They witnessed officers treating 
Red Army women this way, and never forgot the distinction. 
 Even the actual performance of combat roles provided no guarantee that male fighters 
would see frontline women as combatants and equals.  In fact, male troops’ perception of Red 
Army women as sex objects or officers’ playthings could persist even when those women lost 
much of that potential, becoming instead something very close to fantasy.
123
  A junior artillery 
commander thus remembered how he was awakened in hospital:   
They were putting someone next to me and the patients nearby were shouting: ‘the 
lieutenant got lucky, there is a beautiful young girl lying next to him!’ After some 
effort I managed to turn and felt something hard next to me: it was a female medic, a 
lieutenant, and her entire body was covered in plaster. Only her face remained visible.  
The girl was unconscious, but her face moved from time to time in pain.
124
  
 
This sexualized view of a wounded frontline woman and persistent denial of her status as 
combatant comrade shows how male troops could ignore both the shared toll of battle and the 
obvious sacrifice such women made.  These men’s perceptions fit both the physical desires of 
male soldiers experiencing extended separation from women and a masculine subjectivity 
formed around the combat collective.  As women entered established all-male combat units, men 
persisted in behavior that re-affirmed their combat collectives as masculine and thus separate 
from the military collective, which had ceased to be predominantly male, and from the national 
collective, which had never been exclusively male.
125
   
 Women’s efforts to gain acceptance as Red Army fighters were not hopeless, however.  
The same primary group dynamics that led to women’s exclusion or marginalization as sex 
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objects also enabled women’s acceptance and inclusion.126  Each cohesive combat unit in the 
Red Army could vary in its collective norms and expectations, and in particular the extent to 
which notions of soldierly and manly differed.   In units mobilized as all-women or integrated 
formations, this could develop organically.  The presence of more gender-inclusive officers and 
standards, or sufficient time to for men to adjust and women to overcome old norms, also 
enabled women to earn equal status in predominantly male combat units, particularly for those 
women arriving early in the war and establishing the image of a competent female combatant, 
instead of a superfluous object of lust.
127
    
 For women arriving to the front later in the war, or in small numbers, where sexual 
relationships between soldiers and the non-combatant women present already predominated, 
gaining the respect and acceptance could prove more difficult, or even impossible.
128
  The best 
response available consisted of strict celibacy and uncompromising avoidance of any special 
treatment.  In a moment of outrage, a woman sniper succinctly expressed her frustration with the 
gap between her actual motives and what men in her unit expected of her:  
You think that it is far better for a young woman at the front to trade in her sniper’s rifle 
for a submachine-gun and become the bodyguard of her field husband? To live in a safe 
shelter, to clatter around in a vehicle; after all it’s much more peaceful than to fire a 
rifle at Germany infantry. …Never! What, you don’t understand? I’m a sniper and I’ll 
stay as one.  That’s why I headed to the front in the first place.129 
 
Women combatants opted for this approach in order to be taken seriously as combatants, despite 
the fact that a female fighter might face “endless importunate (sometimes even compulsory) 
demands from her comrades for sexual intimacy, which she had experienced from the day when 
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she first joined.”130  While these determined refusals could eventually result in acceptance as a 
fighting equal, they still reflected an oppositional gender dynamic and double standard in which 
a masculine combatant culture remained preeminent at the front.  Women had to remain chaste 
fighters, while men did not.  Moreover, the terms of inclusion and exclusion in the combat 
collective remained a masculine prerogative, whereby combatant women had to avoid the trap of 
disqualifying sexual relations, which allowed those masculine values to endure, even if they 
made equality possible for only a select few women.
131
  In this way, men sought to minimize the 
disruptive potential possessed by women combatants.  The disqualification through sex of 
women as equal combatants and members of the combat collective minimized the challenge to 
Red Army fighters’ romance-infused masculine soldierly subjectivity.  
 The prevailing ideas about Soviet women in front and rear underwent a transformation 
after liberation that emphasized feminine roles subordinate to the combat duties of masculine 
heroes. The creation of the Mother Heroine ideal and series of medals is significant as a 
disavowal of women’s wartime contributions in favor of a pro-natalist agenda that foreshadowed 
postwar developments.  The Mother Heroine also complemented frontline newspapers’ renewed 
emphasis on Stalin’s paternal role within a national Soviet family, and a corresponding 
disavowal of earlier coverage of women combatants as well as the gender equality rhetoric of the 
1930s.  The rank and file emphasized masculine values of their own, which coalesced around an 
“Auxiliary-Lover” femininity in relations with women at the front.  Soldiers’ assertions that 
women systematically avoided hardship and sacrifice sought to preserve the power of combat 
collectives to define frontline culture and norms of soldierly behavior.  These combat collectives 
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adapted to the conditions of the late war, which meant greater criticism for the swelling ranks of 
logistical and support staff that followed combat formations onto foreign soil.  Ultimately, 
frontline propaganda’s redoubled feminization of the rear, and men’s interpretation of growing 
numbers of women at the front appear as two parts of a masculine bloc, which sought to preserve 
masculine values and the image of a war effort anchored in the superiority of Stalin’s leadership 
and the heroic fighting men he inspired. 
Stalinist victory and sexual violence 
 
 Despite the problems masculine frontline culture created for Red Army women, the 
violent dimensions of male soldiers’ attitudes toward sex fully emerged only after the liberation 
of Soviet territory.  Stalin’s infamous comment to visiting Yugoslav Communist Milovan Djilas 
about rape reflected many soldiers’ and officers’ perspective: “And what is so awful in [a Red 
Army soldier] having fun with a woman, after such [wartime] horrors?”132  However, his flippant 
response concealed a pragmatic concern for the impact that such violent sexual behavior, 
typically categorized as “marauding,” had on the war effort and Soviet postwar objectives in 
central Europe.
133
  In late 1944, the Red Army rank-and-file perpetrated a wave of rape and other 
atrocities that appear as a grotesque evolution, rather than new development, in the norms of 
masculine sexual behavior at the front.  Troops’ opportunities to sexually assault female civilians 
coincided with a shift in wartime opinion at the front.  Combatants’ new perspective consisted of 
diminished hopes for surviving the war along with a heightened focus on the interests and 
solidarities of their combat collectives.  These conflicting priorities resulted in a series of 
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changes to Red Army disciplinary policy and propaganda that sought to restrain soldiers’ 
behavior and encourage their loyalty to a national family with Stalin at its head.  Nevertheless, 
fighting men’s physical separation and sense of alienation from their loved ones left many acting 
like they had nothing to lose but the approval of their comrades. 
 The motives and actions of idealized heroes depicted in frontline propaganda underwent 
their final wartime change in the winter of 1945.  The encouragement of indiscriminate revenge 
on the enemy in Krasnaia Zvezda editorials such as “Revenge and Death for the Hitlerite Scum” 
and “Crush the Fascist Reptile!” came to an end once the harmful consequences of soldiers’ 
actions became undeniable.
134
  On 9 February, the editorial “Our Revenge” revised official 
expectations for troops fighting in Germany while openly acknowledging the vitriol of past 
rhetoric.  To break with those practices, the editorial asserted a form of vengeance focused on 
strategic objectives, particularly reparations: “To take revenge on the Hitlerites, we, on the other 
hand, should strive to save from destruction and burning the greatest possible quantity of 
industrial enterprises and material goods of the enemy.”  The editorial contrasted this new ideal 
of Red Army behavior with that from earlier in the war, when “hatred was an additional weapon 
of ours,” as well as with the Germans’ conduct as invaders.  A new emphasis on discipline 
anchored this redefinition of vengeance, with the exaltation of “conscious and unshakeable 
discipline” and warnings that “without discipline there can be no army.”  A single example of 
indiscipline offered in the article distinguishes these otherwise standard calls for discipline, 
presented as an explicit contrast between Soviet and German fighters: “It is unacceptable to 
argue that the fascist two-legged beasts have raped our women publically or engaged in 
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marauding, so that we in revenge should do the same to them.” 135   This appeal for Soviet troops 
to be more honorable men and more calculating conquerors than the Germans reveals at once a 
forward-looking effort to begin Soviet reconstruction and an optimistic effort to revise how 
exhausted and angry Soviet troops prosecuted the war effort in its final weeks.  
 Soviet leaders sought to change soldiers’ motives and conduct in order to maintain the 
Red Army’s combat effectiveness and achieve Soviet foreign policy goals.  Three weeks before 
the “Our Revenge” editorial mentioned the need to avoid unnecessary destruction, the Red Army 
approved plans for massive confiscations of Germany industrial and financial property as 
reparations, for which they diverted considerable transportation resources for the upcoming 
Berlin operation and elite military personnel for “reliable protection of all of the above 
property.”136  The adaptation of Red Army political work to suit these new objectives, and to 
deal with the larger problem of declining morale after liberation, proved challenging for political 
workers.  Army Commissar Lev Mekhlis criticized his subordinates for not explaining the new 
situation to the rank-and-file and for the persistence of disciplinary problems in the weeks that 
followed:  
It is not clear that in this defensive, just war we should leave [our land] and emerge 
the victor.  It is not clear that it is our duty to force the enemy to compensate for the 
damage to our motherland.  Soldiers and officers should know that we are waging 
war on foreign soil in the name of our interests alone, that we are only incidentally 
are we solving the problem of the liberation of Poland and Czechoslovakia.
137
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While such efforts aimed at one side of the problem, punishment for rape remained perfunctory, 
and internal Red Army documents dismissed many charges as “fascist propaganda.”138  Since 
Soviet leaders prioritized combat effectiveness, only incidents that disrupted operations received 
serious attention, and the punishment of penalty battalion duty lost much of its risk in the war’s 
final weeks, especially for officers who were transferred to command positions.
139
  The manner 
in which Red Army leaders pursued a new disciplinary standard reveals their focus on strategic 
and macroeconomic developments and only a tangential interest in the vicious turn in frontline 
culture. 
 Frontline propaganda ceased to celebrate the merciless “Total Warrior” as a hero at the 
same time it placed renewed emphasis on Stalin’s wartime leadership and role in the victorious 
course of the war effort overall.  The Red Army men fighting their way through Germany were 
expected to learn of a new way to fight the enemy, which “Stalinist commanding genius” and 
“the laws of Stalinist military science” made possible.  Stalin provided this, the newspapers 
explained, in terms of paternal care: “The way is before us, sons of the great Soviet state.”140  
This new approach complemented the recent emphasis on restraint, and espoused qualities and 
behaviors relevant to occupation as well as battle, where success now demanded that its 
practitioners possessed “marvelous cool-headedness [замечательным хладнокровием], clarity 
of thought, and the ability to overcome any obstacle.”141   For this new hero, the “Conscious 
Combatant,” the use of Stalin’s new tactics insured both victory and survival, just as Stalin’s 
leadership had outmatched Hitler’s on the strategic level.  The battle exploits that distinguished 
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examples of the “Conscious Combatant” centered not on specific acts, but on an individual 
hero’s decisive achievement of victory  “in battle against the numerically superior forces of the 
enemy,” or a small unit that “was victorious in battle with [only] eight insignificant 
casualties.”142  Most importantly, thanks to Stalin’s inspiration, “in critical minutes the heroic 
spirit of Soviet warriors burns especially bright” and Stalin “kindled fire in the hearts 
[зажигать средца] of Soviet warriors to new exploits.”143  Frontline propaganda’s presentation 
of the new ideal hero again invoked Stalin’s authority to justify the new priorities of restoring 
morale and heightening discipline.
144
 
 The “Conscious Combatant” hero’s emergence in frontline propaganda also served to 
reassert Stalin’s paternal authority and respond to soldiers’ recent feelings of isolation and acts of 
indiscipline.
145
  Beyond inspiration, Stalin provided soldiers with a symbolic father figure amidst 
a sudden proliferation of articles about biological brothers at the front in the spring of 1945.  
With biological fathers absent, young men such as the Boiko brothers appealed to Stalin “to 
participate in the destruction of the enemy and asked for permission to go to the front in their 
own tank”, and dutifully reported to fellow villagers about successes in the training Stalin had 
made possible, such as “Yesterday was my first live fire exercise. All shells landed on target.”146  
Stalin’s personal role in bringing soldiers to battle and harmonizing their interests with national 
priorities extended to the ultimate objectives in fighting around Berlin.  A decorated cavalryman, 
quoted in Krasnaia Zvezda, explained the importance of collective success over individual needs 
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to his unit: “I am appealing to headquarters to request that they order us to return to battle again 
today. In the name of the great military leader Comrade Stalin we will set off for the final 
decisive assault.”147  On the same page, an infantryman in fighting around Berlin obliquely 
addressed the need to avoid rape and other atrocities: “Comrade Stalin calls on us to be 
especially vigilant, to strictly preserve the honor and dignity of a Soviet warrior.  We assure 
comrade Stalin, that we will fulfill all of his orders.”148  Stalin’s central place in troops’ efforts to 
win the war appeared to reconnect individual soldiers to the collective war effort, rather than 
fight in pursuit of personal interests and impulses that had plagued the Red Army for months. 
 To complement Stalin’s guidance of soldier-sons to victory, frontline propaganda briefly 
revived the task of liberating Soviet daughters as an objective alongside the total defeat of the 
enemy. President Kalinin presented such an appeal in his Red Army Day message: “the torment 
of our girls in a German prison, the tears of mothers of murdered children, the blood of millions 
of unparalleled ferocity extermination of people - call our army forward to complete victory over 
the fascist monsters.”149  The revival of this message, that the war effort remained a masculine 
endeavor to save Soviet women, gained a second purpose once the under-acknowledged concern 
over Red Army soldiers’ behavior in regard to German women arose.  Dual-purpose articles 
appeared, reviving the encounter story so common in 1943, in which Red Army troops met 
Soviet civilians and liberated them.  In 1945, such encounters occurred on the Oder, not the Don, 
as one tale of suffering explained:  “Out from the cellar of a burned-down house jumped a half-
naked [полуобнаженная], barefoot girl. Crying and laughing, she threw herself into the arms of 
                                                 
147
 “The words and deeds guards –soldiers,” Krasnaia Zvezda, 4 May 1945, 3. 
148
 “Hold up high the honor of the Soviet Warrior,” Krasnaia Zvezda, 4 May 1945, 3. 
149
 Archived text of “27th Anniversary of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army,” in Krasnoarmeets, February 1945, 
1. RGASPI Fond 78 Opis 1 Delo 1045 List 2. 
  
234 
 
 
our soldiers.  ‘Russians, Russians…’ she said. ‘Hello, comrades, hello, relatives”150  The 
extremely rare description of a woman as topless evoked the specter of rape at the hands of her 
German captors, so that beyond the rescue of Soviet women, such articles sought to remind Red 
Army troops that their duty was to end the victimization of women, rather than continue it.  This 
message complemented the gendered hierarchy of wartime roles prevalent at war’s end, which 
excluded active women and abject male deportees or POWs, just as it had in 1941, but with 
Stalin’s preeminent position restored as symbolic father to the multinational Soviet family. 
 The final shift of the heroic ideal presented to the Red Army drew from 1930s rhetoric of 
Stalinist paternal hierarchy more than any other ideal presented earlier in the war.
151
  Without 
success, examples of this “Conscious Combatant” hero appeared to provide a masculine duty to 
heed Stalin’s fatherly wisdom and rescue feminized deportees, new tactics to mollify wartime 
opinion about unnecessary sacrifice after liberation, and a soldierly subjectivity affiliated with 
the national collective, rather than individual familial concerns or sexual interests.
152
  Army 
Commissar Mekhlis and front-level newspaper editors identified most of these symptoms of 
demoralization correctly, but only sought to raise discipline in pursuit of postwar state ambitions 
and a Stalin-centered narrative of victory, rather than take fighters’ views into account in 
policymaking.   
 Fighting in enemy territory, soldiers enjoyed not only greater contact with female 
civilians in foreign territory, but also more time to rest and regroup between operations and a 
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diminished risk of German counter-attacks.  The latter set of circumstances allowed them longer 
periods to reflect on, discuss, and compare their experiences and opinions with comrades.  As 
one artilleryman explained, “many felt a hunger for some kind of group activity… the most 
prevailing form of our ‘homemade entertainment’ was to share ‘soldier’s tales’ within the 
group.”  The stories these men told were not always or even regularly about war, but about 
women, whereby “Yakov’s stories of his numerous love affairs always attracted younger 
listeners” and “Senior Sergeant Vasya Panteleev also shared interesting narratives from his 
bachelor adventures with us.”153 Since organized entertainment performances took place barely 
twice a year for combatants, these interactions played a central role in both deepening men’s 
bonds and shaping the content and values of frontline culture.
154
  Such stories reinforced the 
masculine character of troops’ affiliation with the combat collective, requiring stories women 
could not tell, even if they had any interest in listening. 
 Sexual activity remained gendered in frontline culture as a source of masculine pride and 
feminine shame, which soldiers’ jokes consistently expressed amidst the expanded social 
interactions of the late war.  Jokes about women marginalized their frontline role in order to 
reinforce the preeminent position and masculine character of those on the firing line, so that “the 
medal Za Boyevie Zaslugi (for military services) when worn by women was often derisively 
called Za Polovye Zaslugi (for sex services).”155 In the largely homosocial combat collectives 
that shaped frontline culture, soldiers’ fondness for such jokes also reveals how sex lost some of 
its prewar status as a taboo subject. An artillery officer recalled the use of a standard joke 
formula in this vein: “Question: What is the difference between a bomb and a frontline girl? 
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Answer: The bomb is stuffed in the rear then dispatched to the front. For a frontline girl, it’s the 
other way around.”156  Women’s alleged use of sex to avoid or minimize hardship, which 
valorized the stoicism of soldierly masculinity, appeared as a common theme, as in this rhymed 
saying “I fell in love with a lieutenant – he wears blue pants, [but] it turned out [he] was of little 
help: the sergeant major [controls] all the foodstuffs.”157  These jokes about women occupied a 
distinct subset of soldiers’ humor that negatively focused inward, whether criticizing certain 
frontline behaviors, or certain Red Army groups within the ranks, such as rear units or Soviet 
Jews.
158
 Like gossip, jokes expressed and reinforced broader values that bonded certain military 
men and sexualized all frontline women. 
   Frontline troops’ increased interest in lewd entertainment stemmed, in part, from a final 
increase in feelings of isolation from home and a corresponding evolution in values.  With their 
hopes for victory or discharge in 1944 dashed, soldiers’ expectations for survival greatly 
diminished by the start of 1945, especially among infantrymen.  Many recalled the scale of 
losses: “A company numbered up to 100 men, with detachments, etc. Yet before Berlin we had a 
total of 29 men, young boys, really.”159 Others remembered this in terms of those who managed 
to survive: “After six months as a rifleman, how could you avoid wounding or death? That made 
you a ‘ducker.’  In my company there were three men called “immortals” [неубиваемых], and 
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they formed the core of the unit.
160
  Whether the odds of survival were three or thirty out of one 
hundred, many troops still fighting in 1945 responded by drawing closer to their comrades at the 
expense of correspondence with family. An artilleryman explained why he chose silence:  
I thought that, when I was fighting, it was completely inappropriate to write 
[home].  Imagine that you wrote a letter, sent it, and after a few days were killed 
or badly wounded.  They would receive the letter at home, think you were alive 
and healthy, fighting around such and such a city, but you were already dead.  I 
promised myself that I would write only when I was off the battle line… For my 
parents, obviously, this was difficult.
161
 
 
After liberation, the prospect of death seemed to worsen soldiers’ sense of distance from their 
loved ones, because their death was no longer essential to the defense or liberation of family 
members, but an isolated event. As a result, fighters forged closer bonds to those with whom 
they retained feelings of mutual dependence:  the members of their combat collective. 
 Red Army troops’ increasing affiliation with their front comrades at the expense of ties to 
their biological families appears vividly in their recollections of the final months of the war.  
Some men considered the two of equal value, in contrast to the impulse to abandon their post 
when family distress required them to return home. An infantryman discussed the relative 
significance of ties to home and front: “They were both important for a person, for a fighter, for a 
soldier: relatives and that small group, on which he depends in battle. However, there would be a 
time when [the latter] will pull him to safety.  [Therefore,] I would give the advantage to the one 
group.”162  He was not alone, as other soldiers emphasized the late war unity of their combat 
groups in the language of family: “My crew was a family unto itself. Of course, much depended 
on the commander and the character of the crew members, but in the majority of cases, and 
absolutely at the end, the crew shared a united goal, and was [like a] single person.  It never 
                                                 
160
 Mikhail B. Levin in Drakbin (2012), 173. 
161
 Recollections of Aleksandr V. Rogachev in Ia Dralsia S Pantservaffe [I fought against the German tank forces], 
ed. Artem Drabkin (Moscow: Iauza, 2007), 345-346. 
162
 Recollections of Vladimir T. Evdokimov in Drabkin (2012), 28-29. 
  
238 
 
 
happened, that one or two did something, and the others sat and watched while smoking 
cigarettes. Everyone worked together.”163  Not all made such direct comparisons, but other 
soldiers described their comrades in ways that elevated them to the level of family: “The most 
frightening thing at the front was to lose your unit. Then you had to start a new life!”164  For 
many soldiers, the likening of small unit cohesion to a familial relationship, no longer simply a 
coexistent brotherhood, expressed a final shift in reaction to conditions of service and sustaining 
motivation.
165
  
 The intensification of soldierly bonds amidst a new battlefield context led rank-and-file 
soldiers to alter their behavior and norms regarding sexual conduct.   Part of the shift stemmed 
from soldiers’ resentment of ongoing hardships after years of observing how “the leadership 
always lived better [than us]. Almost every single one had a field wife.”166  By late-1944, foreign 
women provided the troops with their own sexual opportunities, and many Red Army men, like 
artillerist Petr Mikhin in Hungary, saw romantic liaisons as a well-deserved relief from hardship:  
“I was accustomed to seeing only the filthy padded pants of combat soldiers, and now the sight 
of bare female calves seemed like a dream.”167  Such opportunities arose for soldiers in Eastern 
Europe thanks to the very issue that had limited their options earlier: their combatant status, as 
evidenced by local women’s comments in Poland: “No,’ replied the woman, ‘there are many 
women here from the neighboring farms; they came to have a look at your soldiers.’ We did not 
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stay and spoil their party; in such circumstances a soldier can find things to talk about without a 
general to help him.”168  Beyond women’s interest and officers’ acquiescence, reduced frontline 
duty obligations between offensives provided the rank-and-file with more time to pursue 
relationships, as an episode in the Czech lands suggests:  “Vasia and I met two girlfriends who 
lived almost on the outskirts of Horive, which was located 3-4 kilometers from our camp. Very 
often we went to visit with them in the evenings.”169  A new set of norms around sexual conduct 
thus emerged at the front in late 1944, so that Red Army fighters no longer condemned sexual 
relationships with women as disruptive to the fighting collective.  Instead, the liberation of 
settlements depopulated of adult men allowed Soviet troops to pursue women alongside their 
comrades.  
 Amidst these developments in frontline culture, Red Army troops’ motives to continue 
fighting reflected the isolation from home that many felt after advancing into foreign territory.  
Greater tolerance for self-interest affected motivation, just as it had with sexual values, leading to 
petty looting by the Red Army rank-and-file on a massive scale, most notably of watches.  A 
Georgian rifleman questioned his comrades’ actions, while noting the anxiety about death that 
accompanied late-war opportunity:  “Don’t you know, that you might be killed in half an hour, 
and then what will those watches be good for?”170  The fear of death as an unnecessary sacrifice 
existed not only in the abstract, but also in the continued loss of comrades, which meant that 
revenge continued to drive soldiers.  A heightened sense of loyalty to comrades and the combat 
collective sustained troops such as scout Volodia Kornilov: “We are already in the “lair” and 
with greater strength make the Germans pay for our fallen comrades.  We, scouts, were five men, 
now three, but our [kill] count to avenge Venia’s death has reached 16 German soldiers, and I 
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don’t think we will stop there. [When] we are killed, so will other comrades take revenge for us, 
and for Venia.”171  Revenge remained a powerful motive after remuneration emerged among 
prominent sources of combat motivation, and both reflected soldiers’ renewed focus on their 
frontline circumstances.
172
  Soldiers’ interest in remuneration also reflected the growth in self-
interested and individualistic attitudes otherwise manifest in the evolution of sexual norms 
among the rank-and-file.  
 Red Army soldiers’ perpetration of rape in enemy territory emerged as an escalation and 
convergence of these post-liberation trends: frontline troops’ feelings of isolation and anxiety, an 
evolution in sexual norms, and combat motivation centered on revenge and remuneration.
173
  For 
some, the only benefit of fighting beyond Soviet frontiers was the possibility of a more 
comprehensive revenge, as a cavalryman recalled euphemistically: “I think we can send our 
NKVD officer on holiday now. There is an unspoken order that every soldier should follow his 
heart on enemy territory. If someone would like to take revenge, you should shut your eyes to 
it.”174  Just as such an “unspoken order” could refer to non-sexual violence, possible motives for 
the rape of enemy women extended beyond revenge.  Some Red Army men directly asserted 
women’s motivational value as sexual spoils of war.175  A scout recalled how a commander 
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informally encouraged his riflemen before battle in Hungary: “Men! Ahead of you is a city, and 
there is as much wine and women there as you desire”176 The two motives could also coincide, 
which was something an infantryman discovered during an encounter near Danzig: “‘What sort 
of indecisive twits are you? Her husband is fighting against you, but you’re leaving her alone? 
Look: she’s blood with milk!’  The scouts briefly conferred, then raped the first German officer’s 
wife, then the other young woman.”177  These discussions or suggestions of rape illustrate the 
dual role official sanction and comradely norms played in the permissive atmosphere that 
prevailed in the Red Army regarding sexual violence against German women.  
 The open way soldiers discussed rape in small groups speaks to the front’s figurative 
distance from the prewar taboo status of sex and the extent frontline norms had changed after 
condemning such behavior among officers only a year earlier.  Talk about sexual exploits served 
as a new marker of status among comrades, which campfire discussions considered in detail: 
Chuckling, they were sharing their opinions about German women. Each man told 
the others, as if giving a report, about the victories he had scored on the sexual 
front.  Kondrat had experienced six women. Pas’ko had taken advantage of four. 
“An old buzzard” had fallen to Pavel’s lot, but another had been “quite painfully 
young.” Ivan complained about bad luck: “one stinking old lady.” Nil, as he put it, 
had “made fully a dozen women happy.” “You’re lucky,” Ivan sighed heavily. “I 
tramped across all of Poland and still remained a virgin.” Everybody burst out 
laughing. …Comparing German women to Polish women, everyone came to a 
general conclusion: the Polish women were more sexually dexterous, lively, and 
passionate. “The German women are so painfully cold and dry. They lie there 
beneath you totally without moving, only “Oh!” and gasps – they’re so quiet, it’s 
as if God himself has taken their speech away.
178
 
 
While typical in its focus on sex, these soldiers’ campfire discussion of rape reveals that the 
number of a fighter’s sex partners affected his status, although success on the ‘sexual front’ did 
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not override military contributions.  The extreme ages of Soviet men’s victims reflects the 
sexualization of women in frontline culture that began in 1942, so that sex became the default 
relationship some members of the rank and file had, or at least expected, from all women they 
encountered abroad.  Neither revenge nor rape received direct mention in the conversation, and 
yet the discussion strongly implies that these were integral to the soldiers’ sexual encounters.  
Veteran soldiers such as these were inevitably exposed to the ideas and practices of Soviet 
women’s coerced consent in sexual relationships with Soviet officers earlier in the war.  In those 
scenarios, a level of coercion consistently prefigured such liaisons, and prompted virtually no 
reaction in the unit or by superiors, unless they had a competing relationship with the woman.  It 
is quite probable then, that the combination of sexual abstinence and officers’ coercion of 
women at the pre-liberation front, the moral isolation from home post-liberation, and revenge 
helped diminish or eliminate consent as a concern for Red Army men on foreign soil.   
 Troops’ reactions to comrades’ acts of rape reveal the extent of change in frontline norms 
and the role of sex with enemy women in strengthening masculine affiliation among the Red 
Army rank-and-file.  Red Army fighters primarily evaluated the impact of rape on their fellow 
soldiers, not their female victims.  A popular anecdote approvingly explained that after thirty-
three Soviet soldiers raped a German woman, “General Kotikov, the chief of the Political 
Department… shook his head especially wondering about those who were at the tail end of the 
line of rapists. Nevertheless, the criminal case had been dropped.”179  Among immediate 
comrades, venereal disease provided a means to invert victimization without criticizing the 
masculine impulses of men who pursued sex recklessly, as a tanker recalled:  
Everyone was warned that it was risky to ‘have relations’ with these women 
because of the danger of getting a venereal disease. Nevertheless, our [fuel] truck 
drivers were special brothers – you had to hold on to them with both hands. 
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…Once in our camp I walked by the medical detachment and saw our driver 
Borodin sitting outside on the stairs. He greeted me and complained “Oh, I didn’t 
obey your warning and now I’m climbing up the wall.180  
  
Sympathetic reactions to rapists in the ranks reflected soldiers’ existing affiliation with the 
combat collective and the masculine values it espoused even as some behavioral norms evolved.   
 The long-established frontline culture of apathy surrounding coerced sex and rape across 
the fighting ranks helps explain the widespread dehumanization of women as sex objects as well 
as Red Army commanders’ difficulty in enforcing anti-rape regulations.  Another tanker recalled 
the playful way in which soldiers discussed such matters, as he described a comrades’ public 
pursuit of sex in a town in East Prussia: “some sergeant major was escorting about 300 German 
females down the street. Zhora was ogling the women. The sergeant major called out to him, ‘Go 
ahead and take the cutest one!’” Taking the advice at face value, Zhora raped the woman and 
acquired chlamydia in the process, but his comrades covered up the crime and the illness, since it 
took place after a decree that sent any man seeking treatment to a penalty battalion.  With official 
sanctions circumvented, Zhora faced consequences in the social realm, carried out by the combat 
collective, and reflecting its values:  “He was teased over this for quite some time later: ‘You’re 
a fool! You should have chosen the ugliest one – you would have gotten away with it!’”181  Quite 
possibly around a campfire of their own, his comrades reacted not to the rape itself, or even its 
potential impact of his illness on combat readiness, but his inexperience in targeting a victim.  
The Red Army rank-and-file’s norms for sexual behavior and rape at war’s end constituted a 
culmination of masculine trends in frontline culture and individual soldiers’ subjectivities.  
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Whether approvingly observed or directly perpetrated, actions that not only excluded women, but 
were directed against them, served as motivation and reinforced group bonds for many Soviet 
fighting men. 
 While the personal motives and reasoning of an individual rapist are difficult to assess 
with any certainty, in part due to the unwillingness of perpetrators to admit their actions, a clear 
pattern emerges from comrades’ reactions and observations.  Throughout the three year 
evolution of Red Army troops’ views about sex, women consistently appeared as sex objects and 
that sexualized image trivialized their contributions at the front.  Frontline fighters mocked 
women in the ranks as sex workers seeking special treatment and criticized officers who pursued 
women more than victory, which bonded the rank-and-file against womanizing officers and Red 
Army servicewomen alike.
182
  The continuation of the war after liberation, which diminished 
reasons for self-sacrifice and increased opportunities for sex, contributed to soldiers’ adaptation 
of officers’ values, including low standards for women’s consent.  Just as soldiers learned to 
tolerate comrades’ pursuit of consensual sexual relationships, their tolerance of rape marked a 
change that preserved the masculine hierarchy of roles in the war effort, thus operating according 
to the adaptive nature of a masculine bloc.
183
  This process saw disgust for officers’ antics 
disappear into celebration of comrades’ sexual prowess as a masculine virtue, which bore little 
resemblance to the prudish sexuality of the New Soviet Man in the 1930s or even the less sex-
averse Red Army soldier of the Civil War era.
184
   While ideas of honor mattered to Soviet 
troops, there is too little evidence to suggest a centuries-old Russian way of war motivated men 
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from seventeen to twenty two years of age to rape German women as a form of medieval 
insult.
185
 Alongside a general disregard for foreign women’s rights, the top-down transmission of 
sexual norms helps explain why efforts to combat rape had limited effect:  officers tasked with 
enforcement saw rape as non-issue as long as it did not disrupt operations, and fighting men 
protected each other out of a sense of combatant solidarity even when it did. 
Conclusion 
 
 The final year of the war served as the culmination of many trends in frontline culture, as 
well as the military campaign against Germany.  Examining post-liberation frontline culture 
through the lens of masculine subjectivities and ideals reveals the persistence of personal 
relationships and local collectivities in shaping many soldiers’ responses to the role of conqueror. 
Liberation altered what was at stake for the Red Army, and the false dawn it brought soldiers 
intensified the importance of their comrades and primary group values in the masculine 
subjectivities they expressed.  In official rhetoric, liberation removed the final barrier to focusing 
primarily on Stalin’s paternal leadership and the pursuit of postwar objectives. Responses from 
above and below set off on what were in most respects divergent trajectories for the final time in 
mid-1944.  However, they shared a common set of masculine values, fitting the model of the 
masculine bloc, which shaped how each engaged women and expressed power.
186
 
 Frontline culture in the final year of conflict reacted strongly against women’s growing 
presence in the Red Army, which soldiers and official rhetoric expressed through both prewar 
revivals and wartime innovations to sustain and legitimate their power.
187
  Troops’ reaction to 
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the success of liberation reveals gendered subjectivities that accepted the official rhetoric of 
feminine dependency while ignoring the goals of the national war effort in favor of family 
loyalty.  Although I acknowledge the relevance of ideological inspiration and state control over 
the language of social identification, I argue these soldiers’ petitions for leave demonstrate 
creativity and individuality without resisting or opposing Stalinism. This argument broadens 
Anna Krylova’s assertion about Soviet women’s agency in self-construction to include male 
soldiers as active agents, even though they faced much less ambiguity in official expectations or 
masculine ideals in wartime.
188
   
 Stalin’s return to preeminence in mid-1944 hearkened back to the propaganda of the 
1930s, in which he served as father-mentor to individual heroes as well as paternal leader to the 
country.
189
  However, I argue that the return or revival remained incomplete not only in terms of 
soldiers’ views of the war effort, which remained independent, but also frontline propaganda 
itself.
190
  The latter remained unstable, particularly after the level of Red Army marauding and 
looting on enemy territory reached a point that it warranted a front page editorial.  Stalin’s 
authority or example received no mention amidst the call for restraint and discipline in the ranks, 
which is significant because it shows the enduring power of war to disrupt official narratives, 
even on the eve of victory.   
 The official gender ideals of the late war resonated much more strongly with the Red 
Army rank-and-file. While the war enabled Soviet women to gain what might be described as 
“emancipation on loan” in the words of a historian of women’s wartime gains elsewhere,  the 
final months of the war revealed the reversible nature of women’s possibilities and Soviet 
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military-heroic gender scripts, which downplayed women’s contributions to not only the war 
effort but also to victory.
191
   Soviet official rhetoric and male combatants asserted their status in 
the war effort as power over women.  Official rhetoric validated Soviet policies in gendered 
terms, whereby the paternal care of the Stalinist state not only provided for women and children 
at home, but facilitated the metahuman fertility of “Mother Heroines.”  This depiction of Soviet 
women erased their wartime contributions and made them dependent while simultaneously 
validating the continued demands on Red Army soldiers and their role in the national family.  
For their part, soldiers asserted superior male capacity to sacrifice, act in solidarity, and endure 
hardship, as well as women’s use of disruptive sexuality to undermine those traits, as the basis 
for excluding women from combat collectives. Officers and then soldiers preferred to consider 
frontline women as sexual partners, or at best non-combat helpers, rather than equals.
192
  This 
backlash ended the debate between Soviet traditionalist and egalitarian views about female 
military service that began in 1917 in favor of the traditionalists, thus laying the foundation for 
postwar recruitment policies and popular memory of the war until after Stalin’s death.193  
 The Red Army’s perpetration of rape during this period marks a culmination of several of 
these wartime trends, as does the limited reaction of military officials.  Rapists among Red Army 
soldiers acted on the worst possible combination of elements of frontline culture: officers’ non-
consensual approach sex partners, soldiers’ view that sex was legitimate as long as it did not 
harm comrades, remuneration as a legitimate motive after liberation, feelings of isolation and 
fear about returning home, and a combatant solidarity to small units and primary groups that 
insulated them from external discipline or morals.  Other soldiers raped without this combination 
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of views and values, but Red Army fighters’ immersion in such a frontline culture affected their 
willingness to rape more than prewar views and taboos about sex in Soviet civilian culture.
194
 
 In the larger context of allied forces’ rape of civilian women during the Second World 
War, to say nothing of Axis forces’ atrocities, the Red Army appears as the worst, rather than 
only perpetrator.  Military officials documented multiple cases of units of the British military 
that raped women in Germany and the Pacific theatre, while French forces raped and looted in 
Italy and Germany to the great alarm of their Anglo-American counterparts.
195
  US servicemen 
raped civilian women beginning with their pre-combat deployment to England, and continued to 
rape French and German civilians once engaged in fighting.
196
  Of course, the number of victims 
totaling only several thousand scarcely compares to estimates of Red Army sexual atrocities.   
Both US and Soviet soldiers’ conditions of service impacted their attitudes toward women and 
sexual violence, but serious US military concern for, and investigation of those crimes, however 
flawed, seems to have had a limiting effect absent on the Eastern Front.
197
  Ultimately, the 
implications of rape in the Red Army still retained relevance closer to home, since both state and 
soldier had a stake in forgetting their involvement with women during the war.  
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CONCLUSION: DEFENDING MASCULINE DUTY 
 
 War reveals the complexity and adaptability of official rhetoric and troops’ persistent 
reshaping of it.  While soldier-specific propaganda always emphasized strategic aims and 
mobilization priorities, it provided fighting men with means to claim personal benefits from the 
state or express their superiority over combat-shy military superiors.  The masculine values and 
language of heroism, skill, revenge, and fighting brotherhood enabled the Red Army rank-and-
file to express individual priorities and personal loyalties within the wartime lexicon of patriotic 
motives and foreign policy goals.  Military propagandists and political workers presented heroes 
as models of soldierly subjectivity and combat behavior, but could not control how military 
readers interpreted them through the lens of their own frontline experiences.  The frontline 
context changed both the ideals of collective duty and the masculine subjectivity of citizens-
turned-combatants. 
 The relationship between soldiers’ masculine subjectivities and the scripts and models of 
selfhood available in official rhetoric examined in this study reveals a creative and fluid process.  
This relationship confirms Anna Krylova’s findings that the ambiguous cultural and institutional 
realms of Stalinism did not provide individuals with ready-made identities to strive to become.
1
  
While male soldiers’ participation in military service was largely obligatory, their response to 
mobilization, training, and combat reveals a gradual and non-linear process of reorienting 
themselves away from home and toward the front.  The latter destination only emerged as a 
possibility after a period of exposure to front life, soldier-specific propaganda, and the social 
context of a combat unit.  Soldiers’ ambivalent response to heroic figures in front propaganda 
and community-building among fellow fighters suggests serious limits to Soviet citizens’ 
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determination to personify a collectively affiliated ideal Soviet person as Jochen Hellbeck has 
identified among Soviet citizens in the 1930s.
2
  Red Army fighters’ masculine subjectivities 
developed around personal experiences at the front and the values of small combat groups, but 
were influenced by official ideas, especially the masculine ethic of national defense and a diluted 
valorization of sacrifice and hardship.  Violence loomed large in several stages of soldiers’ 
experience of the war, including the initiation of combat, the vengeance that emerged from 
comradeship and loss, and the perpetration of rape in the war’s final months.3  Situating these 
violent tendencies reveals them to be a product of the wartime context and the frontline culture 
that developed through combat collectives.  Overall, troops’ values, motives, and norms rarely 
shared many common features with heroes celebrated in Krasnaia Zvezda, but their belief in the 
overall cause and commitment to their comrades kept them fighting.  Future research may build 
on these findings by considering how differences between official scripts and gendered 
subjectivities indicate responses to Soviet policies, ideals, or the system itself.   
 In his recent study of Soviet wartime newspaper propaganda, Karel Berkhoff has 
suggested that Soviet wartime propaganda succeeded in controlling the image of military events 
and created a single winning narrative of the war’s purpose.4  Catherine Merridale has likewise 
suggested that propaganda successfully persuaded and inspired soldiers to fight after coercion 
failed to rally them.
5
  A two-phase characterization of Soviet propaganda underlies these and 
most studies of the subject, dividing the war between a relaxed and popularly-infused first half, 
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and a triumphal and Stalin-centered second half.
6
   The responsiveness and specificity of 
propaganda published in Krasnaia Zvezda during the war demonstrates that official rhetoric 
could target different messages to different audiences and address a vast array of issues, as 
depictions of soldier heroes did at the front.  Moreover, soldier-specific propaganda modulated 
Stalin’s role and adapted elements of 1930s culture throughout the war, revealing a propaganda 
system much less reliant on a sentimental style in the years of defeat, and a much more cautious 
one in the years of victory.  Total control of the war narrative certainly eluded Soviet 
propagandists, who never managed to anticipate soldiers’ responses to wartime change, or 
prevent a large-scale loss of combat effectiveness from taking place in three of the war’s four 
years.  This study of the interaction between propaganda and its audience reveals that Red Army 
troops consistently expressed motives and ideas of duty before they became official, and likewise 
appropriated terms such as brotherhood without retaining their connotations of collectivist duty. 
That said, their shared masculine perspective blurred the distinctions between official and 
soldierly versions of the masculine ethic of defense, the need for personal sacrifice, and the 
necessity of conquest, even if not one precisely shared.  Future research may well test the extent 
of popular influence on official rhetoric or examine whether other forms of propaganda 
compartmentalization took place, and how they change scholars’ understanding of the 
relationship between official rhetoric and individual subjectivities.  
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 The title of Catherine Merridale’s article posed the question “Masculinity at war: Did 
gender matter in the Soviet Army?”7  She replies in the negative, with some qualification, 
explaining that other factors, such as age, nationality, and especially rank, mattered more. The 
character of relations among men and between men and women at the front, the portrayal of men 
and women in soldier specific propaganda, and the ways in which soldiers’ views and official 
rhetoric interacted all demonstrate the significance of gender in shaping soldierly subjectivities 
and describing and justifying hierarchies of power.  This study diverges with Anna Krylova’s 
otherwise persuasive examination of the centrality of Soviet women soldiers’ gendered 
subjectivities in their war experience over three issues.  The first is how men received women 
into their ranks, second is why mobilization policy changed to allow women to enter military 
training and frontline combat, and the third is how prewar culture contributed to these two 
wartime developments.  After 22 June 1941, the Red Army remained a site of the masculine 
values of national defense and exclusive male comradeship continuing from the Russian Civil 
War experience that Joshua Sanborn and Eliot Borenstein have examined.
8
  Fighting men’s 
responses reveal the incongruity between women’s new military status and the persistence of old 
gender ideas surrounding military service, which had not changed as quickly as policy, even 
among the younger generation of servicemen. The soldier figure, rather than a specific composite 
of exploits and motives, seemed to operate as a hegemonic masculine ideal, and maintained that 
status across soldiers’ and propagandists’ divergent iterations through the masculine bloc 
dynamic.
9
  The masculine soldier operated in counter-distinction to women and other men, 
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which soldier-specific propaganda preserved by omitting coverage of fighting age men outside 
the military, along with that of capable and integrated enemy-killing women combatants. Future 
research may seek out new contexts in Soviet history in which a masculine bloc dynamic 
mediated differences among official rhetoric, masculine subjectivities, and women’s status or 
roles in Soviet society. 
 Most aspects of Red Army frontline culture reflected the autonomous norms, loyalties, 
and practices of soldiers’ combat collectives.  Troops’ actions in combat and interpretations of 
those events diverged from the narratives of frontline propaganda, and often from their own 
commanders’ expectations.  Soldiers’ subjectivities developed from their experiences and 
observations of each other and the enemy, which provided them a perspective few political 
workers, let alone those in the rear, could appreciate.  These citizen-soldiers’ subjectivity also 
carried strong elitist undercurrents which involved the exclusion of many would-be comrades 
from their groups.  Such elite troops were aware of their distinct role in the war effort and Soviet 
society, so that even non-combatants emphasized their soldierly character and sought medals and 
other markers of front status, even as they systematically avoided its dangerous drawbacks.  For 
both sets of Red Army servicemen, the front was a special place that raised their status in the 
hierarchy of Soviet society.  Despite the internal division between combatant and non-combatant 
servicemen, most seemed to experience life and death at the front as a unique aspect of the 
Soviet war effort.   
 Soviet women’s presence at the front also reveals the exclusive and hierarchical character 
of men’s combat collectives.  While men and women both combined and reconfigured official 
scripts and models of Soviet citizenship regarding war, they did so in dramatically different 
ways.  Building on their early experiences of leaving home and writing female relatives from the 
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front, fighting men’s views of themselves and their primary groups developed in opposition to 
women.  Whether providing medical care, support services, or another gun in the trench, women 
all too often suffered denigration and sexual harassment from the men in their units. While 
women’s experiences varied dramatically, total acceptance was rare, and few men did not think 
of women in the ranks differently, even if they behaved respectfully.  Some of this hostility 
stemmed from prewar Stalinist values, but much of it came from soldiers’ belief in a masculine 
ethic of military service to defend women, which prejudiced many men against the logic or 
effectiveness of women soldiers joining their ranks.   
 The development and responsiveness of official rhetoric to wartime events reveal the 
challenges that total war posed to the Soviet propaganda system.  Foremost among these 
challenges was the uncontrollable variable of enemy action, which could not be managed as 
easily as the coverage of civilian economic efforts or struggles against internal enemies.  More 
significant still was the firsthand knowledge and sobering reality of frontline conditions that 
soldiers regularly encountered as an alternative to official reports and assessments.  The result 
was an immediate split between soldier-specific and civilian propaganda, which included the 
creation of a network of division- and army-level newspapers to provide material all along the 
front.  Soldier-specific propaganda consistently provided soldiers and political workers with a 
narrative of correct motives, correct tactics, and correct expectations for the war.  Heroes 
provided the primary vessel through which propaganda conveyed these messages.  The fluid and 
unpredictable nature of the war’s strategic balance meant changing these heroes as models of 
masculinity, which soldier-specific propaganda usually did at roughly six-month intervals.  
There were two other distinguishing features of soldier-specific propaganda.  The first was 
Stalin’s consistent presence and connection to the Red Army, including roles such as provider of 
  
255 
 
 
strategy, friend to individual soldiers, and model for commanders’ relationships to subordinates, 
among others.  The second was the total absence of civilian men from coverage, except veterans 
beyond fighting age and political elites, in order to emphasize the definitive nature of soldiering 
as a masculine duty.  Coverage of women functioned in an equally instrumental way, to 
emphasize their dependence and support, as well as occasional cases of ill-suited combat roles or 
tragic encounters with the enemy. 
 The changes to heroic ideals in soldier-specific propaganda suggest, but do not definitely 
prove, that soldiers influenced official rhetoric as well as being influenced by it.  The vast 
numbers of classified documents on unit-level political work and moral may one day shed light 
on the exact uses of reports on soldiers’ moods.  They may also reveal any connection between 
such information and how and when the editorial board made changes to major themes in 
Krasnaia Zvezda.  At present, declassified archival materials show three major episodes in which 
soldiers’ mass indiscipline or insubordination prompted substantial changes in propaganda: The 
spring and early summer 1942 rout of Red Army forces that  provoked Stalin to issue Order 227, 
the mid-1943 disorder among non-Slavic troops that led to large-scale translation and national 
hero promotion efforts, and the spring 1944 disorder and marauding that broke out among the 
first Soviet troops to wage war on enemy territory that prompted new disciplinary measures and 
regulations for combat troops operating in foreign lands.  Separate from these instances, the 
soldiers’ focus on combined family and national defense goals, commitment to comradeship, 
desire for revenge, and disillusionment with liberating foreign peoples all preceded changes over 
the same issues in official rhetoric.  Without direct evidence, the reasons behind this relationship 
remain uncertain. The greatest point of convergence between official and personal narratives 
appeared in the shared and sustained framing of national defense and combat as male citizens’ 
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exclusive duty.  Despite other differences, sacrifice, revenge, comradeship, skilled shooting 
competitions, liberation, survival, and conquest all appeared as masculine undertakings.  Both 
perspectives held that women almost never possessed the skills, toughness, or motives to carry 
out these tasks.  Official rhetoric hierarchically linked the active, masculine role of fighting with 
Stalin’s leadership and state power, while women represented the passive, feminine beneficiaries 
of Soviet power who contributed to the war effort by helping the men that fought to protect them.  
This common, overarching vision persisted in spite of women’s mass entry into ranks in 1942.   
   Four years of total war changed the Red Army and the men who fought in it.  The 
dynamics of change in frontline culture, both official and soldierly, especially in the final year of 
the conflict, foreshadowed how limited servicewomen’s impact would be.  Men’s reaction to 
women’s military service, and the comparable line in soldier specific propaganda, helps explain 
why women’s impact on military structures would be no greater after the Second World War 
than it had been after the First World War. Laurie Stoff’s assessment of 1918 describes 1945 
equally well with only a few changed words: 
The successful participation of women in combat roles did not, however, lead to 
general sexual integration of the Soviet armed forces.  Rather, the precedent of 
general sexual integration that was established is one based on exceptionalism.  
The exigencies of war, the type of women who became soldiers, the political 
circumstances of revolution – all were considered to be extraordinary.  Only these 
factors, or particular combinations of factors, made it temporarily acceptable for 
women to fight in Russia and the Soviet Union.  In times of peace and social 
stability, their involvement in military endeavors became undesirable. Nor did 
women’s military participation during World War I provide significant changes to 
conventional gender roles.  … Even the extreme example of women carrying out 
what was considered an exclusively masculine role was insufficient to overturn 
deeply entrenched conceptions of separate sexual spheres.
10
   
 
Combat collectives’ exclusionary masculine solidarity provided no alternative to the narrative of 
women’s combat roles as exceptional in frontline propaganda.  Established primary groups of 
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male soldiers included female members only in the rarest of circumstances.  Despite women’s 
greater numbers, more varied roles, and greater opportunities to showcase their skills, the end of 
the four year national crisis marked the end of the Red Army’s temporary demonstration of 
women’s martial capabilities.  The combination of nearly silent frontline propaganda and hostile 
male comrades-in-arms not only undermined any possibility of permanent integration, but also 
helped shape a misogynistic popular memory of the war that nearly erased Soviet women’s hard-
won victories. 
 Despite the immediate postwar return of a male-only military, Red Army servicemen’s 
wartime gains were in some respects no more long lasting than women’s.  At the front, fighting 
men could not only reinterpret or synthesize official scripts, but draw from new sources of 
information to affect the process of understanding the war and themselves as citizen-soldiers. 
However, their combat collectives and alternative perspectives relied on direct access to 
observations and experiences separate from the narratives of official rhetoric, which disappeared 
at war’s end.  While their experiences and achievements left an enduring impression on their 
sense of self, the circumstances that had made it possible could not return with them to civilian 
life.  The distinctive possibilities of front life both challenged and enhanced the Soviet war 
effort, just as fighting men could express patriotic subjectivities that were dissonant with official 
rhetoric.  The fact that masculine dominance remained a common bond speaks to its enduring 
significance in both the Red Army tradition and the larger foundations of Stalinist culture.   
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